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Preface
This thesis has been submitted to the Department of Management Engineering at the
Technical University of Denmark [DTU], in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a
PhD degree. The work has been supervised by Professor Poul Erik Morthorst (DTU)
and Chief Economist Stine Grenaa Jensen (Energinet.dk). Funding was provided by the
Danish Council for Strategic Research as part of the research project INCAP (Inducing
Consumer Adoption of Automated Reaction Technology for Dynamic Power Pricing Tariffs).
The thesis consists of two major parts. The first part introduces the background
and defines the scope of the study. It gives a brief overview of the methods applied
and a summary and discussion of the results achieved. The second part consists of five
scientific articles that form the major contribution of the study. Two of the articles have
been published in peer-reviewed journals and another two have been submitted for
review. One paper has been presented at an international conference and is published
in the conference proceedings.
Kgs. Lyngby, November 2016
Jonas Katz
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Summary
The large-scale development of variable renewable energy sources, like wind and
solar power, increases the demand for flexibility in power systems. At the same time,
their electricity production replaces that of conventional power plants – the traditional
suppliers of flexibility, and consequently, a new flexible infrastructure needs to be
established. This thesis addresses the policy dimension of the flexibility challenge
with a focus on Denmark, a country committed politically in two ways that make
it particularly interesting: first, a commitment to renewable energy formulated as a
long-term vision of becoming independent of fossil fuels; and second, a commitment
to liberalised energy sectors with a notably progressive approach to market-based
operations.
The crucial question of how it will be possible to balance the Danish electricity
system with large amounts of variable renewable production, primarily wind power, is
still under debate. To maintain reliability in the most cost-efficient way, a policy strategy
aiming at flexibility needs to be developed. Technologically, several different options
are available to fulfil the requirement. A part of the solution may be to make use of idle
flexibility on the demand side. Its potential could be substantial and technical solutions
are available. Still, demand flexibility is largely unutilised and establishing an enabling
policy and regulatory framework has been identified as one of the major challenges.
While the latest Danish energy policies include a clear commitment to develop an
"intelligent" energy system that utilises the flexibility potential of the demand side, a
coherent policy strategy covering all aspects of the flexibility challenge has not yet been
defined.
By use of economic models and concepts of policy analysis, this thesis considers
several policy options aiming at demand flexibility in terms of their effectiveness to
induce adoption and their efficiency in creating system value while accounting for the
specific characteristics of the demand side. The thesis suggests barriers relevant to
be addressed due to either market failures in the classic economic sense or systemic
failures founded in market design, rules and regulations. The analysis covers impacts of
failures stemming from incomplete markets for flexibility and inappropriate regulation
that distort the observed value or risks of demand flexibility. Furthermore, it considers
various types of transaction costs related to adopting a demand response contract
(switching costs) and to activation (monitoring and decision costs). The thesis develops
methods to quantify the impacts of these failures and applies them in relation to the
Danish case.
Switching costs are estimated and found to be a major barrier to the adoption of
dynamic pricing schemes in spite of the benefits that could be achieved. As the cost of
adoption may be difficult to influence directly, policies may aim at increasing the benefits
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of flexible demand. One suggested option is to address the issue of incomplete markets
and expand market access of flexible demand in the spatial and time dimensions. The
value of improving the access of the demand side to intra-hourly reserve markets is
found to be substantial. Quantitative findings of the thesis suggest that the reserve value
of flexible demand may be significantly higher than the value in hourly spot markets.
Another improvement might be achieved by adjusting distortional electricity price
elements. It can be shown that value-based taxation, even if applied to smaller portions
of the electricity taxes and levies, generates benefits sufficient to exceed switching cost
estimates.
Monitoring and decision costs can be caused by the complexity of pricing schemes
and hamper efficient response. Even though real-time pricing generates the highest
benefits in theory, results of the thesis suggest that simplified schemes with minimal
monitoring and decision costs would generate around half of the ideal gains and could
be deemed sufficiently beneficial during an initial phase. After consumers gained
experience with dynamic pricing, they should be transferred to the more complex and
efficient schemes, though. Focussing on the installation of automation equipment could
be another way to improve the efficiency of response. As this would require investments,
the question of risk involved in generating benefits from demand response becomes
more relevant. Using a stochastic price model the thesis shows that risk-averse investors
might require a significant cost reduction, resulting in lower levels of investment in
automation than what could be expected based on average prices. A policy intervention
could be considered to initialise adoption, depending on the further technology cost
development.
Overall, the thesis improves the understanding of the specific challenges that policy-
making faces when aiming at better utilisation of demand-side flexibility. It includes
aspects that often would remain unaddressed in the evaluation of policies. On that
basis, it provides support to the development of a coherent policy strategy for flexibility
that is required for the successful transition to a fossil-free energy system.
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Dansk sammenfatning
Udbygningen med fluktuerende elproduktion fra vedvarende energi, såsom vindmøller
og solceller, medfører et øget fleksibilitetsbehov. Samtidig fortrænges den termiske pro-
duktion, der traditionelt har leveret fleksibiliteten, hvilket nødvendiggør opbygningen
af nye former for fleksibilitet. I denne afhandling behandles den danske fleksibili-
tetsudfordring med henblik på de politiske konsekvenser. Danmark udgør en særlig
interessant case pga. to centrale energipolitiske valg: For det første, er der lagt en stra-
tegi om at udbygge vedvarende energi med baggrund i en langsigtet vision om at
blive uafhængig af fossile brændsler; for det andet, er der en stærk opbakning om-
kring liberaliseringen af energimarkederne og en positiv indstilling til markedsbaserede
løsninger.
Spørgsmålet om hvordan balanceringen af det danske elsystem fremover skal hånd-
teres, er endnu ikke afklaret. For at opretholde driftssikkerheden på den mest omkost-
ningseffektive måde, er det nødvendigt fra politisk side at definere en strategi med
fokus på fleksibilitetsudfordringen. Teknologisk set, står der en række forskellige tiltag
til rådighed for at opfylde behovet. En del af løsningen kunne være at gøre brug af
uudnyttet fleksibilitet på forbrugssiden, da der allerede eksisterer et betragteligt poten-
tiale, samtidig med at de nødvendige tekniske løsninger er til rådighed. Alligevel har
fleksibiliteten på forbrugssiden stort set ikke været anvendt, og i forhold hertil er de
politiske og regulatoriske rammer blevet udpeget som en væsentlig forhindring. Der er
endnu ikke lagt en strategi, der sammenholder alle forskellige aspekter i fleksibilitets-
udfordringen, selvom de seneste danske energipolitiske målsætninger indeholder en
klar beslutning om at udvikle et "intelligent"energisystem, der udnytter elforbrugernes
fleksibilitetspotentiale.
I denne afhandling analyseres forskellige tiltag, som sigter mod at øge forbrugsflek-
sibiliteten. Tiltagene vurderes med henblik på deres evne til at fremme udbredelsen af
fleksibelt forbrug og deres økonomiske effektivitet. Dette sker ved brug af økonomi-
ske modeller og politikanalyse under hensyntagen til de specifikke karakteristika på
forbrugssiden. I afhandlingen afdækkes relevante barrier med udgangspunkt i enten
markedssvigt i klassisk økonomisk forstand eller institutionel svigt grundet markedsde-
sign, regler eller regulering, da disse forhold kan medføre forvrængninger af værdi og
risici ved det fleksible forbrug. Herudover betragtes transaktionsomkostninger relateret
til indgåelsen af fleksibilitetsaftaler (switching costs) samt omkostninger ved løbende
aktivering af fleksibilitet (monitorerings- og beslutningsomkostninger). Der udvikles
metoder for at kvantificere forvrængningseffekterne i en dansk sammenhæng.
Transaktionsomkostninger ved kontraktindgåelse anses for at være en væsentlig
barriere for udbredelsen af dynamiske priser, også selvom forbrugerne kunne opnå en
økonomisk besparelse. I og med at omkostningerne vil være svære at reducere, kunne
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politiske tiltag sigte efter at øge den økonomiske besparelse ved fleksibelt forbrug. En
mulighed vil være at udvide markedsadgangen for fleksibelt forbrug geografisk og
tidsmæssigt. Værdien ved at forbedre forbrugssidens adgang til reservemarkeder inden
for driftstimen vil være betydelig. Resultaterne i denne afhandling tyder på, at værdien
af fleksibelt forbrug som reserve kunne være væsentlig højere end spotmarkedsværdien.
En yderligere forbedring kunne opnås ved at rette op på de forvrængende elementer
i elprisen. En værdibaseret afgift vil kunne generere besparelser hos forbrugerne, der
overstiger transaktionsomkostningerne ved at skifte, også selvom den kun anvendes på
en mindre del af elafgiftene.
Komplekse prismodeller kan være årsag til høje monitorerings- og beslutnings-
omkostninger og på den måde hæmme en effektiv respons. Selvom spotpriser giver
de højeste teoretiske gevinster, så tyder resultaterne i denne afhandling på, at simple
modeller med mindst mulige monitorerings- og beslutningsomkostninger vil kunne
give omtrent halvdelen af de optimale gevinster. I en introduktionsfase vil de simple
modeller derfor kunne betragtes som tilstrækkelige. På et tidspunkt, når forbruger-
ne har samlet erfaring med den dynamiske prissætning, bør man dog gå over til de
mere komplekse og effektive modeller. Et øget fokus på installering af automatik på
forbrugsstederne kunne være en anden tilgang til at opnå en mere effektiv respons.
Eftersom dette vil kræve investeringer, bliver det relevant at analysere, hvilke risici der
er forbundet med at agere fleksibelt. Ved brug af en stokastisk prismodel illustreres
det, at risikoaverse investorer ville kræve en betydelig omkostningsreduktion for at
installere automatik, hvilket vil medføre færre investeringer end der kunne forventes
på baggrund af gennemsnitlige priser. Dette kan modvirkes politisk, hvis den videre
udvikling af teknologi og omkostninger gør det nødvendig.
Alt i alt bidrager denne afhandling ved at fremme forståelsen for de specifikke
politiske udfordringer, der følger med en målsætning om at fremme udnyttelsen af
fleksibelt forbrug. Afhandlingen behandler forhold, der sjældent belyses i forbindelse
med de analyser, der ligger til grund for politiske beslutninger. Konklusionerne kan
bruges til at understøtte udviklingen af en politisk strategi for fleksibilitet, som er
nødvendig for en vellykket overgang til et fossilfrit energisystem.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Scope
An increasing number of countries have set national renewable energy targets, and
energy systems are undergoing a transition towards larger shares of renewable energies
(International Energy Agency [IEA], 2016). Environmental concerns and the mitigation
of climate change play an important role. In addition, for regions like Europe utilising
domestic renewable potentials shall help to reduce the import-dependency and ex-
posure to volatile prices of fossil fuels (European Commission, 2011a). Reductions in
technology costs, in particular for wind and solar power, make investments attractive in
economic terms as well, and, consequently, these technologies are installed at increasing
rates (REN21, 2016). One of the resulting challenges is handling variations in production
due to the intermittent nature of the renewable resources; this requires a flexible system.
Although renewable energies will have an important role to play in other sectors as well,
the focus of this thesis is on the electricity system that faces a very specific challenge in
that it lacks access to inexpensive sources of flexibility.
In power systems, flexibility is a fundamental and technical challenge to start with.
The most important, and traditionally largest source of flexibility, is dispatchable gener-
ation capacity (IEA, 2011). As larger shares of generation will be taken over by variable
renewable sources, dispatchable plants become less available. At the same time the
level of flexibility needed to operate a stable and reliable system is increasing. Tech-
nically, a wide range of options to provide flexibility exists, and it has been argued
that even fully supplying an electricity system by renewable energies is possible, when
employing the available technologies (Hohmeyer & Bohm, 2015). The portfolio of
options has been described in a number of comprehensive international studies (e.g.
Gül & Stenzel, 2005; Papaefthymiou et al., 2014). Besides the conventional power plants,
renewable energies themselves can be used as a flexibility option (P. E. Sørensen, 2009).
For instance, Danish wind turbines are already participating in the regulating power
market as of today (Sorknæs et al., 2013). Under certain conditions wind turbines could
also provide additional ancillary services, such as inertia (Muljadi et al., 2012),voltage
control or secondary reserves (Ela et al., 2014; Red Eléctrica de Espana et al., 2013).
Other categories of flexibility resources include storages and grid infrastructure.
A particular option that has attracted interest throughout several decades now is
the flexibility of the demand side. It seems attractive, because it constitutes a large
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technical potential that could be relatively inexpensive to utilise and, most importantly,
it is already present as part of the existing system. Thus, it may require only minor
technical changes (e.g. new metering equipment); at the same time though, utilising
the potential poses new challenges induced by the adoption and consumption beha-
viour of electricity consumers. From an economic point of view, one should expect
that demand is responsive to changes in price, and exposure to cost-reflective prices
would result in efficient behaviour. Due to fundamental flaws in the structure of the
electricity sector, however, proper interaction of demand and supply is prevented (Stoft,
2002). In particular, the lack of real-time metering and settlement on the basis of actual
consumption prevents demand from being responsive to price in practice. If this issue
was resolved, according to the theoretical argument, substantial welfare gains would be
achieved. Field research of the past more than 30 years has worked towards confirming
and quantifying the theory of price-responsive consumers. Although evidence has been
presented within different settings (see Conchado & Linares, 2012), many countries,
including Denmark, have continued to serve a passive demand side (Danish Energy
Agency, 2009), and practical implications of the theoretical economic argument have
been limited.
With recent developments in the electricity production from intermittent renewable
sources the demand side is once again regarded as a potential solution. The theoretical
argument that enabling demand response would result in welfare gains, will still be
valid. The motivation of addressing cost reductions of integrating renewable energies
in particular, could be even more important, though. Besides creating a need for
flexibility, renewable generation, as opposed to the traditional electricity production in
big centralised units, occurs to a larger extent in smaller decentralised units. Moreover,
electrification of heating and transport may lead to additional loads connected to
distribution grids, hence, resulting in additional challenges at these lower voltage levels.
In such a system a decentralised source of flexibility, like demand response, becomes
important.
The term flexibility is widely used and often applied very broadly to cover different
aspects. In the most general sense, flexibility denotes the "capacity to adapt" (Golden &
Powell, 2000). In an energy system context, most widely, flexibility can be defined as
the capacity to contribute to reliable energy supply. Reliability has different dimensions,
one of which is the time horizon. The capacity to adapt to long-term changes affecting
reliability considers, mostly, the primary energy supply of fuels. A flexible energy
system would, therefore, be able to change the use of fuel or technology in response to
changes in price or availability (Pérez-Arriaga, 2007). In Denmark this ability had high
priority in the aftermath of the 1970s energy crises (Danish Ministry of Energy, 1981;
Hvelplund et al., 1983), and therefore this period showed a prevalent use of the term
flexibility for the long-term horizon.
More recently, flexibility has primarily been used to denote the capacity to adapt to
changes in a shorter time frame. In this perspective flexibility relates to reliability as
defined by electricity system operators: a measure to determine how well customer
load is served (ENTSO-E, 2004). It covers two aspects. The first one is the adequacy of
the system, which is the ability of the system to cover the electrical demand at all times.
Adequacy is a measure reflecting the requirement for sufficient capacity to be installed.
The other aspect is system security, which is the ability to react to sudden disturbances.
At any point in time the system needs to maintain a certain reserve margin to handle
2
such conditions. Flexibility is the prerequisite to maintain a reliable system both in
terms of adequacy and security. In this sense, it may be defined as "the ability of a
power system to cope with variability and uncertainty in both generation and demand, while
maintaining a satisfactory level of reliability at a reasonable cost, over different time horizons"
(Danish Energy Agency et al., 2015).
In the following the term flexibility is used to describe the ability of the electricity
system to change the loading of its components in order to ensure reliable operation
covering both adequacy and security aspects. Consumers that hold a capacity to adapt
will be able to provide flexibility akin to flexible generators. Different terms are being
used to describe the flexible capabilities of demand. Besides demand flexibility, commonly
used terms are demand response and elasticity. The following definitions may be helpful
in distinguishing these concepts and will be used as such in this thesis:
Demand flexibility describes the ability of a demand-side unit to actively change its
level of consumption or production.
Demand response is the active change in reaction to any kind of control signal (usually
price or volume, but also environmental incentives etc.).
Demand elasticity is short for price elasticity of demand and describes the economic
concept of how consumers react to a change in price.
In summary, demand flexibility is used as a more technical term describing the
potential, while demand response denotes utilised potential (this definition is similar
to that of THEMA Consulting Group, 2014); as often potential will be utilised through
price signals on a market, such response is based on the elasticity of demand. In a
wider behavioural understanding of elasticity, the term could as well cover the response
to other kinds of incentive signals that include environmental or social benefits (as
proposed by, e.g. Stoll et al., 2014).
1.2 Research interest
The described conditions lead to an overall policy challenge that this thesis seeks to
address. The policy focus is on Denmark; the country is committed politically in two
ways that make it particularly interesting. First of all, a commitment to green energy
creates an unresolved long-term challenge for electricity system planning and operation
(Energinet.dk, 2015a). Danish Government (2011a) formulated a long-term vision of
becoming independent of fossil fuels by 2050. Regardless of whether this ambition
will be exactly fulfilled in the targeted year, a high share of renewable electricity, in
particular from wind power, will be part of Denmark’s energy supply in a foreseeable
future. Already today Denmark has a high share of wind power corresponding to
around 42% of electricity consumption (Energinet.dk, 2016d)
The second commitment is related to the liberalisation of the electricity sector.
Amongst the countries of the European Union aiming at a common electricity market,
Denmark and its electricity sector institutions have demonstrated a notably progressive
approach to market-based operations. Electricity sector liberalisation, although con-
troversial (see Meyer, 2004), was largely backed up politically. One reason might have
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been that in Denmark state-owned industries play a far less significant role than in
other European countries (Petersen, 2009). Market principles are also sought imple-
mented to support the integration of wind power by both industry stakeholders (e.g.
Energinet.dk, 2015b; Energinet.dk & Dansk Energi, 2012) as well as policy-makers (e.g.
Danish Ministry of Climate, Energy and Building, 2013).
The role of the demand side in the ongoing transition has been acknowledged by
policy-makers.1 Technical challenges remain, but become less of a barrier (Schleicher-
Tappeser, 2012b), in particular, as large-scale smart metering is being installed – Den-
mark opted for a full roll-out by the year 2020 (Danish Energy Agency, 2014b). In the
context of the future development of renewable energies and the focus on a liberalised
market model, an unresolved challenge in Denmark lies in defining a supportive regu-
latory framework. Consumers need to be integrated into the market mechanisms so as
to utilise their flexibility potential. The utilisation of demand flexibility to a large extent
depends on the willingness of electricity consumers to adopt enabling technologies and
pricing schemes. Policy-makers can significantly influence the conditions that enable
this to happen. Consequently, the overarching research question of this thesis is:
How can policies enable cost-efficient utilisation of demand-side flexibility to support
the integration of large shares of variable renewable energy sources in a liberalised
electricity market?
1.3 Contributions
The dissertation is based on a series of articles appended to the thesis. In the text the
articles will be referred to as Papers A–E. The papers provide contributions to the above
research question by addressing different aspects of the policy challenge.
Paper A performs a policy analysis to establish a framework that also serves to
organise the further research within this study. The framework is illustrated in Figure
1.1, and the basis for deriving it is described in more detail in Section 3.2. It aims at
answering the question:
Which are the major issues that policies aiming at demand flexibility should focus
on?
Figure 1.1 is constructed around the concept of system diagrams (van der Lei et al.,
2011), though in a simplified form, with the system to be influenced restricted to demand
flexibility, the theme of this thesis. The overall policy objective, shown on the right-hand
side, is defined as an efficient utilisation of demand flexibility. External factors are given
by the market structure that may be difficult to influence by policy. Policy influences
are summarised under the heading of market design & regulation. The upper part of
the diagram shows how the papers relate to different aspects of demand flexibility.
Their specific contributions are briefly described in the following and in more detail in
Section 4.
1As stated by the European Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy: "[...] we also need to
improve demand-response. We need to look at the barriers – both regulatory or in terms of market design – to
allow consumers to provide flexibility in the market. Changes to the overall market design are needed, both to allow
the market to respond but also to provide the right investment signals for flexible capacity and demand services."
(European Commission, 2015b)
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Figure 1.1: Contributions of papers in relation to addressed policy areas
An essential policy objective in support of demand flexibility is to align the observed
market value and the underlying system value of flexibility. This is dealt with in Paper
D; more specifically the following question is addressed:
What is the value of expanding the scope of demand-side market access?
Paper D considers valuation at an intra-hourly time frame to include the potential
contribution of demand-side flexibility to system reserves. It may be seen as an attempt
to establish a more complete market value of demand flexibility with the reserve element
as a potential addition to the value generated in the hourly market.
Papers B, C and E address different aspects of value. Their focus lies on the alignment
of flexibility policies with the specific capabilities of the demand side. Paper B focusses
on value in relation to risks and transaction costs of different retail product designs.
It acts on the assumption that complex products might not result in efficient demand
response or that they will not even be adopted by consumers. Simplifying products,
though, results in a lower value of the response from a system perspective. This poses
the question:
How valuable are simplified products for flexibility?
Paper C, similar to Paper B, investigates the impact of different pricing schemes,
but focusses more on the value from an individual households perspective, and how it
would be influenced by redesigning electricity taxation. It acknowledges that consumer
adoption of dynamic pricing is subject to transaction costs of switching to a new contract
and potentially even a new supplier. It therefore considers the question:
Can consumers be expected to adopt dynamic pricing in the light of their transaction
costs of switching?
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The last Paper E addresses the aspect of uncertainty regarding the value of demand
response, which may become relevant in particular in those cases that require additional
up-front investment in automation equipment. This analysis aims to provide insight
into the following question:
Is risk a major issue for demand response adoption and does it need to be addressed
by policy-makers?
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the flexibil-
ity challenge in more detail. It describes the role the demand side might be able to play
and focusses furthermore on the policy response to the issue. Section 3 summarises the
methodological approach. Where necessary, descriptions are expanded, in comparison
to those in the papers, to provide appropriate background. Section 4 discusses the
contributions of the thesis and possible policy implications. General conclusions and
recommendation for further research are presented in Section 5.
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Chapter 2
Background: Flexibility, policy and the
demand-side
2.1 Demand flexibility in Danish energy policy
2.1.1 Energy conservation and load management
The overall aim of Danish energy policy is to provide secure, cost-efficient and envir-
onmentally friendly energy. Since the energy crises of the 1970s a key driving force
of energy policy has been to reduce the dependency from imported fuels (Moe, 2007).
This was primarily sought achieved by implementing energy efficiency measures and
developing domestic resources (Danish Ministry of Commerce, 1976). Moreover, in
1985 plans to develop nuclear power had been abandoned (Folketinget, 1985). This first
and foremost left natural gas and renewable energies as domestic resources for further
development.
The focus on energy efficiency increased the focus on the demand side. With the
development of a more diverse electricity production infrastructure based on coal and
gas-fired plants, to a larger extent cogenerating heat, and slowly increasing production
from wind power, the time dimension of savings became more relevant (see also
Edvinsson, 1986). This meant that besides emphasising mere energy conservation,
a more efficient utilisation of resources became possible by load shifting (Ilic et al.,
2007). A more even distribution of load to better utilise coal power plants and avoid
costly oil-based peak production was an early motivation for demand-side management
in Denmark (Danish Ministry of Energy, 1981). Such measures had already been
implemented in other European countries, like France, Great Britain and Germany
(Mitchell & Acton, 1977). In the US the first load control programs fall into this period
as well (see Hurley et al., 2013). A programme aiming at controlling air condition units
was implemented in California in 1983; larger units had been targeted already during
the 1970s (Zarnikau, 2008).
The focus on cost efficiency resulted in a first significant wave of demand response
research internationally. Economists became more involved in the debate on electricity
rates, and whether they should be based on marginal cost principles instead of account-
ing costs (Malko & Swensen, 1989). The discussion about implementing time-of-use
pricing go back to the beginning of the electricity industry (Hausman & Neufeld, 1984),
but now even more detailed concepts of real-time pricing were proposed building
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upon the very same arguments about demand response1 (Schweppe, 1978; Schweppe
et al., 1980). Such pricing schemes were expected to reflect costs more precisely onto
consumers, potentially, facilitating savings in operation but also in the requirement for
new capacity (Räsänen et al., 1997). To find out about the responsiveness of consumers,
also a range of pricing experiments based on time-of-use principles were conducted
(e.g. Faruqui & Malko, 1983; Lifson & Miedema, 1981).
In Denmark time-of-use tariffs for large customers were not introduced before the
late 1980s (Togeby et al., 2001). Also proposals of dynamic pricing had been put forward,
for instance, in order to provide incentives for electric heating customers to shift their
consumption (Mikkelsen et al., 1994). This was even before, in 2000, Denmark had fully
become part of the common Nordic electricity exchange Nordpool and its hourly spot
market (Grønli, 2003). The active management of electric heating installations had not
been put into practice, however. One reason might have been the ban Danish legislation
put onto the installation of electric heating when introducing decentralised combined
heat and power plants across the country (Danish Energy Agency, 2005).
2.1.2 Liberalised markets and smart grids
New interest had been generated in the topic of demand response after the liberalisation
of the electricity sector during the late 1990s and early 2000s. In the early days of
liberalisation there had been a focus on efficient market operation and the potential
market power of incumbent utilities. Some of the still immature electricity spot markets
settled at extremely high prices in some of the traded hours (e.g. Sweeney, 2006; von der
Fehr et al., 2005). While in a pure market-based system, with the spot market as the main
source of generator revenues, such scarcity prices are necessary to recover fixed costs,
frequent price spikes might as well be interpreted as a sign of market power. Better
integration of the demand side into the market was seen as a promising instrument to
mitigate the exercise of market power (IEA, 2003).
As wholesale markets began to attract more liquidity giving less cause for concerns
about market power, the demand response debate shifted somewhat from the wholesale
level to lower grid levels. The liberalisation in most countries had been phased-in
first on wholesale level affecting generation and large consumers (IEA, 1999). Europe
opted for a development towards full retail competition, while for instance parts of
the US contained liberalisation to wholesale level (Faruqui et al., 2010). Efficient retail
competition required the unbundling of grid operation and electricity supply business.
The isolation of distribution grid operations entailed a focus on cost efficiency in this part
of the industry as well (Danish Electricity Regulation Committee, 2014b). In particular,
a question appeared on the agenda of whether it could be preferable to invest into
smarter distribution grids instead of investing into capacity expansion. Accordingly, an
effort was made in both Europe and the US towards increasingly including intelligent
control to avoid capacity investments, fostering the now ubiquitous term of a smart grid
(Amin & Wollenberg, 2005; Coll-Mayor et al., 2007).
1One of the first records in economic literature regarding the importance of the timing of demand has
been made by Clark (1911): "If consumers can make extra demands on the utility without paying as much as the
extra expense they are causing, they are likely to make wastefully large demands on it." (p. 475)
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2.1.3 Renewable energy integration
The flexibility challenge of an energy system largely based on renewable and combined
heat and power production had been acknowledged early on (B. Sørensen, 1975). While
the very first energy policy plan merely considered the impact of wind power on the
physical landscape (Danish Ministry of Commerce, 1976), the integration with the
existing power system had been identified as a potential issue already in the earliest
phases of its development (Danish Ministry of Energy, 1981). Up until the mid 1980s
the technical maximum for the integration of wind power production into the electricity
system was claimed by the utilities to lie at around 10% (H. Lund, 2000). Consequently,
policies were cautious in their assumptions about future developments. The first official
plans started out with negligible amounts of variable production from renewable
energies at 3% of electricity production in the target year of 1995 (Danish Ministry of
Commerce, 1976). At the same time, however, alternative plans were developed that
included shares of 10% and were based on the premise of avoiding the introduction
of nuclear energy into the Danish system (Blegaa et al., 1976, 1977). A target of 10%
of wind in electricity production for the year 1995 has later been set in the official
plans as well (Danish Ministry of Energy, 1981). Beyond such levels it was expected
that additional flexibility measures would become necessary or that wind production
would need to be curtailed (see B. Sørensen, 1978). Already, it had been expected that
the increase of electricity cogenerated with heat would introduce the risk of excess
production (ELSAM, 1984).
With experience gained and technologies maturing, scenarios and policies became
more optimistic regarding wind power in the 1990s. On a local scale concepts were
developed that combined flexible electricity production and consumption in decentral-
ised district heating with wind power to allow for wind shares in electricity above 25%
(Jørgensen et al., 1986). Also the emergence of the climate policy agenda was a driver
for more ambitious renewable energy targets. The official 1990-plan was based on a
scenario with a level of 20% of wind power in 2030 (Danish Ministry of Energy, 1990).
Measures to handle variability were explicitly addressed, and integration issues were
defined as a focus area for research. This path was further pursued, and the Danish
Energy Agency (1995) developed a scenario with 37% of variable renewables. From that
point and onwards, system flexibility became an important element of energy policy.
The important role of the district heating sector in balancing the system was emphasised
and measures like building heat storages and increasing the flexibility of power plants
were included in the policies (Danish Ministry of Environment and Energy, 1996).
The political push towards renewable energies during the 1990s was expected to put
the electricity system under stress. In particular, the issue of excess wind and combined
heat and power production was sought addressed in a range of studies. Various
stakeholders were involved in an analysis prepared for the Danish Energy Agency (2001)
that foresaw the possibility to handle excess production in a 2020 scenario at reasonable
costs and on the basis of readily available technologies, e.g. industrial demand response
as well as the use of heat storages and electric boilers in the district heatings system.
In a subsequent political agreement in 2002 it was decided to improve the possibility
of the system operator to regulate decentralised and renewable production in cases
of oversupply (Danish Government, 2002). Subsequently, the potential of domestic
resources to balance the increasing wind power production was further emphasised in
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several studies (H. Lund & Münster, 2003, 2006). Integrating 50% wind shares or even
more were deemed possible without compromising system security if balancing and
ancillary service provision were decentralised as well (Østergaard, 2006).
In 2006 the Danish Government announced the long-term goal of a self-sufficient
energy supply independent of fossil fuels (Danish Prime Minister’s Office, 2006). A
strategy paper specifying the target was published the following year – without, how-
ever, setting a more precise time horizon for the attainment of the formulated goal
(Danish Ministry of Transportation and Energy, 2007). The target year of 2050 to achieve
the goal was set four years later (Danish Government, 2011a, 2011b). Ever since, and in
particular after the energy agreement of 2012 between all major Danish parties (Danish
Government, 2012), this target has been a guiding principle of Danish energy policy. At
the same time, it is an important element in the overall climate policy target of reducing
greenhouse gas emission by 40% in 20202 and contributing to the common European
reduction target by 2050 (Danish Government, 2013).
The formulation of the Danish long-term target of a fossil-free energy system once
more stepped up the need to define a feasible solution to the flexibility challenge.
Extensive scenario analyses with large shares of wind production were initialised that
also included evaluations of different flexibility options. Besides the district heating
system, scenarios increasingly included storage and demand-side options (e.g Karlsson
& Meibom, 2008; H. Lund, 2007; H. Lund & Mathiesen, 2009). The most important
demand-side options included electric vehicles, individual heat pumps and flexible
industrial demand (Danish Commission on Climate Change Policy, 2010).
Danish Government had taken up demand-side flexibility again in 2007 as one
of the initiatives regarding energy efficiency (Danish Ministry of Transportation and
Energy, 2007). In governmental strategies following in 2011 flexible demand and the
smart-grid concept have been emphasised as a precondition to reach the formulated
targets of a fossil-free energy system (Danish Government, 2011a, 2011b). Resulting
from these strategies and the following agreement of the political parties in 2012 was the
decision about a full smart-meter roll-out by 2020 and the first definition of an official
smart grid strategy (Danish Ministry of Climate, Energy and Building, 2013), the most
comprehensive Danish policy document regarding flexible demand thus far.
2.2 The flexibility challenge
2.2.1 System balancing with large shares of renewable production
As a consequence of the political agreements the Danish energy system will primarily
be based on wind, solar and biomass as energy source in the long run. On the supply
side two major scenario paths have been pursued in recent years (see Danish Energy
Agency, 2014c). One with a focus on mainly wind power, and one with a maximum
utilisation of electricity production from biomass complemented by wind. Of these two
approaches the wind path seems to be the least controversial, due to the fact that the
biomass path would to a large extent rely on imports and create new dependencies (see
Energinet.dk, 2015a). As mentioned, Danish energy policy has aimed at becoming less
dependent on imports for some time. Full self-sufficiency had been finally achieved by
2as compared to 1990-levels
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Figure 2.1: Shares of generation from variable sources and dispatchable plants in
Denmark (based on data from Danish Energy Agency, 2016b)
1997 by developing own resources of fossil fuels, highly efficient use of energy through
insulation of buildings and using combined heat and power production, as well as
developing domestic renewable energy resources, in particular wind (Sovacool, 2013).
On the other hand, the cost of wind developments, especially offshore, have recently
been subject to some debate and could be argued to justify a certain level of imported
biomass (Danish Economic Councils, 2014).
According to the scenario calculations of the Danish Energy Agency (2014c) a wind
share in the range of 60% to 90% of total electricity consumption is to be expected.
The share will eventually depend not only on the use of biomass, but also on the
strategy regarding the transport sector. In any case, though, wind power development
will be a major driver for future flexibility demand. The challenge may become even
more severe as Denmark’s largest neighbour Germany is pursuing a similar path and
foresees a substantial need for flexibility as well (German Ministry for the Environment,
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2012, sketches and categorises the demand for
flexibility in the German system). Moreover, it can be expected that conventional sources
of flexibility will become less available. The downward trend in the development
of production from dispatchable supply from both central and decentralised power
producers in Denmark is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Specific challenges for the Danish system have been summarised in several reports
(Dansk Energi & Energinet.dk, 2012; Energinet.dk et al., 2015; Energinet.dk & Dansk
Energi, 2012; Togeby, Werling, Hethey et al., 2009). Also the Danish transmission system
operator [TSO] addresses challenges within their Nordic (Statnett et al., 2016) and wider
European cooperation (ENTSO-E, 2010). In the light of closing thermal power plants,
increasing shares of wind power and developments in neighbouring regions, challenges
at system level have been identified under the headings of flexibility, functionality and
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capacity (Energinet.dk et al., 2015). More specifically, system operators need to maintain
a certain degree of controllable elements (flexibility), ensure that adequate transmission
and generation capacity is available to serve load (capacity) and that the stability of
the system is maintained by means of frequency quality as well as sufficient inertia
(functionality).
Often the system balancing challenge is illustrated with the residual demand to be
covered when non-dispatchable production is subtracted from total demand. Chal-
lenges already arise in the present system. As political targets set the ambition of a fully
renewable system, analyses of residual demand in such a future system are helpful in
understanding the flexibility challenge related to balancing. A number of such analyses
have been carried out for, e.g. Denmark (Dansk Energi & Energinet.dk, 2015; Hedegaard
& Meibom, 2012), Germany (Droste-Franke et al., 2012; Schill, 2014) or the whole of
Europe (Bertsch et al., 2016; Huber et al., 2014).
Figure 2.2 provides an illustration of Danish residual demand in the form of a
duration curve. The example simply takes the total Danish electricity consumption of
2015 and subtracts the corresponding wind profile as well as the same profile scaled to
cover 80% of the demand. Although of course neither consumption nor the wind profile
exactly resemble a future situation, it gives an impression of the challenge ahead. In
addition to the duration curves, Figure 2.4 shows curves with the maximum consecutive
duration of the respective residual demand. For clarity, only the positive and negative
extremes are shown. It can be seen that while a certain residual demand may occur in a
large number of hours, the maximum number of consecutive hours that such capacity
would have to be supplied, is much lower. The latter curve, therefore, provides a good
indication of the needed flexibility in terms of volume, i.e. the capacity and the duration
it needs to be available. Some of it will be provided by dispatchable generation, and a
certain share will be covered by imports and exports. In terms of demand response, the
left-hand side of the curve (Figure 2.4a) represents a need for capacity to be curtailed,
while the right-hand side (Figure 2.4b) represents additional need for consumption.
Ideally, some of the load would be shifted between those periods.
Another important aspect to consider is the change in residual load from one hour
to the next, as this defines the ramping requirement of the system. Figure 2.3 illustrates
the rise in ramping requirement with larger shares of wind. It is based on hourly values
– intra-hourly ramp rates may be less severe (Holttinen et al., 2011). The extreme ends
show a clear rise in the demand for flexibility in the form of almost doubled ramping
requirements from hour to hour. In combination with the reduction in dispatchable
capacity this will create a flexibility gap that in parts could be filled by the demand side
(Papaefthymiou et al., 2014).
2.2.2 Distribution grid challenges
Not only will the Danish transition towards a fossil-free energy system result in chal-
lenges to balance the electricity system as a whole, it will most likely also affect condi-
tions at the distribution level (Energinet.dk & Dansk Energi, 2012). In contrast to the
centralised production of most fossil power plants, more and more production units
will be connected to lower voltage grids, resulting in power flows that have not been
foreseen when the grids were originally planned. Challenges may occur, in particular,
when production is fed into the lowest levels, which increasingly is the case with con-
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Figure 2.2: Residual demand duration curve (based on data for consumption and wind
power in Denmark from Nord Pool, 2016)
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Figure 2.3: Duration curve of hourly changes in residual demand (based on data for
consumption and wind power in Denmark from Nord Pool, 2016)
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Figure 2.4: Maximum continuous duration of residual demand (based on data for
consumption and wind power in Denmark from Nord Pool, 2016)
sumers installing roof-top photovoltaic. As the production from such units may avoid
consumption of electricity from the grid, with declining technology costs they become
attractive without any additional support measures at some point in time. At what cost
level that would be the case depends on the exact regulation regarding the metering and
settlement of the end consumers’ own production. With current net-metering schemes,
the Danish TSO foresees a rapid growth in photovoltaic installations over the coming
decades (Energinet.dk, 2016e). Increasing decentralised production may lead to voltage
fluctuations and risks of reversing the power flow (Passey et al., 2011). Already now
this seems to create issues for some distribution companies in Denmark (e.g. Johansen,
2016).
Another development that might put stress on distribution grids in the future is the
connection of new electric loads for transport and heating, as they will have a significant
effect on the load profiles (Andersen et al., 2013). Such new loads would primarily be
electric vehicles and in some areas potentially individual electric heat pumps. If such
elements are operated in a random fashion, they will have a severe impact on peak
demand and thus on the required capacity, such that an increased use of the grid is to
be expected (Dansk Energi & Energinet.dk, 2012). In Denmark the impact from such
new loads is expected by some to become more severe than that of new generation
(Rasmussen et al., 2012).
This development occurs at a time of ageing infrastructure providing an opportunity
to reconsider grid operation (Veldman et al., 2009). In a future system with increasing
variable activity at the distribution level, instead of building or replacing grid capacity,
distribution system operators may ask for flexibility services and seek to establish a
more active management of such resources (Energinet.dk & Dansk Energi, 2012). In
certain case studies, such measures are found to contribute with significant savings
due to avoided grid capacity (Veldman et al., 2013). Some of the use cases that flexible
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demand is supposed to address will make sense in any environment irrespective of the
development of new loads and production. The installation of new loads and generation,
however, adds significantly to the value of smart grid operation, and flexibility placed
in the distribution grids, like demand-side resources, might be well suited to address
the introduced challenges directly at the source (Biegel et al., 2014).
The exact impacts are always subject to the individual configuration of a specific
grid. Thus distribution grid impacts are more difficult to assess than aggregated system
impacts. Moreover, they are very much subject to the future development of distributed
generation and load. For now, at least in Denmark, industry organisations do not yet
see an urgent need to act (Danish Intelligent Energy Alliance, 2013). Also, most Danish
scenario studies still have a focus on the system level, and distribution grid challenges
are often not included. As distribution grid issues have been emphasised more and
more in connection with recent developments of solar power, however, these are coming
more into focus also in scenario analyses (Energinet.dk, 2016e), and some attempts have
been made also in a Danish context. E.g. Dansk Energi and Energinet.dk (2015) address
the future demand for capacity in distribution grids to asses the potential for local
flexibility within the framework of a system study. This has been done as an expansion
of earlier studies with a focus on the value of avoided distribution grid expansion
(Dansk Energi & Energinet.dk, 2010). From the results it becomes clear that distribution
grid impacts are subject to considerable uncertainty. While the early analysis (Dansk
Energi & Energinet.dk, 2010) reports a reduction of costs for grid expansions of around
AC215 million, the figure is more than halved in the updated analysis (Dansk Energi &
Energinet.dk, 2015).
2.3 The demand side as flexibility option
2.3.1 Specific characteristics
The development of balancing requirements at system level creates a demand for
additional flexibility. In combination with the challenges at distribution level this
could provide an interesting option for flexible consumption. To assess the potential
response that can be expected from different customer groups, one has to take into
account the composition of their loads, technical restrictions, comfort requirements,
alternative sources of supply, and the involved costs. Figure 2.5 shows a classification of
loads based on technical characteristics. As illustrated, self-generation behind customer
meters may sometimes be included. Subject to the right incentives, it may provide
similar services to the system as all other generation. Loads, however, are subject to
different constraints as described below.
A first distinction is made between loads with and without access to storage. Ob-
vious examples for storable loads are battery systems that are about to gain some
popularity in connection with on-site solar electricity production. Another example
involving storage are electric vehicles that are equipped with batteries as well. Equip-
ment used for heat production from electricity often has access to thermal stores, thus,
providing the possibility to shift electricity consumption. Many times a building has a
certain thermal storage capacity of its own enabling load shift even without additional
heat buffer tanks (Hedegaard & Balyk, 2013). All of these options do not store electricity
15
Demand-side elements 
Loads 
Storable 
Non-storable 
Shiftable 
Load shift Fuel shift 
 
Non-shiftable 
Base load 
Adjustable load 
Curtailable load Additional load 
 
 
 
 
Self-generation 
Curtailable generation Dispatchable generation Must-run 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Categories of demand-side resources (own illustration based on Ea Energi-
analyse, 2011; Gellings, 1985; He et al., 2013)
directly and are therefore categorised as shiftable loads rather than storage options.
A wide range of other loads might be considered shiftable. A characteristic for
such loads is that, while there is a fixed demand for a certain service, the timing is
flexible within limits. For industrial and other large commercial consumers this might
be electricity used for pumping, cooling, ventilation or pressurised air. In the residential
sector electric heating may provide a large contribution if widely applied (e.g. Klobasa,
2007). Moreover, circulation pumps in heating systems, refrigerators and freezers, as
well as washing machines and dishwashers hold a certain load-shift potential. Industrial
processes may hold a large potential for fuel shift as well. This means that either
electricity driving certain processes may be substituted by other fuels or vice versa (see
Ea Energianalyse, 2011). In particular this could be applied in installations providing
process heat for steam production, heating, drying, distillation, vitrification, melting etc.
A precondition is to establish dual lines of process heat production.
The remaining load will not be shiftable. The base load category covers all loads
that will have the highest priority to run. This is the case for most of residential
lighting, cooking and consumer electronic appliances. Some loads, however, may still
be curtailed at times if required. Depending on the time of day and location lighting
could be curtailable, e.g. street lights, advertisements, shop windows and the like.
Also in the residential sector lighting for purposes not strictly necessary (e.g. outdoor,
garden and pool lights) might add to the potential. Sometimes it may be possible
to use additional electricity for some purposes. Additional loads could, for instance,
be switched on to produce extra hot water or space heat. This type of response will
probably be applied more rarely in comparison to the others, though.
A special case of flexible electricity demand is represented by other energy sectors
that may be coupled to electricity. Short-term flexibility is particularly relevant for the
electricity system, while most other types of energy supply have inexpensive sources of
flexibility, often in the form of storage. This includes grid-bound systems like gas and
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district heating. Sector coupling has gained increased attention with more ambitious
policy targets and the development of 100% renewable energy scenarios (H. Lund
et al., 2014; H. Lund & Mathiesen, 2009; Mathiesen et al., 2015). But the importance of
considering the coupling of energy sectors has been emphasised already in the early
Danish energy plans. For instance, Hvelplund et al. (1983) refer to research on the
electrification of transport and how electric vehicles could be used for storage. In
the Danish context, the extensive district heating system is often proposed as a good
supplement to the variable wind production (Morthorst et al., 2009). In the future, the
coupling of power and gas systems may play a role in providing flexibility (Anderson
& Leach, 2004).
2.3.2 Theoretical and technical potential of demand response
The Danish demand response potential has been assessed by several studies over the
years. A theoretical estimate is given by Kwon and Østergaard (2014) in a bottom-up
calculation. Here the maximum hourly potential of flexible demand is estimated to
around 2.4 GW, which assumes a load factor of the underlying demand of 50%. Another
estimate of the Danish potential is given as part of a larger European study of the
theoretical demand response potential divided by types of consumption (Gils, 2014).
On average Danish consumption may be reduced by 920 MW for the duration of one
hour. Figure 2.6 shows the average Danish potentials by sector as well as the possible
duration of a response action according to the study. The hourly distribution of the
potential is part of the study as well, but data is only available on an aggregate basis.
Across the whole of Europe, demand response would be able to curtail or delay around
93 GW on average, while in certain hours the potential could become as much as 172
GW and down to 61 GW based on the underlying consumption patterns.
Boundaries for the Danish potential are given in relation to the peak load. Approx-
imate values, can thus be derived such that the maximum load reduction lies at 1.6
GW, while the minimum lies at around 500 MW. Based on these figures, and depending
on the timing, demand response might be able to reduce the residual demand (Figure
2.4a) with up to one third in extreme situations, and even more at other times. Also
the theoretical potential of increasing load could make up a high share of the excess
production illustrated in Figure 2.4b.
In an extensive survey, an estimate of shiftable and curtailable volumes of large
industrial and commercial consumers has been determined (Ea Energianalyse, 2011).
The total volume that could be shifted on a yearly basis is estimated to be 6372 TJ
from industry and 6847 TJ in the trades and services sector. Moreover, the household
potential is estimated to be 13,195 TJ. No number is provided in terms of capacity. If
conservatively assuming a flat annual profile for all consumers, these potentials would
add up to 664 MW and would thus be very close to the earlier findings.
The technical potential, in contrast to the theoretical potential, accounts for the
technical feasibility of measures (Grein & Pehnt, 2011). This distinction is not easily
verifiable, as different studies put different emphasis on technical constraints. Estimates
by utilities and grid operators tend to be more of a technical potential. Early assessments
by Danish utilities focussed mostly on savings – although the possibility of peak-load
reduction had been acknowledged as well (Mikkelsen et al., 1994). A review of the
flexibility potential in the Eastern Danish transmission zone estimated that about 142
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Figure 2.6: Average theoretical potentials of demand response in Denmark by sector
(based on data from Gils, 2014)
MW of load from large customers could be shifted for at least one hour (Togeby et al.,
2001). In a follow up report (Elkraft System & Eltra, 2005) the scope has been extended
to cover the whole of Denmark. A potential of 660 MW had been identified, which
included a contribution of 187 MW from household electric heating. This is actually
close to the minimum hourly theoretical potential as found by Gils (2014). Recent
estimates by the Danish TSO are slightly lower (Energinet.dk et al., 2015): the potential
is expected to lie around 150 MW, while in addition emergency supply units (e.g. at
hospital and water plants) could contribute another 300 MW. These numbers are called
a "practical" potential and clearly consider more strict constraints than mere technical
feasibility.
The potential for new loads that may provide flexibility in the future could be
substantial as well. A scenario analysis of the Danish Energy Agency (2014a) includes
estimates of shiftable or curtailable electricity demand. Residential heat pumps account
for 800 MW in the study. Electric vehicles, although not considered flexible, are assumed
to use 1100 MW on average. Moreover, large flexible consumption is assumed to be
present in the form of hydrogen production (4600 MW), large heat pumps (500 MW),
as well as electric boilers (2300 MW). The same scenario analysis, however, does not
apply any of the theoretical potential in the existing demand as identified by the above
studies.
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2.3.3 Barriers to utilisation
In practice one seldom sees much of the potential realised, and sometimes demand
response is viewed as too limited in providing the required flexibility at all (H. Lund
et al., 2012). As Olsthoorn et al. (2015) conclude, policy-makers should not solely rely on
reports on the technical potentials. One concern is that demand response for large parts
would require enabling technologies. A row of experiments conclude that automatic
control is required in order to get a relevant response (Clastres, 2011), for example, from
household customers with electric heating (Togeby & Hay, 2009). Manual response, on
the other hand, shows almost no effect (P. Lund et al., 2015). For larger consumers such
automation will be even more relevant to avoid expenses for additional manual labour
(Togeby et al., 2001).
Often the lack of adoption is attributed to a lack of economic attractiveness (Alcázar-
Ortega et al., 2015), and the economic potential can therefore be considered significantly
smaller than the technical potential. A range of studies identify only very limited
benefits when breaking them down onto individual customers. Togeby and Hay (2009)
find that electric heating customers could achieve savings of around AC13 per year3
under hourly dynamic pricing. Danish Energy Agency (2009) finds savings in the same
order of magnitude based on the theoretical potential in Danish spot prices. Customer
expectations regarding benefits on the other hand tend to be in the order of several
hundred Euro (see Groothuis & McDaniel Mohr, 2014; Torstensson & Wallin, 2015). A
factor closely related to benefits is risk He et al. (2013). Insights into the barriers to
demand response from an industrial customer perspective are provided by Olsthoorn
et al. (2015) using a framework developed in relation to energy efficiency. One of
the conclusions is that energy intensive industries are very risk averse. The risk of
disruption during the production process plays an important role. Also companies do
not in any way want to compromise product quality.
Other obstacles to the success of demand response lie in regulation and behavioural
constraints (Kim & Shcherbakova, 2011). Regulatory barriers include issues of market
rules, organisation and product structure. Some of these conditions directly inhibit
market access of demand-side resources, while others affect the achievable value and
the level of risks. As soon as, especially, individual households or smaller businesses
are expected to react, behavioural issues may come into play as well (Allcott & Mul-
lainathan, 2010). Some studies have shown that not only the economics play a role in
adopting responsive behaviour. While in most cases these issues represent an additional
barrier, if addressed properly, they might also be used to work in favour of demand
response (Rathi & Chunekar, 2015).
2.4 Policy options
2.4.1 Key policy objectives
The development of large amounts of wind power on the supply side is not contested in
principle. Details of the implementations are discussed, e.g. in relation to the timing and
3100 DKK/year
19
shares of onshore, near-shore and offshore wind developments.4 The crucial question
of how it will be possible to balance the electricity system with such large amounts of
wind power, on the other hand, is still under rigorous debate. A range of measures have
been proposed – amongst them demand-side flexibility that is strongly encouraged by
EU legislation as well (EU, 2009a, 2009b). The present focus, though, is still on defining
technically feasible solutions, and many solutions require further research before they
can be reliably implemented (Energinet.dk, 2015a). A policy strategy covering all
aspects of the flexibility challenge therefore has not yet been settled.
Nonetheless, based on the published policies on national and European level a
set of key principles related to the electricity demand side and its flexibility can be
compiled. First of all, demand-side participation shall be organised around market-
based principles (European Commission, 2011b). European legislation contains some
regulations in support of demand response. The Electricity Market Directive states that
the potential for demand-side flexibility must be taken into account in grid planning
(EU, 2009b). Furthermore, the Energy Efficiency Directive states that grid regulation
should allow for demand response measures, and tariffs should reflect potential cost-
savings from demand response (EU, 2012). At the same time, consumer protection
principles shall be maintained such that consumers will be free to choose whether
they offer flexibility (European Commission, 2015a). Also, inflexible consumers should
not be penalised. The Danish Smart Grid Strategy formulates the general aim that
cost-efficient demand-side measures shall contribute to the integration of renewable
energies (Danish Ministry of Climate, Energy and Building, 2013). In more practical
terms all consumers shall be equipped with smart meters (Danish Government, 2012;
EU, 2009b) and have the possibility to be settled on an hourly basis (Danish Energy
Agency, 2014b). Initiatives have been taken for further development of wholesale
markets (Energinet.dk, 2015b), retail markets (NordREG, 2014) and the regulatory
framework (Danish Electricity Regulation Committee, 2014a) in support of an enhanced
contribution of demand flexibility.
2.4.2 Strategic considerations
The way in which responsibility for the development of demand flexibility is shared
between the regulated or the liberalised part of the industry is one of the fundamental
policy questions that need to be addressed (Brandstätt et al., 2012). Policies targeting the
demand side of electricity for its flexibility may be centred around different approaches.
In terms of the instruments, they may make use of the approaches are not mutually
exclusive, but they differ in responsibilities assigned. Choosing one particular direction
defines which types of instruments primarily should be taken into use. Earlier pub-
lications on the smart grid distinguish three concepts: a more technical grid oriented
one, a market oriented concept and one focussing on direct consumer engagement
(Slootweg et al., 2011).5 Although the smart grid concept aims broader, activation of
4The Danish Economic Councils (2014), e.g., have been critical about Danish over-achievement of
European energy policy targets due to the support and fast introduction of renewable energies.
5Slootweg et al. (2011) distinguish a system and a market oriented smart grid concept, the first
focussing on system balancing and the latter on market integration of consumers; as in the Danish
context system optimisation is closely related to the market (see also Jenle, 2015), here, a slightly different
terminology is used for the concepts.
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Figure 2.7: Overview of policy approaches for demand flexibility
demand flexibility is an important element and the concepts are roughly transferable.
Therefore a similar distinction will be applied here to describe the overall implied policy
options. Figure 2.7 shows the three distinct policy approaches to demand flexibility in
combination with relevant instruments.
The grid-centred approach is based on the idea that grid operators should become
the initial responsible actors to ensure that flexible demand is utilised. Flexibility
would thus be subject to a centralised control structure as a starting point (Friedrichsen,
2015). From a policy point of view this necessitates a focus on the grid-related regulatory
framework. A particular challenge related to this approach is that benefits from demand
response would probably be distributed onto various actors. If investments should
be driven by grid operators, therefore, this requires appropriate incentive regulation
(Clastres, 2011). In comparison to cost-based regulation, the incentive-based schemes
are able to induce higher levels of investment (Cambini et al., 2016). Also the terms
under which grids may be accessed by the user, i.e. grid codes or other standardised
connection agreements, may have to be adjusted in order to create a more standardised
interface between grid operators and flexibility resources. In such a context, even the
implementation of obligations for demand flexibility, similar to those established for
energy efficiency measures (Togeby, 2009), would be a possibility.
Although grid operators may be expected to play a significant role in the utilisation
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of demand flexibility, a purely grid-centred model is unlikely to be implemented within
the guidelines formulated by the European Union. At the same time the Smart Grid
Strategy at the European level has an explicit focus on market mechanisms (European
Commission, 2011b). The principle of a market-driven development of demand flexibil-
ity is also propagated by European regulators (Council of European Energy Regulators,
2014). As stated above, EU policies have a strong focus on market mechanisms and
Danish policies point into a similar direction. A recent Danish reform has introduced a
supplier-centric approach in the retail market that is intended to serve as a common
Nordic model (Pöyry, 2015) and is favoured on the European level as well (Eurelectric,
2011). The model establishes the supplier as the single point of contact to the end-user
with the intention to encourage commercial actors to provide innovative products that
at some point may include demand response (Danish Ministry of Climate, Energy and
Building, 2013). The grid operator, in this model, could only interact with the demand
side via market mechanisms for flexibility that are not yet defined and established.
Danish policies at present point towards an approach focussing on the commercial
actors as the major drivers of demand-flexibility development. The primary role of the
regulated actors is to define products and market mechanism that enable commercial
actors to deliver the required flexibility. Grid operators are still the ultimate responsible
parties for maintaining reliability. As they have been unbundled from the production
and demand side, though, they do not have the resources to balance the system just by
themselves. Therefore flexibility is mostly procured through market arrangements,6
and focus should be on well-functioning wholesale markets that accommodate for the
utilisation of the demand side. The Danish system operator has significant influence
on the design of such mechanisms (Lockwood, 2015) and takes a leading roles in the
practical development of market design and regulation (e.g. Energinet.dk, 2014). In a
process involving many relevant stakeholders several issues have been identified (Ener-
ginet.dk, 2015b), e.g. settlement periods, gate-closure times and balancing mechanisms,
and adjustments are about to be implemented (Energinet.dk, 2016c).
It is still an open question in how far the development should be solely driven by
wholesale actors or to a larger extent should directly involve the consumer level. While
such a development could as well run in parallel to a market-driven approach, policy-
makers have a role in directing the process and may have the possibility to encourage
it or slow it down. Following this approach will provide consumers with a high level
of freedom. While evoking consumer activity, therefore, it is important to ensure
incentive structures that contribute to an overall optimisation of the system. To describe
the behaviour by consumers of co-creating system value the term prosumption has
constructed (Ritzer & Jurgenson, 2010). Prosumers interact with the system not merely
as off-takers of energy, but are able and willing to contribute themselves. Consumers
with own generation capacity are obvious examples (Rickerson et al., 2014), but the
term may be used more widely to describe consumers that provide services to the grid
including demand response (Shandurkova et al., 2012).
Consumer-centred policies will focus on providing access to the market for small
decentralised units and could aim at encouraging adoption of flexible behaviour by
consumers. A key element is the design of retail markets including regulations regarding
6Exceptions to the market-based approach may be observed in some segments of the ancillary services
that plant operators are obliged to supply.
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contracts, pricing and aggregation. Electricity taxation and grid tariff regulation could
play a role as well. Thus far, Danish policies and in particular the Danish smart grid
strategy have not yet put much emphasis on the involvement of consumers (Schick
& Gad, 2015). The most mature initiatives, moreover, focus on the wholesale level. A
wholesale market focus implies a rather hierarchical model, whereas the emergence
of advanced IT infrastructure and increasing consumer engagement in self-generation
could necessitate a more distributed approach to activate flexibility (Schleicher-Tappeser,
2012a). Even though there is some uncertainty to the extent of such developments, their
potential impact has been acknowledged (Energinet.dk, 2016b).
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Chapter 3
Methods
3.1 Overall approach
The starting point for all analyses of the thesis is the seemingly paradoxical difference
between a substantial theoretical value of demand flexibility derived in many studies,
and its apparently low practical value at present. This discrepancy has a considerable
parallel to the so-called "efficiency gap" observed in the lack of implemented energy
saving measures (see Hirst & Brown, 1990). While implementing energy efficiency
often is a question of investment and requires limited action afterwards, benefits from
demand flexibility are generated in a more continuous effort (Goldman et al., 2007). The
decision of adopting new technology or behaviour is quite similar, however, and thus
studies of barriers to energy efficiency are helpful in the further analysis of demand
flexibility as well.
Market barriers to demand response are frequently addressed in the literature (see
Nolan & O’Malley, 2015, for a recent review). As the major technical barrier, installing
suitable metering equipment, has been overcome in many places, the focus is increas-
ingly on the regulatory framework and consumer behaviour. While overall economic
benefits are mostly undisputed, the incentives to those responsible for adopting demand
response activities, i.e. consumers, but also intermediaries and utilities, are commonly
regarded as too small. Policy-makers should therefore remove barriers in regulation
and ensure to engage the relevant actors. Two obvious approaches would be either
to address individual benefits or costs by policy intervention. Even subsidising de-
mand response has been regarded a valid policy to achieve its activation in some cases
(Muench et al., 2014; Walawalkar et al., 2008).
It should be clear that demand response is no end in itself, but rather it may provide
a contribution to the overall energy policy objectives. Hence, demand flexibility should
only become utilised if it is competitive with alternative flexibility options. A balance
must be struck between breaking down barriers and inducing excessive, and potentially
inefficient, demand response. Economists underline that policies should only address a
subset of market barriers that constitute market failures (Jaffe & Stavins, 1994). Such
failures would violate the underlying assumptions of fully competitive markets (Brown,
2001): rationality, perfect information, lack of transaction costs. While market failures
are an essential concept in deciding on policy interventions, it may be too narrow to
address the full range of obstacles that exist in the real world (Sorrell, 2004). Studies
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Figure 3.1: Difference between efficient and observed value of flexibility
within the framework of innovation systems argue that policy interventions should be
based on systemic failures in addition to market failures (Wieczorek & Hekkert, 2012).
As from the outset the electricity market is subject to a substantial amount of regulation,
institutional failures, a special case of systemic failures, may have to be addressed as
well (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005).
This thesis focusses on such policies that reduce the gap between the efficient and
the observed value of demand flexibility. A central argument is that a gap exists due to
conditions that may be affected by policy-makers, either by directly addressing market
failures or by correcting for inadequate framework conditions. Figure 3.1 is an attempt
to illustrate the targeted gaps in value. The left bar shows the ideal situation. The
theoretical value of demand flexibility can only be achieved in a world of perfectly
competitive markets with full information and no transaction costs. In reality organising
a market to cover for all aspects of flexibility would be costly in terms of transaction
costs. In that case, the losses due to a missing market are lower than these transaction
costs, and therefore the achievable market value will be lower than the theoretical
value. The market value can be interpreted as the wholesale-level value. Benefits at the
consumer level will be lower due to the costs involved in providing the flexibility – a
part of these related to risks. Disregarding such costs will lead to an overestimation of
benefits to the consumer and potentially wrongful policy decision.
There is some evidence that the currently observed value of demand flexibility is
not fully reflective of the efficient value. Some conditions directly affect the observed
wholesale market value. Markets may be incomplete leading to a lack of information
about the supply and demand of flexibility (Newbery, 2016). Added reliability by de-
mand response may thus be an unpriced externality to the market (Droste-Franke et al.,
2012). There may also be issues of information asymmetry and split incentives resulting
in benefits accruing to stakeholders not carrying the costs (Römer et al., 2012). The
achievable retail value could be further reduced by a range of policy induced conditions:
the regulatory framework may expose certain market participants to additional risks;
transaction costs may be increased by complex market rules; and regulations regarding
taxes and grid tariffs may introduce further distortions (Brown, 2001).
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On the basis of these overall considerations on the value of demand flexibility the
remainder of the thesis will analyse, in how far it will be possible to close the gap
between the observed and efficient wholesale market value of flexibility, and in how far
it will be possible to close the gap between the observed and efficient consumer value
of flexibility. Another concern that should guide demand-side policy is the difference
between efficient market and efficient consumer value. The initial part consists of a
qualitative policy analysis (Paper A) that indicates sensible policy measures. This is
followed up by a set of quantitative studies that seek to elaborate on related aspects
to provide further input to policy recommendations. Hidden value due to missing
markets is addressed in Paper D. Impacts of transaction costs are analysed in Papers B
and C. In addition, Paper C analyses the impact of the electricity tax regime. Costs of
risks are quantified in Paper E. In the cases of risks and transaction costs, the analyses
concern both real costs and artificial policy-induced costs as depicted in Figure 3.1. In
relation to the formulation of policies, the real cost elements are important to get a
realistic expectation of the demand response potential. While transaction costs should
be considered real costs and thus part of the production costs of demand flexibility
(Joskow & Marron, 1992), it should also be taken into account in how far policy-makers
may affect them (Sorrell, 2004). Implementing efficient regulation that acknowledges
transaction costs may increase benefits, while inefficient regulation may as well be the
cause for additional costs.
3.2 Policy analysis
A first concern of this thesis addressed in Paper A is to diagnose the policy problem
related to the activation of demand-side flexibility. This is required in order to be
able to define proper areas for policy intervention. The framework laid out in this
way also serves as a basis for the remaining analyses of the thesis that select different
policy aspects and point out specific issues that need to be taken into account regarding
their implementation. The problem diagnosis builds on general concepts of policy
analysis that are combined with elements from the fields of industrial organisation
(V. J. Tremblay & Tremblay, 2012) and transaction cost economics (Williamson, 2008).
The basic underlying idea is a system analytical approach (Thissen, 2013).
The focus of Paper A lies in distinguishing between system elements that can and
should be influenced by policy and those that are part of the underlying structure. This
distinction has been inspired by the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of industrial
organisation (V. J. Tremblay & Tremblay, 2012). The theory builds upon the presumption
that the market outcome (performance) is a result of the behaviour of market participants
(conduct), which may be explained by the market structure and basic conditions such as
the characteristics of demand and technology. Policy may intervene in order to achieve
a socially more desirable market outcome if market failures exist.
Basic conditions can only be affected by policy to a limited extent; for example by
support of research and development. They will barely be affected by such policies
that are the focus of this thesis and that target market rules and regulation. Research in
the field of industrial organisation is mainly concerned with issues of market power,
and market structure describes relevant parameters like the number of firms and
concentration. In this thesis these are not the subject of analysis; rather, a competitive
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Figure 3.2: Example of a system diagram (based on Thissen & Walker, 2013) with
additional labels according to the structure-conduct-performance paradigm
market outcome is assumed as a starting point. The issues identified in this thesis deal
with other elements that may prevent the market from approaching the best possible
outcome. These are related to imperfect information and the definition of market rules
and regulation. Market structure is here used as a term to describe the fundamental
conditions that policy-makers have to deal with (in accordance with Stoft, 2002, p. 74).
An informative tool to develop and work with a system analytical approach is
the system diagram as presented in Figure 3.2 (Thissen & Walker, 2013). In the system
analytical approach a system of interest is influenced by external factors. Policy-makers
will not be able to affect them or at least they will be difficult to affect in the short
term. At the same time the system may be influenced by different measures (policy
options). External factors and policies in combination generate a set of outcomes that
are of relevance to the policy-maker. In terms of the framework developed in Paper A
market structure represents these external factors. The mix of developed policy options
will be referred to as market design, using the term market in a broader sense than the
mere place of transactions and trades.
A set of methods exists to identify the different elements of a System Diagram (van
der Lei et al., 2011). External factors have been presented in the Background Section
2. The presented demand-side policy objective may be broken down from the overall
targets by the use of objective trees. Potential measures may be defined by the use of a
means-ends diagram. Those tools are helpful in visualising the aspects that this thesis
focusses on. Paper A does not make explicit use of these tools. Nonetheless, they are
applied in Section 4 for a better illustration of the results. The format of the diagrams is
shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.
The basic structure of the objectives tree and the means-ends diagram are similar.
28
Fundamental 
objective 
Intermediate 
objectives … … 
Measurable 
indicators … … … 
General 
Specific 
Figure 3.3: Structure of an objectives-tree diagram (based on Thissen & Walker, 2013)
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Figure 3.4: Structure of a means-ends diagram (based on Thissen & Walker, 2013)
Both start with an overarching fundamental objective. The purpose of the objectives
tree is to determine measurable indicators that specify in how far the objective has been
achieved. This is done be finding specific attributes describing the general objective.
The indicators may be used on the right side of the system diagram as more specific
outcomes of interest. The means-ends diagram also works from the general towards
the specific. It establishes a causal relationship, however. Rather than defining specific
attributes, its aim is to define concrete means that contribute to the objective. These
means can be interpreted as policy options that enter the top of the system diagram.
3.3 Economic valuation of demand flexibility
On the basis of the current overall policy objectives demand flexibility would have to
be developed in a liberalised market framework. Thus, the development would be
value-driven and to a large extent the analyses of the thesis are concerned with the
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valuation of flexibility. They are not, however, aiming at determining an absolute value,
but rather deal with gaps in value to point out elements that might be missed out in the
current framework. Those elements are sought quantified in order to determine their
relevance, as they might be part of the explanation of why there is a lack of demand
response adoption and could form a further foundation for policy decisions. The general
valuation methods used to quantify various gaps are not always the same. A common
approach, though, is to use a particular valuation in a version with and without the
element of interest to identify the gap between those two cases. This section provides
an overview of the models used; approaches to deal with the specific gaps are described
separately in the following section.
In the literature several ways have been used to assess the value of demand flexibility.
The evaluation of demand response benefits has been subject to a vast amount of
analysis ever since the concept has been proposed to enhance system efficiency. The
choice of model for demand response has a significant impact (as illustated by Neves
et al., 2015). The analyses of this thesis address the value of demand response from
different angles. A brief review of valuation methods has been presented by Katz et al.
(2015) and in Paper B (for a more extensive review of methodologies used in recent
demand response modelling studies see also Boßmann & Eser, 2016).
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the most common approaches within different di-
mensions in model-based demand response evaluation relevant for the analyses of the
papers. Some of the dimensions are similar to those proposed by Boßmann and Eser
(2016). In addition, to illustrate differences in the approaches used in the papers, the
modelling of demand flexibility and the type of market model have been included as
properties too. The table also indicates how the aspects are dealt with in the quantitative
analyses of Papers B–E. The analyses of this thesis deviate from one another in the
following aspects: the underlying model of demand and its flexibility; the underlying
assumptions about the market framework, the interactions between flexible demand
and the rest of the system and how the market outcome is calculated; the perspective
of evaluation; the spatial scope; and the time resolution. The chosen approaches are
marked in Table 3.1. When a model mixes approaches, then the secondary one is marked
in parentheses. A more detailed discussion follows below.
Beginning with the modelling of demand flexibility itself a range of approaches exist
that originate from the theoretical background of the model. Models founded in eco-
nomic theory will typically use an elasticity-based approach, while the more technical
models tend to model flexible appliances directly or use generic representations as an
approximation. Both types have their merits and disadvantages. The price elasticity of
demand is an integral part of microeconomic theory and may therefore be helpful in the
formulation of more formalised models of demand response – from an economic point
of view. It is however a somewhat theoretical construct that needs to be confirmed by
empirical evidence in order to be helpful in policy analysis. Many studies have tried to
estimate values for demand elasticity. Such estimates, however, seem to be very much
subject to the framework conditions under which data has been collected. The climate
plays a role (Darby & McKenna, 2012), details of pricing schemes do as well (Batlle &
Rodilla, 2009), and it may be hard to transfer results from one environment to the other.
Appliance-based bottom-up models may have a bit of an advantage in this regard.
Such models take offset in the technical potential and constraints of response. These
technical aspects might be more straight-forward to measure. National or even regional
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Table 3.1: Properties of demand response models and applications in Papers B–E
Approach Paper
B C D E
Demand model Elasticity-based ×
Appliance-based (×)
Generic × × ×
Agent-based
Calculation method Optimisation × ×
Simulation (ex-post/ex-ante) × ×
Empirical estimates
Market model Static × ×
Static equilibrium ×
Dynamic equilibrium × ×
Perspective System × ×
End-user (×) ×
Utility ×
Spatial scope Local
National × × ×
International (×) ×
Sectoral scope Electricity (sub-sectors) × × × ×
Coupled energy sectors (×)
Time resolutions Peak/off-peak
Hour × × × ×
Intra-hour (×)
statistics might help in determining differences in usage, installation rates and flexibility
potential if models should be transferred to other settings. If some of the consumption
is controlled automatically anyway, such methods could be more exact. If the control
algorithms are known, then the response to different kinds of pricing schemes are easier
to model as well. One issue that these models might fail to capture is the behaviour
of consumers and their potential impact on flexibility available for control. More and
more of such elements are taken into account in another category of models using an
agent-based approach, or at least incorporating aspects of behaviour in other types of
models.
The demand model used is very closely related to the calculation method applied and
the underlying market model that is assumed. For the calculation method a distinction
is made between optimisation, simulation and empirical estimates. In optimisation
models the best possible outcome under a set of given constraints is determined for the
whole system (Fleiter et al., 2011). Simulation studies may apply optimisation methods
as well. They do however focus on results within a static framework. The same is
valid for valuations based on empirical data that estimate benefits on the basis of actual
behaviour.
The close relation to the market model is obvious. As in simulation studies demand
response does not affect the market, they act within a static framework. This may be
thought of as a price-taker approach. Such a method may seem wrong to start with.
Often, however, analyses have a limited scope and it may be valid to assume that
the market is not influenced by flexibility within the scope of the study. The Danish
market, for example, is strongly interconnected with both Nordic and the continental
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power markets. Analyses limited to Denmark could therefore be thought of as having
a very limited impact on prices. Nevertheless, from a theoretical point of view using
an equilibrium approach is more complete. Here, supply and demand is brought into
balance resulting in prices that clear the market. In a static equilibrium new capacity
investments are neglected and the supply-demand structure is kept constant. A dynamic
equilibrium takes such long-term changes of capacity into account. Calculations will
then have to be based on an optimisation approach. An elasticity-based demand model
only makes sense in an equilibrium framework, while the other types of demand models
my be applied within different market settings.
Demand response evaluation can take various perspectives. Most importantly there is
the system perspective and the individual customer value. These largely correspond to
the concepts of socio-economic and private cost-benefits. A third perspective is added in
Table 3.1 to also include an intermediary like the utility – or another type of aggregator.
Here we also take an individual actor’s private perspective. The socio-economic value
tells us whether demand flexibility is valuable taking into account the economy as a
whole. If it is beneficial it may be an indication for policy-makers to work towards
framework conditions in support of demand flexibility utilisation.
The private-economic value tells us something about the individual incentives to
adopt flexible technology and behaviour. Although an individual benefit does not equal
a societal benefit, the private value indicates whether an existing potential would be
utilised and to which extent. Often private and social value would be different, due
to, e.g. externalities or distortive effects of subsidies and taxes, potentially requiring
policy intervention. Such intervention could go into either the direction of supporting
further development or the opposite of preventing a development based on adverse
incentives. For example, we may want to support flexible behaviour of consumers
to help the system as a whole; on the other hand, we may want to prevent flexibility
that only serves individual purposes and may counteract system needs. An example
for such a case are net-metering arrangements for decentralised power producers that
could create incentives for local battery storages. These will then be optimised with
regard to local needs and may even create additional system stress (Eid et al., 2014).
Other important dimensions of valuation are the spatial, sectoral and temporal scope.
The characteristics of demand flexibility often mean that they are not fully suited for
the scope of existing markets. For all sources of flexibility to be utilised, thus, the scope
may have to be adjusted in time or space (see also Henriot & Glachant, 2013). A typical
spatial scope is the national energy system. Modelling of interconnected markets would
provide more correct results, though. This is both the case for including neighbouring
systems as well as other coupled energy sectors, like heating and transport. On the
opposite side of the spectre the scope may be extended as well to include smaller units,
like distribution grids, that have specific flexibility needs, and thus might contribute
to the value of demand flexibility. In terms of time, higher resolution enables a more
accurate determination of flexibility value. If a certain time horizon is left out of scope,
the value it might contribute with cannot be captured. Many models use an hourly
resolution, as intra-hourly modelling may be difficult to do due to lack of available data
and higher computational effort. It may be possible to take short-cuts approximating
activities within shorter time-frames by limiting details in other model dimensions.
As indicated in Table 3.1 the papers take different perspectives and use different
approaches. Papers B and D take primarily a system perspective, while Papers C and E
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take a private perspective. For the private analyses we assume static market conditions,
i.e. demand flexibility does not affect prices. These can be regarded as simulation
studies with Paper C taking an ex-post approach based on historical data, and Paper
E taking an ex-ante approach based on simulated future prices. Both use a simplified
generic demand response model. Paper D uses a similar model of flexibility, but defines
the potential more specifically on an appliance basis. Paper B uses a price elasticity of
demand to determine demand response.
The most thorough valuation approach is used in Paper D that applies a detailed
energy system model with an international scope and includes the flexibility of the
heating sector. All other models have a limited scope that, nonetheless, allows for a
more detailed analysis of the policy aspects in focus of the different papers. The gap
analysis of Paper D is concerned with the time resolution and explores the value of
extending the model to include intra-hourly contributions. Papers B, C and E keep
their respective model structures throughout the analysis and only change economic
incentives to the consumers.
3.4 Gap analyses
3.4.1 Intra-hourly market value
The value creation from flexibility sources should be properly reflected in the market, in
order to get supply and demand of flexibility to meet. To be able to discover the value
and create incentives to establish and utilise flexible capacity, the reliability requirements
need be translated into marketable products (Helman et al., 2008). Maintaining system
reliability requires a wide range of activities and therefore a wide range of flexibility
tools. Besides the plain delivery of energy, the ability to adjust the level of loading at
certain rates and lead-times, will usually be defined as a separate regulation product
(Baritaud, 2012). Moreover, electricity network constraints add a locational dimension
that may be reflected in products as well. Defining the right set of products to ensure
reliability in the most efficient way is an important task in designing electricity markets.
In this way, ideally, all potential flexibility suppliers may provide their bids to the
system and a least-cost solution may be found (Gül & Stenzel, 2005). In practice, though,
market products will often not cover the full system demand, and some services will
be delivered under out-of-market arrangements that may distort markets for existing
products (Baritaud, 2012). As a result some of the underlying value will be missing in
the observed market value.
System needs are only one side of products. The design should as well consider
constraints to those delivering a product. For demand response it could become at-
tractive to offer intra-hourly services, as the value that can be captured by shifting
between hours often will be limited for many types of demand flexibility due to tech-
nical restrictions. Therefore, although the volume of intra-hourly markets in general
is smaller than the hourly market, the provision of such reserves could make up a
larger share in the revenues of demand response in comparison to the smaller relevance
this market has in revenues of participants on the supply side. As at the wholesale
level of electricity markets, traditionally, large power plant operators had been the
primary counterparties, product design in some cases favours such units in comparison
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to decentralised resources and the demand side (e.g. Cappers et al., 2012; Neuhoff et al.,
2016). This could be another reason for missing market value.
Paper D sheds some light on the foregone value of not enabling the demand side to
contribute to intra-hourly flexibility. As indicated in Paper A, market access of demand
flexibility could be expanded in the dimensions of space and time. While the locational
dimension has been addressed in several recent studies (e.g. Babonneau et al., 2016;
Conchado et al., 2013; Dansk Energi & Energinet.dk, 2015; Mathieu, 2015), Paper D
focusses on the time aspect. It evaluates the capacity available for regulation tasks
within the hour by implementing a reserve requirement in an energy system model.
Reserves have to be provided by costly supply-side measures in a reference case. The
contribution of demand flexibility is determined as the difference in total system costs
between this reference case and a case that allows for demand-side contributions to the
reserve.
3.4.2 Transaction costs of adoption
If demand response activities are to take place at the level of the private consumer then,
on top of pure economic and regulatory considerations, behavioural restrictions need
to be taken into account. At the consumer end such non-tangible costs may play a
significant role; and the smaller the consumer, the higher the impact of such costs. But
even large industrial and commercial consumers will face additional costs, although
these may be more easily quantified in terms of used resources. Not accounting for such
costs in implementing policies aimed at consumers may lead to wrong expectations
about participation and response.
As introduced above, these parts of the analysis rely on the theoretical framework of
transaction costs economics. While originally this framework has considered mostly
firms and their decisions to make or buy, the idea behind the concept is applicable
more widely. A useful classification of transaction costs has been proposed in the area
of energy efficiency (Sorrell, 2004). While efficiency measures are different in certain
aspects from utilising demand flexibility, they are closely related and have traditionally
been addressed under the common headline of demand-side management (see Gellings,
1985). Many cost categories defined for energy efficiency do clearly matter in the case
of demand response adoption and activation as well. Transaction costs can be divided
into market transaction costs and organisational transactions costs. Market costs cover
all kinds of costs that come with a transaction, or potential transaction, via the market
place. This includes search costs for collecting and understanding information regarding
relevant products, determining the right supplier, negotiating contractual terms and,
potentially, even legal counsel. Organisational costs are internal costs to the consumer
related to monitoring, control and, decision-making. This thesis deals with both market
and organisational costs, but in slightly different ways.
The adoption of contracts based on dynamic pricing and enabling technology are
a precondition for demand response and a major obstacle at the same time (Goldman
et al., 2007). Market transaction costs are considered an important barrier to adoption.
In electricity markets with retail competition market transaction costs are not only
an issue related to flexibility. A common phenomenon of liberalised retail markets
for electricity are low switching rates of consumers as compared to other industries
like telecommunication, for instance (Defeuilley, 2009). According to the key policy
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objectives formulated at EU and national level (see also Section 2.4.1) consumers should
be free to choose their supplier and whether they want to participate in demand
response activities. They would therefore have to make an active choice incurring
search costs very similar to switching retail supplier. Probably, the effort to understand
the contractual terms are even higher as compared to the standard supply contract in
the present market.
The transaction costs related to switching contract or supplier are sometimes termed
switching costs (Klemperer, 1995). To be more precise, transaction costs may be a
substantial part of the costs involved in switching that may also include more tangible
elements, like e.g. discount and bonus schemes. For the most part though the elements
of switching costs conform to the broad definition of transaction costs used in the
analyses of this thesis. Usually a quantification is challenging. While some empirical
attempts have been made to estimate the impact of switching costs (e.g. Ek & Söderholm,
2008; Patterson & Smith, 2003), simplified concepts relying on aggregated market data
have been developed as well (Shy, 2002).
In Paper C such a method is applied to estimate the cost of switching in the Danish
electricity retail market. As noted in Table 3.1, the paper addresses the question of
value by focussing on the individual customers’ perspective. In this way it has been
possible to derive conclusions on the incentive to adopt demand response activities
and appropriate contract structures. Moreover, the paper analyses how policy-makers
may influence the attractiveness of demand response by changing the way electricity
is taxed. Instead of using an equilibrium setting to determine the impact of demand
response on the rest of the market, the analysis is done in a static setting with fixed
prices not affected by consumers. Consumers are thus price-takers, which might not be
a correct assumption if analysing large-scale impacts, but is deemed valid here, as the
analysis takes an individual perspective.
3.4.3 Transaction costs of response actions
After adoption, the second step in utilising demand flexibility is the actual response
to the market or other kinds of control signals. At this stage monitoring and decision
costs will begin to play a role. Based on the framework presented above, system
value translates into market prices and products, which eventually will be reflected in
contractual terms at the end-consumer level. In order to cover real-time value, contract
prices would need to reflect real-time system conditions. Real-time prices, however, may
be difficult to monitor and interpret from a consumer perspective. Most likely, it will not
be possible to make any reasonable decisions different from what could be done under
simpler averaging schemes, like time-of-use pricing, because monitoring and decision
costs would become too high (Slootweg & Ackermann, 2012). There is some evidence of
such costs and that routines play a role in substituting active monitoring of prices such
that the exact price profile has less impact (Klaassen et al., 2016). Similar effects can be
shown in customers’ response to non-linear block rates, where the monthly bills are
often used by consumers as a proxy instead of the actual marginal price of consumption
(Ito, 2014).
Transaction costs may be brought down by simplifying contract structures such
that beneficial decisions are more obvious and frequent monitoring is reduced by
simple provision of information. Demand response on a manual basis requires a
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simple price signal for significant effects to occur (Darby & McKenna, 2012). For some
purposes, like peak shaving, such simple schemes may be sufficient (Bergaentzlé et al.,
2014). They could also provide a good option to gather experience and prepare for
more complex schemes (Kintner-Meyer et al., 2003). The signal should preferably be
rather stable and foreseeable. In practical terms this means that if some consumption
may be shifted, it should be clear from the price signal at which alternative point in
time consumption is favourable; and when that time comes, the shift should still be
beneficial. A phenomenon termed response fatigue has been observed in dynamic pricing
pilots, i.e. consumers at some point lose interest (Goldman et al., 2007). It is likely that
such fatigue will increase if active participation does not pay out as expected due to
frequent changes in the underlying price of the product.
Several simplified pricing schemes have been proposed for demand response. A
popular one is critical peak pricing, which is meant to reflect real-time conditions only
at critical points in time (Hu et al., 2015). Of course the more simple the product,
the less real-time information will be carried by the price (Brandstätt & Friedrichsen,
2012). Therefore response to the price will be imprecise and of less value to the overall
system compared to an exact (automated) response to a real-time signal. So while these
structures address the issue of transaction costs, some value is lost in translation by
reducing the amount of information in the product. Paper B analyses a simple rebate
structure for such losses from a system perspective. It applies a partial equilibrium
model of the electricity market in order to derive the impact on the surplus of different
groups of consumers and suppliers. Focussing on simpler instruments to achieve
flexible behaviour at the demand side the analysis informs policy-makers about the
loss in efficiency, when transaction costs are taken into account. Moreover, focus is
on the difference between short-term and long-term effects. Solutions that work in
the short-term might not be suited in the longer run or vice versa. The case study
calculations for Denmark provide specific insights into how benefits are affected and
distributed in systems with large amounts of wind power.
An alternative to simplifying products and a common response to behavioural
concerns is the automation of response activities (Di Giorgio & Pimpinella, 2012). The
behaviour of loads would thus be optimised by algorithms with the aim to extract the
highest possible value. A complex pricing scheme may be implemented if monitoring
and decision-making is automated in this way. However, automation devices need to
be accepted by consumers. So even in such a case we face a private adoption decision
that does not necessarily have to be fully rational (see also Brewer et al., 2015). The
issue of adopting automation equipment is taken up in Paper E addressing it from a
risk perspective.
3.4.4 Distortional taxation
Taxes and levies on electricity are a substantial part of the electricity bill in countries of
the European Union, especially of household customers (European Commission, 2014b).
Together with increasing grid costs these are the main cause of rising prices amongst
these customers (European Commission, 2014a). In Denmark taxes are particularly high,
accounting for around 60% of the household end-consumer price (Kitzing et al., 2016).
From the vantage point of demand flexibility, excessive taxation has distortive effects
and creates a gap between the efficient and the observed value of flexibility. Paper C
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takes up this issue and discusses whether there could be a more efficient way to tax
electricity than the present approach.
The first Danish tax on electricity had been put into force in 1977 (Danish Energy
Agency, 2016a). It was primarily introduced as a measure to induce energy savings, but
like other energy taxes it also served a fiscal, i.e., revenue generating purpose (Danish
Environmental Protection Agency, 2000). Over time the rate was raised and additional
levies and taxes on electricity were introduced for different purposes. In 1992 Denmark
introduced a tax to reflect a shadow price of CO2 onto electricity consumption. After
market liberalisation in 1999 a set of additional levies were introduced, partly with
a mere fiscal purpose and partly to pay for special purposes, like energy efficiency
measures (Danish Ministry of Taxation, 2010). When Denmark became part of the
European emission trading scheme for CO2 allowances, the CO2 tax became obsolete
for other than fiscal purposes. It was, however, maintained under a different name
until, beginning in 2014, electricity taxation was greatly simplified, and all elements
were adjusted and gathered into a single tax.
In 1998 an additional levy for public-service obligations [PSO] collected by the
transmission system operator had been introduced. This levy still is a separate part
of the electricity bill in addition to the general electricity tax, although the removal of
the PSO element from the bill to transfer it onto the general state budget is currently
being discussed (Danish Ministry of Taxation, 2016b).1 The payment covers for costs
of prioritised electricity production from renewable sources and decentralised CHP as
well as research activities mandated to the electricity industry by the Danish state. As it
is purely meant for cost recovery, EU law treats it as a para-fiscal levy.
Danish electricity taxation thus fulfils a set of different aims. At first, it should
contribute to the political targets of energy efficiency and renewable electricity produc-
tion. The taxes are, however, not directly related to the damage costs of environmental
impacts from electricity production. Such costs should already be part of the electricity
price, due to environmental taxes on SO2 and NOx related to the fuel input as well as
a price on CO2 determined by the European emission trading scheme. Although it
could be questioned whether the full damage costs are being internalised via the politic-
ally implemented cap on CO2 (Lehmann & Gawel, 2013), such external costs should
clearly not be the primary objective of electricity taxation. Nonetheless, the support
of renewable energies may have positive consequences beyond reducing emissions
that may justify the target and the related levy. Also the energy savings argument may
still be somewhat relevant, but less so with increasing shares of renewable production.
Otherwise the main objective of electricity taxes seems to be fiscal.
Taxing parts of consumption will always to some extent distort the economy and
generate so-called deadweight losses. In combination with dynamic pricing schemes,
the current tax system will also lead to a weakening of the market price signal. In
relative terms, price differences between different time periods decline because of the
tax. If generating government revenues was the only purpose, then fully removing the
tax payments from electricity and instead increasing income tax may be a less distorting
option (Danish Ministry of Taxation, 2016a). This does not seem like a realistic scenario,
though, as the tax on electricity could be used for other purposes than for mere revenue.
1The outcome of this discussion is still uncertain, but there seems to be a majority in support of this
proposition.
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Moreover, European legislation requires Member States to put a minimum tax on
electricity (EU, 2003), so a certain level of tax is likely to be maintained.
There are different views on how a revenue-generating electricity tax should be
designed ideally. Stoft (2002) points at Ramsey taxation as the most efficient way to
raise revenues.2 The approach involves the so called inverse elasticity rule that requires
ad-valorem tax rates, i.e. percentage rates based on price, proportional to the inverse of
demand elasticities. Effectively, demand with low elasticity should be taxed higher than
demand with high elasticity (see also Myles, 1995). Stoft (2002), however, advocates a
simple unit rate on all electricity use, as this would minimise the administrative burden
and avoid discrimination between customers.
The great advantage of an ad-valorem rate over a unit-tax would surface, though,
when end-consumer prices are variable and reflect marginal costs. The inverse elasticity
rule also implies that if elasticities are equal then the percentage tax rate should be
the same. This is clearly not the case with unit taxation, as at high prices the unit rate
decreases relative to prices and vice versa. So in the case of constant price elasticity over
time, one common ad-valorem rate would disturb consumption the least (Togeby et al.,
2001). Although the price elasticity is not exactly constant across hours (see Knaut &
Paulus, 2016), the ad-valorem tax is still likely to be a more accurate instrument than
unit taxation.
Besides revenue generation an electricity tax could contribute to fulfil the target of
renewable energy use. For that purpose it could make sense to specifically tax the use
of fossil electricity on a per-unit basis (Danish Ministry of Taxation, 2016a). One of the
issues here is that the production of electricity is dynamic, and the exact amount of fossil
production would not be the same for each unit consumed. A unit-tax on consumption
would thus only contribute to the target on average. At the same time, the share of
wind power does have a significant impact on price (Jónsson et al., 2010) providing
another argument for value-based taxation. The PSO levy could be particularly relevant
to consider in this context, because it directly supports renewable energies. If high
prices largely correspond to low renewable energy penetrations, then a dynamic PSO
levy could contribute to shifting demand towards times with more renewable resources
available.
The positive impact of dynamic ad-valorem taxation on the demand reponse incent-
ive has been emphasised from time to time (e.g. Østrup, 2013; Singh & Østergaard, 2010;
Togeby et al., 2001; Togeby, Werling & Hethey, 2009). Paper C quantifies the difference in
benefits to flexible consumers. Revenue-neutrality of the change in taxation is ensured.
As the analysis uses a simulation approach, it disregards dynamic effects. It thus applies
a price-taker approach to estimate in how far a changed tax regime might contribute
to the adoption of demand response accounting for transaction costs of switching as
described above. It does so analysing the effects of a dynamic tax as well as a dynamic
PSO levy for different groups of residential consumers and different levels of flexibility.
3.4.5 Risk analysis
The previous sections used the term value as though it could be determined with
certainty. This is not the case; rather the value of flexibility is strongly driven by
2as initially proposed by Ramsey (1927)
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uncertainty: the higher the uncertainty, the higher the value of flexibility. At the same
time, the realisation of value is subject to various risks.3 Demand response contains
elements of volume and price risk that affect value and thus the willingness to adopt
tariffs and technologies. Price risk stems from uncertainty about the timing and level
of prices in the future. It is therefore difficult to foresee when, and if, the expected
revenues will be generated. Volume risk relates to uncertainty about the availability of
the capacity. These remain to be dealt with through market design, and thus to some
extent it is a political question, who should deal with the risk.
Uncertainty has an impact on the valuation of flexibility. In fact, flexibility value
is not easily determined on the basis of market conditions in a specific point in time.
The value of flexibility is contingent on future market developments similar to option
contracts in finance. Just as the value of an option contract will depend on the market
outcome, so will the value of demand flexibility. The challenge is to set a price on
the option before the market outcome is known. Valuation is further complicated
by the employment of variable production. While it could make demand response
activities more attractive, revenues will become even more uncertain. An additional
uncertainty is the indirect dependence on political decisions related to the development
of renewables.
Issues of uncertain revenues are particularly relevant if upfront investments are
required to become flexible. The traditional cost-benefit approach would be to determ-
ine an expected value of the investment under an assumed price scenario. Instead,
stochastic approaches have been developed that provide insights into a possible distri-
bution of resulting revenues. A technique based on Monte Carlo analysis is applied in
Paper E to evaluate the opportunity to invest into demand response equipment from the
perspective of an aggregator. Based on a stochastic price model, a number of possible
future price outcomes are simulated and the value of demand response is determined
in each of the scenarios. The paper thus only deals with price risk. It still provides
an idea of the impact of risk on the adoption decision for demand response and may
deliver insights into the potential upside and downside of such investments. Using a
value-at-risk approach a threshold value depending on the risk appetite of an investor
may be established. This threshold may represent an additional barrier to be taken into
account when considering demand response adoption on the basis of costly automation
equipment.
3as e.g. in the case of storage (Sioshansi et al., 2012)
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Chapter 4
Main results and discussion
This section summarises the main results of the papers of this thesis and responds to
the research questions stated in Section 1.3. It concludes by evaluating the results in
relation to the overall research question of Section 1.1.
4.1 Elements of a sound demand-side policy
The overall policy analysis of Paper A addressed the following question:
Which are the major issues that policies aiming at demand flexibility should focus
on?
Major areas of concern for policy-makers have been defined in Paper A. By use
of the tools described in Section 3.2, these findings are first put into a greater policy
context that relates them to the background described in 2. A recommended policy
focus is presented as a basis for the further analysis. This is done in two steps: first,
suitable objectives are defined; second, based on suggestions of Paper A, a selection of
instruments is proposed and related to the defined objectives.
4.1.1 Measurable objectives
Policies regarding demand flexibility should support one or more of the overall energy
policy objectives, and should preferably not compromise any of them. Figure 4.1 shows
an objectives tree that relates demand-side flexibility to the overall objectives. Starting
at the top, Danish energy policy aims at a fossil-free system in the long run resulting
in a high penetration of variable renewable electricity production. The variability in
production has an impact on reliability, another essential policy objective, resulting
in a need for additional provision of flexibility to the power system. A sub-target for
flexibility or renewable-integration has been stated, in mostly general ways, in many of
the Danish Government energy policy plans (see also Section 2.1). Demand flexibility is
more specifically addressed in the government’s Smart Grid Strategy (Danish Ministry
of Climate, Energy and Building, 2013).
The third major objective of energy policy, cost efficiency, should be the guiding
principle in selecting the sources of flexibility. Clearly, demand flexibility is only one
of the building blocks in the overall picture, and it needs to be utilised in competition
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Figure 4.1: Policy objectives and relation to demand flexibility
with other options. Implementation at any cost would counteract the goal of cost
efficiency. Therefore, in economic terms policies should aim at removing barriers to
efficient utilisation of demand flexibility. In Danish policy, and also in a wider European
context, this objective translates into a wide application of market mechanisms. This
has been the point of departure in Paper A.
The objective of efficient utilisation of demand-side flexibility serves as the main policy
goal. Its fulfilment would certainly contribute to the general energy policy targets. It
is not directly measurable, though. As this is a requirement in order to evaluate the
success of policies, it will be necessary to define attributes of the objective that can
be tracked by policy-makers and regulators. Paper A argues that interest in market
participation of demand flexibility is low even in segments that should face relatively
low barriers. Consequently, information that could enable efficient demand response is
not passed through to the demand side. Achieving higher participation and providing
information for efficient response may be defined as sub-objectives of demand flexibility
policy and could potentially serve as measurable indicators. Participation rates should
be straight-forward to quantify. Information for efficient response is still a more abstract
objective. It could become operational by setting a target for the share of load to be
activated through market mechanisms.
4.1.2 Targeted policy instruments
On the basis of the intermediate objectives of participation and efficiency, Paper A
identifies three areas of concern for policy. The first area addresses the market value of
demand flexibility in order to ensure that the economic incentive is appropriate. The
second area focusses on risks involved in utilising demand flexibility, as high risks will
prevent participation. The last area is termed responsibility; in a broad sense it addresses
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Figure 4.2: Means-ends diagram illustrating policy focus for demand flexibility
the market access of demand-side participants. These areas are preconditions to activate
the demand side for flexibility and are critical in determining the value that may be
achieved. In order to determine relevant measures, however, it is necessary to define
whether conditions affecting value, risk or market access should be considered a market
failure or not. Policy interventions aiming at conditions that cannot be considered a
failure could lead to even less efficient outcomes. Using the distinction between market
structure and market design, i.e. rules and regulation, a number of relevant measures
are pointed out.
The exact choice of means should ultimately depend on strategic considerations, as
described in Section 2.4, taking either a grid, market or consumer-centred approach.
As argued in that section, many of the developments on the demand side will be
consumer-driven and a successful activation of demand flexibility would probably
require a somewhat consumer-centred approach. At the same time, this has to be based
on sound wholesale market mechanisms. The proposed instruments therefore cover
both wholesale and retail elements. Figure 4.2 illustrates how different means may
contribute to the overall objective using a means-ends diagram. The black boxes indicate
specific measures that have been proposed in Paper A. These have been complemented
with additional initiatives, some of which have been more specifically addressed in the
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Figure 4.3: Simplified system diagram indicating paper contributions
quantitative analyses of the thesis.
The efficient utilisation of demand flexibility requires participation on the one hand,
and efficient response on the other. A basic precondition for participating is market
access and a better integration of wholesale and retail markets. Measures in support
of market access are an hourly settlement of demand in accordance to the wholesale
market settlement periods and a distribution of market roles and responsibilities that
ensures proper information transfer from wholesale to retail. Further, to extend market
participation it should be taken into account that the arrangements do not introduce
prohibitive transaction costs in terms of monitoring, control and decision-making.
This requires accounting for demand-side characteristics in the design of products,
keeping them simple or enabling automation. Also risks should be appropriately
shared accounting for specific characteristics of demand flexibility, such as shorter
forecasting horizons and changes in availability at short notice. Short gate-closure times
may be helpful. The design of the balancing mechanism could be an issue if it penalises
flexible demand stronger than other participants. A general risk issue is the lack of
products to hedge the long-term value of demand flexibility.
To ensure efficient response the demand side should not only become able to parti-
cipate in the market on equal terms. Benefits achievable on the market should reflect
the real system value. Therefore markets may have to be aligned to the spatial and
temporal characteristics of the demand side. If value can be created in the local grid
it should be possible to offer a service. At the same time international harmonisation
might open up opportunities across borders. Regarding the timing, shorter settlement
periods and the participation in real-time markets could be relevant for the demand
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side. In addition, grid tariffs and taxation should be aligned to reflect actual underlying
costs.
Some of the identified aspects of the framework and their impact on expected value,
risks and responsibilities are further addressed in the following results. The value
aspect is taken up by considering the market scope in Paper D and different aspects
of transaction costs in Papers B and C. The risk aspect is addressed in E. Figure 4.3
illustrates the paper contributions in a simplified system diagram denoting external
conditions as market structure and policy options as market design & regulation. In addition
to the illustration in Section 1.3, it provides an overview of how aspects of demand
flexibility may be addressed by policy instruments. Moreover, the figure shows external
factors inherent in the structure of the electricity system that influence the demand side.
4.2 Missing market value of flexibility
One of the central policy measures as defined above is to align the observed market
value with the efficient system value of flexibility. The question addressed in Paper D is
consequently:
What is the value of expanding the scope of demand-side market access?
As shown in Figure 4.2, an expansion may be carried out in spatial or temporal
dimensions. Paper D carries out an analysis of increasing demand-side participation in
markets with higher granularity in the time dimension.
The central conclusion from Paper D is that the intra-hourly value of demand
flexibility may be even higher than the value obtainable in the hourly spot market.
In the model calculations, system costs are reduced by around AC60 million per year,
when the full flexibility potential of residential loads for cooling and freezing as well
as for cleaning are utilised. The same loads achieve savings of below AC30 million per
year in pure spot market optimisation. Although of course these values are subject
to a considerable amount of uncertainty, their relative sizes point into an interesting
direction for the further development of demand flexibility.
It can be concluded that a significant value potential lies within the hourly balancing
tasks, and using demand-side resources will have a positive impact on the reserve
capacity needed from generation. For some flexibility providers, revenues generated in
these markets may even exceed those generated in spot markets. Therefore it will be
crucial to provide adequate market access to such units. It cannot be finally concluded,
in how far the value potential may be captured by small-scale demand response, even
if markets would be redesigned in full consideration of their characteristics. It may
simply be more efficient and require fewer adjustments to integrate flexibility from
other sources.
Although some market re-designs may be considered no-regret options (Baritaud,
2012), defining new market arrangements to exchange information and trade flexibility
is a complex task that comes at a cost. It is not possible at this point to provide a
complete estimation of such costs. It is clear, however, that they need to be outweighed
by the benefits in a proper assessment. Costs to be considered include the cost of
market operation, metering and settlement of volumes. Additional costs will occur in
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the retail part in particular for customer care and billing. It should also be expected
that disputes occur more often due to disagreement about, e.g. prices, timing and
frequency of requests to respond or customer bills in general. Some changes in market
design, however, seem to be recommendable in any case. These could concern the
reduction of minimum bid sizes, allowing to define upper limits on volumes and less
strict technical requirements regarding the monitoring and metering of participating
units (see Energinet.dk et al., 2015).
4.3 Transaction cost assessment
The transaction costs of demand response activities depend on a range of factors. The
organisation of market access and the definition of information flows between the
parties is one fundamental element as considered in Paper A. The benefits that may
be achieved from a reduction in transaction cost are somewhat intangible. Therefore a
cost-benefit analysis of measures will have to rely on approximations, as those presented
below.
4.3.1 Adoption costs
One cost element that has been addressed is switching costs, i.e. costs related to search
and hassle of finding a new supplier and understanding contractual terms etc. The
existence of such costs poses the following question that has been analysed in Paper C:
Can consumers be expected to adopt dynamic pricing in the light of their transaction
costs of switching?
Besides the detailed design of products analysed in Paper B, the overall economic
benefit plays a great role in the adoption decision. As Paper C argues, though, a
contract will not necessarily be adopted on the basis of just any economic benefit. Using
observations from Danish retail competition, first, an estimate of the cost of switching is
made and, second, it is compared to possible benefits. This reveals that dynamic pricing
as such could be insufficient.
The switching cost estimates are not an accurate measure, but provide an indication
of the level of benefits required to incentivise large-scale adoption of new pricing
schemes. In Paper C two different estimates have been derived that differ in what they
assume to be the incumbent market share. As most customers still have a contract
with the former monopoly supplier in their area (84% on average according to data
provided in Energinet.dk, 2016a), a switching cost estimate based on the market share
of the largest local suppliers becomes rather high. As in relation to dynamic pricing the
contract structure is more relevant than the actual supplier, an alternative switching
costs has been derived based on the market share of traditional fixed price contracts
(55% according to Danish Energy Regulatory Authority, 2016). These two estimates
span a range from AC78 to AC114.
The analysis of benefits has been performed using disaggregated consumption
data to account for the diversity of household consumers. A first observation as a
consequence of using such detailed profiles is that, even within the same customer
categories, e.g. apartments or single-family homes, the costs of electricity may be quite
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different. Therefore the benefits of dynamic pricing and, thus, the incentive to adopt
such schemes cover a wide range. In relation to the switching costs estimates, only a
minority of consumers would be able to generate benefits exceeding them, even if load
could be shifted optimally within time windows of up to six hours. Switching costs
would only be exceeded on average at load shifts within 12 hours or more. Taking into
account the practical limitations of residential loads, it is very uncertain whether such
flexibility may be provided by many consumers.
The limited incentive in the light of switching costs to adopt dynamic pricing and
demand response activities could be addressed by easing the switching process. From a
policy stand, possibilities beyond the tools of supportive web interfaces and inform-
ation campaigns seem to be limited, though. It might make sense, rather, to address
inefficiencies in the end-consumer price, related to grid tariffs and taxes. Such other
price components could be made variable, as a supplement. Based on the arguments
given in Section 3.4.4, Paper C therefore also analyses the impact of dynamic taxation.
The analysis shows that introducing dynamic taxation would allow benefits to
exceed switching costs at realistic levels of consumer flexibility. Furthermore, it can
be shown that, even restricting dynamics to certain elements, like the PSO payment,
could yield sufficient incentives to switch for large shares of consumers. Of course the
positive effects of suches switches should not be seen in isolation. As Paper C also
points out, welfare and distributional effects should be analysed in more detail. Still,
both theoretical arguments and practical implications seem to be in favour of a more
dynamic approach to electricity taxation. As the value of flexibility may be expected to
rise in the future, a dynamic tax could as well be introduced with the long-term target
of phasing it out again, when market price variations suffice as an incentive to shift.
4.3.2 Activation costs
As argued in Paper B reducing product complexity or enabling automation could reduce
transaction costs of customers. The underlying reasoning is that instead of (hourly)
real-time pricing schemes, dynamic price information may be provided to consumers
in the form of tariffs that are less volatile. Paper B takes a rebate scheme as an example
to address the question:
How valuable are simplified products for flexibility?
It is based on a design that offers a fixed percentage reduction in the electricity price
for volumes increased or reduced relative to a baseline. This reduces the signal to the
customer to a simple request asking for either to increase or reduce consumption during
a critical time period. Customers would always be able to save the same amount on the
adjusted volumes. Transaction costs for monitoring and decision-making should thus
be minimal. Moreover, customers would not have to be concerned with potential losses.
Based on the rebate-product example, Paper B finds that simplified products may
be of significantly lower value if compared to the ideal pricing schemes. In a new
long term equilibrium the rebate only captures around 18% of the system value as
compared to an hourly pricing scheme. Taking into account that even in the case of
full adoption of hourly pricing the long-term benefits amount to around 4% of system
costs of serving load, the rebate result is rather limited. In the short term, though, i.e.
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without accounting for capacity adjustments on the supply side, even simple products
may generate benefits of around 50% compared to hourly pricing.
The inputs to the analysis of Paper B are not sufficiently certain to conclude on the
absolute level of benefits from demand response. Moreover, as discussed in the paper,
the developed model neglects some of the conditions that might have a crucial impact on
the absolute value of flexibility, e.g. competition from other domestic and international
flexibility resources. That said, the paper confirms the positive effect of responsive
demand under dynamic pricing and shows that the value increases (in absolute terms)
with higher shares of wind power. The results of Paper B are mostly relevant for
strategic considerations if the benefits are deemed sufficient, and the introduction of
mass-market dynamic pricing is considered. In view of current Danish and European
policy initiatives that facilitate large-scale smart metering and encourage dynamic
pricing, this seems to be the case.
Although the exact timing of the dynamic effects are uncertain, the adjustments of
the system in the long run have a severe impact on the value of demand flexibility. To
some extent the long-term development will be subject to large investment decisions
and could thus be expected to be somewhat sluggish. This sluggishness could be
leveraged in support of the introduction of dynamic pricing. As the paper shows, it
is possible to generate a large share of the short-term benefits under simple schemes
as well. Therefore, it might be a good idea to introduce simple products to start with
and go over to more complex schemes only in the long run, when the benefits of simple
schemes vanish. With minimal transaction costs of responding, higher adoption rates
should be expected. At the same time consumers gain valuable experience that lower
the learning costs of adopting complex schemes and may even increase the resulting
response (as found by Taylor et al., 2005).
4.4 Risks of demand flexibility
The final element considered as potentially leading to unnecessarily high costs at the
demand side is risk. Paper E allows for drawing preliminary conclusions regarding the
question:
Is risk a major issue for demand response adoption and does it need to be addressed
by policy-makers?
Paper E answers this question in relation to the price risk. Price variations represent
the major source of income for flexibility providers, which makes it essential to address
related risks. The paper strictly analyses hourly spot prices, as in the Nordic market
they serve as a reference point for both forward and real-time markets. In the analysis
the difference in the willingness to invest is determined between a risky and a rather
certain outcome. More specifically, the comparison is between the expected value that
is subject to risk, and the Value-at-Risk at the 5% level, that is, a value that will be
exceeded with 95% probability. In the paper this gap is illustrated in terms of a potential
downside in the gross margin of an aggregator.
The risk assessment confirms some general and immediately intuitive mechanisms:
increasing flexibility gives rise to higher benefits; at the same time, those are subject
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to increased uncertainty. Moreover, the results show an upside potential that is larger
than the downside. An example of the pronounced right hand tail in the distribution
of demand response benefits can be observed in Figure 4.4. If one assumes, as in the
optimisation model of Paper E, that volumes will only be shifted when it is beneficial,
then a benefit of zero is the natural lower bound. The upside, on the other hand, is in
principle unbounded. Still, it will still be possible to end up with a net negative outcome,
if a commitment to provide flexibility is associated with costs, as for instance due to
investments in appropriate equipment. The risk of negative outcomes may create a
reluctance to invest, and either investment costs would be required to become relatively
lower or the potential benefits higher.
Paper E argues that the price risk should have a low impact, as the aggregator is
assumed to be the supplier at the same time. In this case the demand response benefits
make up only a small share in the operating gross margin, and so does the risk. Seen
in isolation, however, the impact of price risk on investments may be substantial. The
difference between the mean value that has a downside risk of around 50%, and the
value with a downside risk of only 5% represents a reduction in value according to
around 10% of the investment threshold. This could be interpreted as the premium
equivalent to being able to almost fully remove the price risk. A risk-averse investor
would, thus, require lower costs than what would be optimal on average. Investments
in demand flexibility might, therefore, be underprovided in the existence of risk. As
discussed in Paper A, a further issue in this regard is the lack of instruments to properly
hedge the risk.
Policy interventions could counterbalance the risk of flexible demand to some extent.
It might be worth considering if this risk should be borne solely by flexible consumers, or
whether some of it could be shared amongst all consumers to support the introduction
of demand response. The capacity to bear risk, in general, could be higher if it is
distributed more widely (Arrow & Lind, 1970). This principle could be applicable
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to demand response as well. An option that has been proposed for this purpose is
integrating the demand-side into capacity remuneration mechanisms (e.g. Rious et al.,
2015).
The question of risk sharing may become even more relevant when other risks than
price volatility are taken into account, in particular, volume risk. Depending on the
market rules, demand flexibility could also become subject to harsh penalties when
committed capacity in spot or regulating markets are not available for some reason.
Such payments could in the worst case not just reduce benefits, but generate losses. The
design of market rules should, therefore, ensure that penalties reflect proper costs. It
could be considered as well whether all of these costs should be borne by the flexibility
provider, or if some of it could be shared.
4.5 Revisiting the policy implications
This thesis set out to answer the question:
How can policies enable cost-efficient utilisation of demand-side flexibility to support
the integration of large shares of variable renewable energy sources in a liberalised
electricity market?
A set of detailed policy options has been presented above, followed by a range of
quantitative analyses of missing value elements and hidden costs of demand flexibil-
ity. The results and answers to the sub-questions allow for the formulation of policy
implications given in the form of overall guiding principles:
Commit to a strategy for consumer involvement: Clearly defining the intended role
of the consumers enables a more targeted choice of instruments. In the light of the
developments of on-site generation and advanced digital solutions, consumers
should become an integral part of the strategy for demand flexibility.
Choose policies to support the strategy: Targeted instruments can be chosen on the
basis of a clearly stated strategy. The proposed strategy entails a focus on strength-
ening the link between wholesale and retail markets.
Set targets for demand-side market participation: The evaluation of policies requires
the definition of clear and measurable targets. Therefore, a target should be set for
the level of flexible demand adoption. The share of consumers on dynamic pricing
schemes could be considered as another indicator. Defined targets for demand
flexibility establish a commitment that is expected to encourage further adoption.
Consider initial measures to support adoption: To overcome adoption barriers, such
as transaction costs of switching, monitoring and learning, supportive regulations
could initialise the development of demand response, through e.g.:
• adjustment of distortional electricity price elements;
• encouraging simplified dynamic pricing;
• risk sharing mechanisms.
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Widen the scope of markets to cover missing value: Large-scale adoption is crucially
dependent on market mechanisms to discover the full value of flexibility. Where
market operation costs outweigh the estimated benefits, regulatory arrangements
should seek to utilise a broad range of options on a least-cost basis. For mass-
market demand response, though, an integration into the market mechanism
seems inevitable.
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Chapter 5
Concluding remarks
This thesis started out by identifying the flexibility challenge as one of the essential
issues in building a sustainable and reliable energy system. The focus of this study has
been Denmark, but many other countries will face similar issues in the future. With
increasing efforts to bring down CO2 emissions and lessen import dependency of fuels,
a strong development towards renewable energy sources can be observed. With the
least costly and most widely available types of renewable resources, wind and solar
energy, come fluctuations and the need for balancing. The Danish case has shown
throughout more than three decades that the need may be fulfilled by a combination
of flexible power production and exchange with neighbouring countries. With larger
shares from variable sources, however, flexible producers become fewer. Although
interconnections are an instrument to smooth out variations across larger areas, not all
balancing tasks can be exported.
Technologically, several different flexibility options are available and scenario ana-
lyses of an energy system with large shares of variable renewable production show
that feasible solutions may be found at reasonable costs. One contribution to solve the
flexibility challenge may come from the demand side, supposedly through the electrific-
ation of transport and heating, but also through more active management of existing
demand. Another strong driver that may play a role in the future is the development
at the distribution-grid level. Both the installation of renewable production as well
as the expected new loads from electric vehicles and heating systems will to a large
extent occur at the distribution level. This will create a need for investments in new or
additional distribution grid capacities. Activating the demand side to avoid some of the
investments could supplement the ability to support the system as a whole and reduce
overall costs.
A review of Danish energy policies since the mid 1970s has shown that the interest
in developing renewable energies has always been accompanied with the question of
how to integrate them with the rest of the system. Related policy initiatives started
out with a focus on research. Ideas of using heating and transport for flexibility in the
electricity system had been developed early on. With more ambitious policies regarding
the development of wind power, came more detailed analyses of the effects, often
including proposals for solutions as well. The latest Danish energy policies include a
clear commitment to develop an "intelligent" energy system and refers extensively to a
flexible demand side as part of the solution.
The demand-side focus has been followed up by a Smart Grid Strategy defining
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initiatives more specifically. Besides the need to roll out smart metering and establish
the basis for hourly settlement of all consumption, the strategy mostly points at further
research that needs be done in order to address the flexibility challenge as a whole.
This development work is, thus, at present delegated to system operators, industry
stakeholders and research institutions. Although the results are still open, the role of
the demand side has been clearly acknowledged. At the same time current regulation
has been identified as one of the major challenges and focus areas in the development
of smart energy solutions and utilisation of demand flexibility (Smart Energy Networks,
2015).
In view of this background of technical challenges and regulatory gaps, this thesis
aimed at providing insights into some of the aspects that affect the utilisation and
efficient activation of demand flexibility from a policy point of view. Instead of viewing
the lack of incentives to demand response as a regulatory issue in general, the first
contribution of the thesis was to distinguish between those barriers that should and
those that should not be addressed by public policy. Only barriers due to either market
failures in the classic economic sense or systemic failures founded in market design,
rules and regulations are deemed relevant to be addressed. A range of such failures
have been identified in the Danish framework, and options to address them have been
proposed. Although the focus has been on Danish regulation, similar issues will be
present in other countries. In that sense, the conclusions are of general concern for
systems aiming at the utilisation of demand flexibility.
A frequently mentioned barrier to becoming responsive is the economic incentive.
As analyses of the thesis have shown, achievable benefits seem to be outweighed,
currently, by transaction costs that arise from initial adoption and continuous activity of
flexible demand. Simply put, policies may aim at either increasing benefits or reducing
costs in order to ensure participation and adequate response. Measures to add value
to flexibility are limited, especially, if no particular market failures can be identified.
This thesis points out, however, that potential failures may also be found in the design
of markets and regulation. The current definition of market scope in the dimensions
space and time are not optimal for the demand side, and higher granularity in both
dimensions could increase benefits. Moreover, taxation and grid tariff regimes could be
argued to unnecessarily stabilise prices, working as a disincentive to flexible behaviour.
In this thesis, value lying in a higher time granularity of relevant markets for demand
and a change in the taxation regime have been quantified. It has been found that
the demand side could generate significant value serving as intra-hourly reserves, if
automated and reliable response is available. A change in taxation regime towards a
value-based electricity taxation has been found to hold a significant value potential as
well. Such value gains, however, always need to be held up against the costs involved
in establishing the measures.
The costs of demand response are another crucial issue. These need not be a market
failure if they reflect the real production costs of demand flexibility. The study has
been most concerned with the more intangible cost elements like transaction costs
and risks, and less so with costs for technology. Some of these intangible elements
are significantly influenced by the design of markets, rules and contracts, and should
therefore be included in the assessment of policy options. Transaction costs addressed
are costs related to adopting a demand response contract (switching costs) and costs
of activation (monitoring and decision costs). The first have been estimated indirectly
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from available market data and used as a benchmark to evaluate potential benefits. The
latter have not been estimated directly; rather, the foregone benefits of a simple contract
structure have been estimated to provide insights into the potential effect of such costs.
This could provide a benchmark for the value of automation as well.
Apart from transaction cost analyses the thesis also addressed the question of risks
involved in activating demand response. For some parts, risks may be due to design,
but much of the price and volume risk is a fundamental characteristic of flexibility. Price
risk has been dealt with in a quantitative way, and has been found to further increase
the threshold to adoption when investment costs are involved. It might be relevant to
consider from a policy perspective whether such risks should be borne alone by those
that provide flexibility.
5.1 Further research
Some of the suggested issues may be directly addressed by policy-makers. On the other
hand, there are many open questions that provide possibilities for further research. A
refinement of the evaluations that have been part of this thesis is one option. Besides
that, there are a set of relevant issues that have not been addressed. In terms of
missing markets, the spatial dimension could become more relevant in the future, and
market mechanisms at the distribution-grid level are intensely debated. An analysis
of the costs and benefits of such markets, including their impact on a system-wide
scale, would be highly relevant. The thesis touched upon the question of electricity
taxation – an issue that is addressed from time to time by government agencies, but
rarely in academic literature. More detailed analysis of the dynamic effects of different
taxation techniques is clearly recommendable. As a final issue, the role of risks in the
development of demand response holds various opportunities for further research
and may become increasingly relevant in the future. New risk sharing agreements
based on the experience with renewable energy deployment, for instance, could be
interesting to further investigate, as they could additionally contribute to enhanced
market participation.
5.2 Outlook
How much the demand side will contribute to solving the challenges of future energy
systems, depends very much on the vision that is pursued. Two relevant alternatives
have been suggested that differ in the involvement of consumers in the green transition
towards a renewable system. A consumer-centred vision would seek to engage the
consumer as much as possible to contribute with flexibility, potentially in combination
with decentralised renewable production. A wholesale-centred vision builds on an
energy system that just works – with minimal consumer involvement – much like the
traditional system. Demand-side contribution under this vision would likely not exceed
that of today.
The increase that can be seen in roof-top solar electricity installations, the use of
electric vehicles and heat pumps, may make it difficult to pursue the latter vision and
isolate the consumer fully from the system. At the least, the green transition requires
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informed consumers that are somewhat familiar with the effects of their installations,
and on that basis accept possible interventions as well as technical or financial oblig-
ations. A consumer-centred vision with active and engaged consumers on the other
side, may only be achieved on the basis of a firm political commitment, targeted market
rules and regulation as well as supportive industry stakeholders. Only if the role of
consumers is made explicit, they can be expected to try to work towards the political
goal. Inspiration may be drawn from the development in renewable installations: a
clear political commitment, combined with risk sharing arrangements, has led to a
broad engagement also by households. A similar development is possible for demand
flexibility.
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Abstract
Present trends in the development of electricity systems are expected to generate
a growing need for flexibility in decentralised resources, including demand response.
In order to enable decentralised actors to create value, the organisation of markets
and incentives should incorporate these new participants. The roll-out of smart
metering to electricity consumers is an important precondition to establishing a
flexible demand side and will provide essential information flows. On the basis
of current incentive structures and related risks, however, the pass-through of
information and value from wholesale market participants to the demand side is
mostly infeasible, resulting in flexibility tasks being aggregated and delegated to
balancing responsible wholesale traders. This analysis focuses on whether current
incentives and roles are appropriate and where the design could be improved to
establish a flexible demand side with a particular focus on the Danish case. Design-
related barriers are identified that affect expected value, associated risks, and the
distribution of responsibilities. This serves as a basis to define policy options in the
context of Nordic electricity markets.
aTechnical University of Denmark
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A.1 Introduction
Policy-makers intend to cure the missing information transfer between the demand
side and wholesale markets by rolling out smart metering to all or most customers.
Arguments for establishing this kind of infrastructure are based on socio-economic
calculations that show substantial benefits induced by flexible demand-side resources
(e.g., Danish Energy Agency, 2013; Energinet.dk, 2013, for Denmark). However, such
findings also rely on significant adoption rates.
At the moment many barriers, mainly regulatory and institutional, still exclude de-
centralised resources from the informational flows about flexibility supply and demand
(e.g., Greening, 2010).
Currently, with market products generating only weak incentives, combined with
their risk profiles it remains an open question whether adoption will take place at
expected rates and if economic projections are justified. The present distribution of
responsibilities for handling flexibility suggests the need for some adjustment.
Considering the Danish situation, the existing market places for flexibility are re-
viewed from the perspective of decentralised resources, including both demand re-
sponse and distributed generation.
The analysis focuses not so much on the economic value of flexibility and the
underlying incentive to bring it to the market. Instead, the focus lies on how flexibility
trades and whether the form of products and the organisation of markets fit with the
characteristics of demand-side flexibility. The reasoning is that while the demand for
flexibility and its value can be expected to increase with growing shares of intermittent
production, it is of central importance that information about the rise in value is in a
form that creates demand-side incentives.
The next section lays out the scope and research interest in more detail. It points out
trends that suggest a growing importance of flexibility from decentralised resources
and describes the approach taken towards barriers to demand-side flexibility. A clear
distinction is drawn between barriers caused by the underlying market structure and
additional barriers introduced by regulation and design. Hereafter the major design-
related barriers as well as options to address them in favour of small-scale demand-side
actors are presented and discussed.
A.2 Drivers for decentralised flexibility
A.2.1 A growing demand for flexible resources
The necessity of providing flexibility to the system originates from reliability require-
ments. Securing system balance and power quality at all times are basic preconditions to
the operation of electricity systems. In a liberalised electricity market these requirements
establish the demand side in a market for flexibility.
As reliability is both a long-term and a short-term task, so is the provision of flex-
ibility. In the long-term the reliability or system adequacy requirement traditionally
meant providing sufficient production and transmission capacity to serve demand at all
times (ENTSO-E, 2004). Here flexibility is seen as the ability to handle fluctuations in
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demand (see also Nicolosi, 2010). With recent developments in intermittent production,
adequacy increasingly must to take into account variability of production.
In the short term reliability translates into security requirements within an otherwise
adequate system. In particular, reserve requirements for outages and stochastic devi-
ations are determining factors. Although electricity demand is subject to forecasting
errors, these are comparatively small on an aggregated basis. Flexibility in the short
term, therefore, is almost completely driven by the supply side of the system (Gül &
Stenzel, 2005).
The demand for flexibility due to adequacy and security requirements thus depends
very much on supply-side developments. In a broader sense, therefore, flexibility can
be defined as changes in the behaviour of connected parties to accommodate system
needs (Dansk Energi & Energinet.dk, 2012). As the supply side of electricity changes, so
will the value of and the demand for flexibility. The development of variable renewable
electricity production, accordingly, is expected to increase the demand for flexible
capacity (Grohnheit et al., 2011).
A.2.2 Declining availability of traditional flexibility providers
Centralised thermal power plants are the most common providers of operational flexib-
ility to the system at present. Due to low marginal costs of most renewable energies,
conventional production technologies may experience lower utilisation rates. Com-
bined with the overall price depressing effect (cp. Munksgaard & Morthorst, 2008), this
reduces the feasibility of these traditional suppliers of flexibility.
Therefore, it can be expected that conventional sources of flexibility will become
less available or, at least, more costly (cp. e.g., Droste-Franke et al., 2012, p. 63ff., for an
analysis of German scenarios). Although there is an option of keeping them on-line to
provide reliability services, this may result in substantial costs. Adding new flexibility
resources should be considered.
Several flexibility options have been identified, ranging from grid extension to
establishing storage and demand response (cp. Energinet.dk & Dansk Energi, 2012;
German Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2012;
Gül & Stenzel, 2005). Some of those are centralised options and others are more
decentralised, that is, smaller in size and typically connected to lower voltage grids.
A cost-efficient system should take advantage of and optimise among all available
resources.
A.2.3 Decentralisation of reliability management
Building an electricity system with large shares of intermittent renewable production
typically implies that the supply structure becomes more decentralised. Therefore
regional and local grids may become challenged. As a result, reliability management
requires either more grid capacity or more decentralised solutions (CIRED, 2013).
Currently, flexibility services are primarily managed by transmission-system operat-
ors. At the distribution level, reliability requirements traditionally have been covered
by investments in new grid capacity. In a future system with increasing variable activity
at the distribution level, building sufficient grid capacity may come at a significant cost
and distribution system operators may instead ask for flexibility services and seek to
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establish a more active management of such resources (Energinet.dk & Dansk Energi,
2012).
In addition to the specific challenges in distribution grids, various benefits have
been identified and are expected to become effective when activating the flexibility of
the demand side (see e.g., Albadi & El-Saadany, 2008; Andersen et al., 2006). Active
demand response is expected to improve general market performance by reducing
variability of prices and preventing market power (Hirst, 2001; Kirschen, 2003). It
reduces the usage and investments in peak capacity and supports reliability (Earle
& Faruqui, 2006; Strbac, 2008). At the same time, improved monitoring may lead to
operational benefits to suppliers and grid companies (Faruqui, 2010).
Although developing a smart and flexible demand side is supported by research
and acknowledged by policy-makers in countries with growing shares of renewable
resources, including Denmark and Germany, the scale is an ongoing debate (see Lund et
al., 2012). In particular the demand-response potential from most household appliances
may be limited. If individual transport and heating systems become electrified, however,
the flexibility of such devices should be utilised actively in order to prevent severe
reliability issues (Slootweg et al., 2011).
A.2.4 Market structure and impacts of market design
Many options already exist to activate flexible capacities on the demand side. In
principle demand response and other decentralised resources also are able to participate
in most if not all of the relevant markets (Hirst, 2002). The lack of smart metering
installations is sometimes considered a major barrier to the utilisation of demand
response (e.g., Kim & Shcherbakova, 2011). While this clearly is an important technical
precondition, metering by itself is not sufficient to induce flexible demand.
In order to enable decentralised actors to create value, informational links between
markets and customer meters should be established. The current information asym-
metry in electricity markets to a great extent explains the inelasticity of demand (Stoft,
2002). It has been shown that customers respond to dynamic price information (Faruqui
& Sergici, 2010), but even in the case of large-volume market participants (such as
industrial customers) with advanced metering already installed, timely information
about market conditions is only rarely passed-through.
Customers often prefer fixed rates to variable ones (for a survey amongst large
Danish consumers, see Dansk Energi Analyse & Norenergi, 2005), and household
customers may prefer stable prices as well (Costello, 2004). An astonishing finding
is that only a small number of customers with real-time metering is actually bringing
flexibility to the market (see Faruqui et al., 2014).
From a commercial point of view, three major reasons contribute to this situation.
First, the expected value from response actions on existing markets is low. Second, even
though studies claim to identify value created from demand response, it will always be
subject to substantial risks. Third, demand-side actors are mostly not held responsible
for their behaviour toward the system.
All of these three barriers may be perfectly good reasons, economically speaking, to
refrain from implementing demand response in spite of smart metering installations. It
would be clearly inefficient to employ demand response if the related costs for enabling
automation equipment and information management are not competitive. Prevailing
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market risks add to the cost of demand response as well. Delegation of responsibility
also makes economic sense due to economies of scale and benefits from portfolio
aggregation.
These conditions are built into the basic structure of the market. They are based on
the underlying economics of flexibility, on technological restrictions and costs, which
are difficult to affect by policy-makers. While these structural barriers exist, they are
most certainly not the only reasons for weak incentives and missing information flows
(see Sorrell, 2004, for an analysis of barriers in the context of energy efficiency). There is
a difference between the value that demand-side flexibility could add to the electricity
system and the value reflected in market conditions and perceived on the demand side.
Essentially, this difference can be attributed to imperfect information not addressed by
market design. As shown below, the small size of the potential new flexibility resources
and their location at the distribution-grid level play an important role in this regard.
Another distinct characteristic of decentralised flexibility resources is that their
primary function is not to provide services to the electricity system. Therefore the
planning horizon and availability for these services is different from traditional options.
Market organisation and product design perfectly suited for centralised actors may
imply additional uncertainties for small-scale actors (e.g., Cappers et al., 2012), although,
they would not necessarily pose an additional risk to the system.
Accordingly, the distribution of responsibilities across the whole model of mar-
ket roles is designed around a passive demand side. If predefined by legislation or
market rules, however, delegation of responsibility may become a barrier to utilising
decentralised resources in spite of potentially favourable economic incentives.
The market should take the structural characteristics of the demand side into account
if its flexibility is to be developed as a resource option. In the following framework, to
distinguish it from basic structural factors, market design refers to features founded in
policy, market organisation and product design. It is analysed with regard to impacts
on expected value, risks, and on the distribution of responsibilities. Table A.1 provides
an overview of these distinctions.
Due to the developments described above, the value of flexible demand can be
expected to increase and structural barriers should decline. To improve incentives on
the demand side, the primary policy focus should be directed to the design-related
barriers. With regard to regulatory intervention it is important to acknowledge that the
design of incentives and the resulting informational flows contribute to the missing
activation of demand-side flexibility potential. By looking into market rules and product
definitions it can be shown for the Danish case how market design aspects and barriers
relate.
The following sections at first evaluate design-based risks related to demand-side
participation in existing flexibility markets. Subsequently, the design issue of imperfect
information about the underlying value of flexibility is discussed. A third section
deals with the distribution of market responsibilities and how the established market
organisation may impede development of demand-side flexibility. All sections conclude
with policy measures to address the identified barriers.
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Table A.1: Market structure and market-design impacts on flexible demand
Basic market structure Market-design impacts
Expected value Value based on:
– Supply/demand balance
– Price-elasticity
– Technology
– Costs
Low perceived value due to:
– Imperfect information about loca-
tion of supply/demand
– Imperfect information about tim-
ing of demand
Risks Risks due to:
– Price-dependent revenue
– Timing of response (availability)
– Greater technical risks (reliability)
High perceived risks due to:
– Difference between planning ho-
rizon and trading lead times
– Penalties for non-availability
– Unsuitable hedging instruments
Responsibility Delegation due to:
– Economies of scale
– Efficiency gains from aggregation
– Specialisation
Limited responsibility due to:
– Pooling requirements
– Defined information flows in mar-
ket model
A.3 Risks related to product design
The underlying flexibility incentive of electricity market products relates to the supply
and demand balance of flexible capacity within the respective time frames of the
products. This is reflected in price differences encouraging a load shift, or price spikes
(both upwards and downwards) encouraging a change in instantaneous consumption.
An exception is a capacity market, like the one for reserves, that remunerates the
potential for adjustments in production or consumption.
As the exact supply and demand situation for flexibility is uncertain the exact value
of flexible capacity cannot be known in advance. This is a basic market risk that also
will be reflected in the prices of the products; but as such it is not caused by the design
of the products. In this section only design-related risks shall be discussed.
Table A.2 sums up the characteristics of different flexibility products traded publicly
in the Nordic system. It shows basic market design aspects as well as the related barriers
to demand-side flexibility due to product design. Many of the barriers can be associated
with an increased risk in relation to the value of flexibility.
A.3.1 Trading lead times
The demand side is usually forecast on a day-ahead basis, sometimes merely based on
fixed standard profiles. While providing active and reliable response requires precise
forecasts, these also become more challenging to generate. Long lead times in traded
markets will result in a higher risk of deviating from a promised response, although
smart metering certainly would make better forecasting possible over a shorter time
horizon.
As of now, traded markets require lead times and determine prices based on bids
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Table A.2: Design-based barriers in flexibility products
Market design Design-based barriers
Forwards – Continuous trading
– Peak/base contracts
– Price differences provide incentive for load
shift
– Value locked-in immediately
– Quantity risk due to uncertainty about
volumes and load pattern
– Timing structure does not reflect
flexibility supply/demand
– Minimum bid size of 1 MW
Day-ahead – Daily auction with hourly resolution
– Prices provide basis for optimal dispatch de-
cision
– Close to actual value based on marginal costs
– Risk/opportunities from price spikes
– Risk due to unplanned imbalances
– Trading lead times do not fit plan-
ning horizon
– Minimum bid size of 0.1 MW
Intraday – Continuous trading with hourly resolution
– Adjustment market with limited liquidity
– Reflects (firm) expectations about the state of
the physical system close to delivery
– No auction to determine clearing
price and gather liquidity
– Automation may be required
– Minimum bid size of 1 MW
Real time – Physical deviations create demand for regu-
lation
– Available capacities submit hourly bids
– Intra-hourly activation
– Reflects immediate system costs of flexibility
– Substantial price risk/opportunities
– Short activation lead time requires
automation
– Penalties for non-availability
– Minimum bid size of 10 MW
from market participants. Ideally, the demand side would respond to prices reflecting
real-time system conditions. Although the system operator publishes real-time balan-
cing prices, under the current market rules they do not provide an incentive to utilise
short-term flexibility. By definition, to encourage bidding into existing markets, passive
regulation (without submitting regulation bids) cannot surpass spot market value. All
relevant flexibility products are traded with specified lead times.
Daily unit commitment has been organised around big and centralised production
units. The lead time required for their dispatch is very different from that of small-
scale demand-side activities. Nevertheless, the hourly day-ahead price for most actors
determines volumes planned to produce and to consume, respectively.
In the Nordic system, the day-ahead market forms the benchmark for the settlement
of forward financial contracts (NASDAQ OMX, 2013). Also the day-ahead prices are
used as a baseline for the real-time market (Energinet.dk, 2008). These structural facts
make it a central market place for the trade of flexibility.
It has therefore been a prominent market place for the pass through of price signals
to the demand side (e.g., Hirst, 2002). Day-ahead prices come close to the actual value
of electricity in a specific hour and at times provide substantial incentives for demand
response due to spikes or even negative prices in some hours.
Most demand-side actors, however, will not be able to schedule their response
actions in advance with the necessary lead times. They will therefore not be able to
recover the full day-ahead value. If their characteristics require shorter lead times,
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flexibility could instead be offered closer to real time on the intraday or regulating
markets.
The intraday market is a short-term hourly market mainly used to react to new
information and unforeseen events. Some design features of the intraday market make
direct utilisation of the demand side a bit more challenging. It is based on continuous
trading; the delivery for a particular hour may be traded at several different, potentially
quite volatile, prices only valid for the two involved parties. Thus, it may be the case
that the individual price and a resulting reaction are not based on the average value of
flexibility.
The real-time or regulating market is organised by the transmission-system oper-
ator to ensure that no physical deviations occur. Available flexibility may bid into
the regulating market while the flexibility demand arises from physical deviations
from scheduled transactions resulting in an obligation to trade at the real-time system
price. This market reflects the immediate system costs of flexibility and thus provides
substantial value potential.
Activation of real-time resources happens in a cascade of automatic reaction of units
within seconds and manual regulation within the time frame of minutes. The bidding
lead time for regulation is 45 minutes. The activation lead time, however, will be a
maximum of 15 minutes only. In most cases, additional investments in automation
equipment are required if decentralised resources are to participate at all.
A.3.2 Penalties
Harsh penalties may be prohibitive to small and new market participants. In the tradi-
tional markets participants commit firm volumes. The day-ahead market conveniently
determines prices before actual delivery, allowing them to be easily communicated to
all relevant parties. But they will be the result of an auction requiring commitment of
firm volumes. Deviations from committed volumes will usually have a value that is
different from the discovered prices.
Closer to delivery, market prices approach the actual value of electricity at a particu-
lar point in time. Market trading still occurs after the day-ahead market has closed. This
means that deviations incur costs, while the providers of flexibility generate additional
income for providing the service.
Availability of committed capacity therefore is subject to risk. The risk may be
increased by market design features, for example the above mentioned lead times. The
cost should be determined by the basic market structure and reflect system costs to
replace the capacity at short notice. This cost, however, may be further increased by
the design of penalties forming an additional barrier for small market participants.
Penalties can be included in balancing prices and in the rules for regulating power.
The risk of imbalances can hardly be avoided. The market-design aspect lies in the
definition of balancing rules and price mechanisms. A penalty in imbalance prices
can have the form of a simple premium. But it may also be the result of an inefficient
regulating power market resulting in higher costs for balancing.
The regulating market, typically backed up by reserve markets, organises the for-
ward trading of reliability provision. Flexible capacities may participate in these markets
and receive payments for availability. The system operator commits these capacities to
remain available for regulation within a specific time frame.
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A risk for providers of flexibility lies in potential penalties from not providing the
announced regulation. A particularly harsh penalty is the threat of disqualification
from further market participation.
Clearly, the system operator requires reliable forecasts and resources to balance the
system. However, even if aggregated in larger portfolios, decentralised resources will
have difficulty marketing their flexibility through the traditional products if the risks of
imbalances and penalties in the regulating markets are too high.
A.3.3 Hedging instruments
The participation of demand-side flexibility in electricity markets will most likely
require upfront investments in additional communication infrastructure, automation
equipment, and in-house displays (e.g., Strbac, 2008). As the long-term revenue from
such investments will be uncertain to some extent, market participants may want to be
able to hedge some of the involved risks.
At present, forwards are the only long-term contracts that may be used to lock-in
the value of a load-shift potential, thus forming a basis for investments in necessary
equipment. In the forward market, buyers and sellers commit to certain quantities
before actual delivery, for example for the upcoming month over several years. Usually
contracts are traded as peak or base load deliveries. Price differences between the two
will provide incentives for flexible capacities to shift production or consumption from
one period to the other.
Forward contracts for electricity deliveries are the basis for pricing most traditional
end-customer contracts (see also Burger et al., 2007, p. 220ff.). Therefore expected price
differences between peak and off-peak periods are passed through to the demand side.
Accordingly, a customer who is able to influence his load shape may be able to achieve
favourable prices in contracts based on the forward market.
A design issue with forwards is that as they represent expected averages over longer
periods, incentive effects will be dampened. This is partially due to the fact that future
load is unknown and it may not make sense to trade in more precise volumes, such as
hourly profiles.
Large shares of demand-side flexibility potential do not fit with the design of for-
wards, limiting their usefulness as an instrument to hedge such activities. To support
investments in responsive technologies different products or tariffs will be required.
A.3.4 Policy measures: Consideration of risks
Providing flexibility is a completely new function for most of the demand side. It may
be a valuable service for the system but its value is very volatile and to a large extent
uncertain. Precise timing and forecasting is crucial.
The availability of flexible demand-side resources is more uncertain than that of
centralised units. In a system with large shares of intermittent production, the demand
for flexibility also is uncertain. It may therefore become increasingly necessary to
commit capacities closer to delivery and more frequent than is the case today. At
the moment this need is met via intraday trading platforms. However, auctions may
be a more suitable way to market small capacities. They would make pricing more
transparent while also gathering the existing liquidity in the market and lowering the
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risk of failing to find a counterparty for an intraday trade. Having several auctions a
day would be an option.
The Nordic regulating power market already provides a market place for short-term
flexibility. The rules can be regarded as rather accommodating and generally suited
for participation by decentralised actors. In particular, short lead times in the bidding
process allow for small participants to gain a sufficient amount of information before
submitting bids.
Still, the submission of bids and commitment of capacities may prove to be difficult
with demand-side resources. For that reason, the concepts of bidless real-time markets
(as proposed by Ding et al., 2012) would make it possible to provide prices ahead of the
actual delivery and communicate respective signals (volume or price) to customers.
The risk of penalties in the Danish case is limited at present. A deviation from
the schedule may, however, have a significant effect. Costs are incurred through the
balancing mechanism. Its design should therefore consider whether a risk imposed
through balancing costs is appropriate and not prohibitive for active demand-side
participation. This to a large extent depends on competitive regulating markets that do
not exclude any capacities from participating.
If investments are a prerequisite to participate in flexibility markets, uncertainty
related to the long-term value of flexibility may become an issue. As described above,
existing forward products seem to provide only limited help in this regard. As the
forward market is organised by commercial actors, it is unlikely that new products
will emerge in the short run. Complementary policies and pricing schemes that help
demand-side actors to plan for longer time frames could be a temporary solution (see
also Alexander, 2010).
A good example of investments based on long-term price incentives is the installation
of large thermal stores at Danish decentralised combined-heat-and-power plants. They
have mostly been based on a three-level tariff, which is only slightly more variable than
the two levels of Nordic forward markets (cp. Togeby et al., 2009). Similar tariff schemes
backed by legislation could be imagined for demand response as well.
A.4 Barriers to discovering the value of flexibility
Information about supply and demand for flexibility contained in the prices of existing
products (Table A.2) is limited to the scope of the products. Any demand or potential
supply that does not fit with the predefined timing or location will not be allowed to
participate. Besides indicating a possibly low value of flexibility due to the basic market
structure, the imperfect information may be one of the reasons why incentives from
traded products are often found to be too weak to establish demand response (see Chao,
2010; Singh & Østergaard, 2010; Strbac, 2008).
The discussion in this section suggests that existing products and markets do not
reveal the full value of flexibility. The decentralised part of the demand for flexibility
is hidden. If flexibility remuneration mechanisms can be designed to reflect needs at
higher resolutions in time and location, then it will become more attractive to activate
decentralised resources.
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A.4.1 Locational information
At some level of penetration with variable renewable production connected to regional
and local grids, signs indicate a demand by the system that cannot be suitably addressed
with existing products. If not coordinated, the use of some products at system level
may even increase localised demands.
Local regulation and re-dispatch is already taking place on a bilateral basis to ensure
power-system stability. The extent of such flexibility actions without public price signals
may become significant with increasing shares of distributed production. One example
is the extensive regulation of wind power in North-Eastern Germany (cp. Bömer, 2011).
In 2012, the amount paid to regulate German renewable energy plants in this way was
almost half of the amount spent on the comparable service of tertiary reserves the same
year (cp. Bundesnetzagentur, 2013).
In the future, regulation in the opposite direction may become a growing issue. Such
sub-market regulation is not reflected in current prices, raising questions about the
possibility of including a larger share of the actual value of decentralised flexibility
resources in existing or new market products.
According to the expectations about future challenges in distribution grids, it is
likely that some value is hidden from the current markets at the regional and local levels.
Challenges for distribution system operators will originate from increased installation
of distributed generation and potentially from new electrical loads associated with
electric vehicles and heat pumps.
If regulation services must be provided at lower voltage levels, demand-side re-
sources would be very well suited to provide those (cp. e.g., Csetvei et al., 2011; Shaw
et al., 2009). This will eventually help reduce the need for capacity investments (Dansk
Energi & Energinet.dk, 2012). Value created in this way should be reflected back onto the
actors creating it, which may allow some demand-side resources to become competitive
with conventional measures (CIRED, 2013).
A.4.2 Timing prerequisites
Market-design barriers regarding the time frame for providing existing products are
closely related to the characteristics and technical capabilities at the demand side.
Decentralised flexibility resources will differ in the services they are able to provide (cp.
Hirst & Kirby, 2001). Some may have limits regarding the duration of their response;
others may not be able to return to previous load levels fast enough. Such resources
have limited value within the current framework, although they could be well suited
for new or slightly adjusted services.
In the Nordic system, both the day-ahead and the intraday markets are settled
on an hourly basis. Any provider of flexibility on these markets, therefore, must be
able to react for at least one hour. If load shifting is involved, both the increase and
the decrease of load is required to have a duration of at least one hour. For many
residential appliances this will be prohibitive unless they are pooled and controlled in
an aggregated way to fulfil the market requirements.
The timing requirements of products on the regulating power market may be a
challenge as well. Although Denmark provides rather flexible conditions in support of
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decentralised production units, integrating the demand side into this market remains a
big step.
A.4.3 Policy measures: Product definitions to reveal full value
A market for flexibility services on a more local level is being widely discussed. On
the one hand, such markets could help to solve regulation tasks at the distribution
level. On the other hand, they may become necessary as a coordinating mechanism if
increasingly transmission-system services are supplied by demand-side resources, thus
putting more pressure on distribution grids (cp. Medina et al., 2010).
It is still somewhat open what kind of products should be traded on such markets
(proposals for the Danish case can be found in Ding et al., 2013; Energinet.dk & Dansk
Energi, 2012). One of the challenges is to design them in a way that does not conflict
with the existing set-up at system level. Continuous coordination mechanisms between
system and local levels will most likely be required (Friedrichsen, 2012).
In general, the demand for flexibility at the distribution-grid level is not easily
addressed through market-based arrangements. At low-voltage levels, the need very
much depends on the layout of the local grid infrastructure (DENA, 2012). Therefore,
tendering standardised products may sometimes be difficult, as demand can be very
specific. The grid operator should avoid paying for resources not actually required.
Yet knowing when to upgrade the grid and socialise costs among all users instead of
applying local incentives is also a critical policy issue (cp. Csetvei et al., 2011).
From a timing perspective conclusions on changes in market design seem less clear
than from a locational perspective. To achieve full efficiency prices should reflect
real-time conditions of the power system. However, it is not certain that such volatile
price information would lead to the most efficient response from the demand side.
Frequent price changes to prompt changes in consumption behaviour may result in
consumers getting tired of reacting and, eventually, becoming less responsive (Kim &
Shcherbakova, 2011). Of course, for automated load control this will not be an issue.
Automated and manual demand response should therefore be targeted at different time
scales.
A.5 Barriers in the design of roles and responsibility
Defining clear incentives and adequate risks towards the demand side is an important
foundation for activating flexibility potential. Moreover, the incentive structures in
the market also require a suitable division of roles and responsibilities. Adoption of
demand response contracts and flexible technologies only makes sense in a model that
can communicate the right information and make use of the responsive behaviour of
small units.
Market-structural factors, such as costs and risks of participating in flexibility mar-
kets, naturally lead to an aggregation of capacities and centralisation of responsibility
for such portfolios. However, various design elements contribute to predefining roles
and responsibilities as well and these may impede the development of an active demand
side.
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Product definitions are important in this respect too as they implicitly or explicitly
contain pooling requirements for participating capacities. But delegation may also
be built into policies and market regulations, leaving no choice but to actively take
responsibility.
Here the focus will be on information flows within the Danish model. Essential
information on the demand for flexibility is contained in short-term price signals.
Initially, the market-role model determines who receives such signals, defining the type
of actors allowed in the market and how communication must take place amongst them.
On the other hand, communicating demand-side activities back to the market
without significant delay is just as important. Besides the definition of market roles,
balancing and settlement rules for demand-side volumes are important in predefining
how potential flexibility is aggregated and whether it can be utilised in the market
places.
A.5.1 Pooling requirements
To some extent, some of the market-design issues mentioned in Sections A.3 and A.4
are currently mitigated by the pooling of smaller capacities. If one unit cannot fulfil the
requirements, then perhaps another portfolio of units will do so.
Minimum bid-sizes in the markets represent an explicit pooling requirement if small
capacities are to participate. While the Nordic spot market enables trading of relatively
small lots of 100 kW, long-term forward and intraday trades have to cover at least 1
MW. The regulating power market has a minimum bid-size of 10 MW.
Besides the mere volume requirements, timing also plays a role. The day-ahead and
intraday markets cover settlement periods of one hour. Forward products cover far
longer periods. The underlying physical capacities must match these time patterns as
deviations will have to be settled in the balancing market at an additional cost. Portfolio
aggregation is the only practical solution.
The attractive market for regulating power features a few more implicit pooling
requirements besides the explicit minimum bid size. While committed capacity will
have to stay available for at least one full hour, activation is scheduled only in 5-minute
intervals. At the same time, complying with a potential activation of one whole hour
or only five minutes may be very difficult without aggregation of many small units.
Moreover, to mitigate the risk of a unit not being available for regulation it may become
necessary to hold reserve capacity within the portfolio, depending on what level of
penalties to expect.
The result is that the only practical access to flexibility markets is through centralised
aggregation. Direct market participants will have to translate market products into
products for the demand side. Pooling then can become complex and, inevitably,
pooling providers will add risk premiums to cover any differences in value between
wholesale and demand-side products.
This creates additional design-related costs for demand-side flexibility. Moreover the
pooling of smaller capacities limits taking into account individual preferences. Unless
it is possible to pool units with like preferences, this would reduce the efficiency of
demand-side flexibility.
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Figure A.1: Market-roles and short-term informational links in the present model
A.5.2 Information flows in the market-role model
All incentives must work along given lines of communication, determined to a great
extent by the model of market-roles. In liberalised markets, the model assigns re-
sponsibilities to different actors and defines indispensable information flows. In this
way, the market-role model enables efficient handling of the processes required to
run functioning wholesale and retail markets while continuously maintaining system
reliability.
The following observations are organised around the current Danish model of mar-
ket roles (Energinet.dk, 2007). As the Danish model reflects the harmonised European
electricity market-role model (ENTSO-E, 2011) the observations to some extent apply
for other European markets as well.
The model of roles as shown in Figure A.1 describes informational flows between
different actors related to price and quantities on a short-term basis (at least daily
exchange of information). These flows are most relevant to the provision of flexibility.
The grid and system operators as well as grid-connected parties, both consumers
and producers, make up the physical side of the system. The commercial actors are
shown on the right side and consist of suppliers and balancing responsible parties
[BRP].
Grid and system operators may set the terms and incentives to ensure reliability
in the physical system entering into contractual relations with the commercial actors.
Consumers as well as generating plants are obliged to enter agreements with a supplier
that assumes the obligation to supply certain loads and to off-take produced electricity.
The supplier then has to make sure that all production and consumption is part of a
86
Figure A.2: Market-roles including DSO price information links
BRP’s account.
Such contractual links often include some form of information exchange regarding
volume and price. Those long-term links are omitted in Figure A.1 as they only contain
limited information on the actual value of flexibility. Some degree of information may
be transferred by implementing time-of-use pricing within a contract; the flexibility
incentive, however, will be weaker.
Due to explicit and implicit pooling requirements, aggregation takes place on the
commercial side as to make portfolios fit with wholesale products and system services.
The only commercial party receiving initial short-term price information is the BRP. It
is thus the only role that is obliged and incentivised towards the system operator to
maintain a balanced portfolio in the short-term. This way, it has become the central
role on the commercial side to communicate demand for reliability in the system by
trading with other BRPs and by distributing control signals to connected parties possibly
through their respective suppliers.
In principle the preconditions to market flexibility from demand-side actors are
given, also under the present conditions and by the use of existing products. Most of
the activities related to bringing new demand-side flexibility to the market would have
to be organised around the role of the BRP. Either existing BRPs in the market would
take that role, or alternatively other actors would have to assume the role of a BRP.
As the market model in its present form does not distribute price information to the
demand side, this would have to be done by commercial actors as well. In that case, to
establish the required informational links between demand side and flexibility markets,
suitable commercial agreements would have to be negotiated (see also He et al., 2013).
In Figure A.2 communication between the BRP and connected parties is indicated
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by an additional price link. Signals to the demand side may instead contain quantity
information or quantity-related information, such as temperature set-points see also,
Ikäheimo et al. (2010, for examples of different signals).
New informational flows would also have to be established if flexibility products
are to address a local demand. Figure A.2 also provides an example of how the in-
formational flow from local grid companies could be extended to include signals about
flexibility and its potential value. In this first, step it is not important to whom these
signals are sent as long as they are received by one of the commercial actors.
A.5.3 Aggregation and settlement of demand-side volumes
At this point in time, it is still somewhat unclear which market role should be expected to
initiate the development of decentralised flexibility resources. Internationally, countries
are following diverse approaches (cp. Brandstätt et al., 2012).
Denmark is pursuing a market-based approach that puts responsibility for devel-
oping suitable products with the commercial actors to the greatest extent possible.
Although some degree of direct regulation by grid operators may still be necessary (cp.
Energinet.dk & Dansk Energi, 2012), this might conflict with the evolving retail market
model (Danish Energy Agency, 2012). This new model is aimed at establishing the
supplier as the single point-of-contact for end customers. This commercial role would
clearly have to be included in the facilitation and operation of demand-side flexibility.
The challenges of pooling in order to participate in the market were described above.
In addition, pooling only makes sense if balancing and settlement rules for the demand
side are consistent with the requirements of market products.
As indicated by the black arrows from the connected parties and further upwards
in Figures A.1 and A.2, short-term changes in demand-side volumes must be reflected
back to the commercial side and onto the respective wholesale balancing accounts. At
present, in Denmark as in many other markets, this only happens for large customers
(annual consumption of at least 100 MWh).
Unless they accept a significant increase in their metering tariff, smaller customers
will be settled based on the same hourly profiles valid for all customers in the distri-
bution grid area. Even if hourly metering is installed, the actual consumption will not
have an immediate effect on the market portfolio of the balancing responsible party.
Thus, it will not be possible to earn a profit from potential response actions, which
presents a severe design-related barrier to demand-side flexibility.
A.5.4 Policy measures: Ensure adequate aggregation
Enforced centralisation should be viewed as an important policy issue regarding the
aggregation of demand-side flexibility. Aggregation should be an active choice based
on fundamental economics and not a requirement in market regulations.
In the case of product definitions in the regulating power market the issue of bid
sizes and demand-side participation is already being discussed by regulatory policy-
makers (Bang et al., 2012). A change in the timing of products, however, does not seem
to be on the way. The neighbouring German market, by comparison, has 15-minute
settlement periods and is preparing to introduce 15-minute day-ahead contracts. For
some decentralised resources this could be an attractive option.
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Substantial changes to the model of market roles are unlikely in the near future, and
activation of flexible resources has to primarily rely on commercial initiatives within
the defined framework of roles. As long as reliability is maintained, it makes sense from
the perspective of the system operator to keep this set-up. Adjustments could still be
achieved by introducing new flexibility products.
Concepts of flexibility products at distribution-grid level are being developed. A
model in which the system operator then would coordinate both local and system-wide
flexibility demand and exchange information with the BRPs has been proposed by the
Danish system operator (cp. Energinet.dk & Dansk Energi, 2012). Alternatively, grid
companies could also enter into agreements with the commercial side directly.
At present, on the commercial side, BRPs are the central hub for flexibility inform-
ation, while at the same time their connection to the demand side is still rather weak.
This unbalanced constellation could impede the creation of a more active demand side.
The adoption of demand flexibility by commercial actors could be supported by
establishing a more direct link to the relevant markets. With BRP aggregation there will
be a chain of communication and contractual links between consumer and markets.
While it may be possible to break up this chain or shorten some of the links by integration
of roles or by commercial agreements within the present model, another option is to
create a link by re-designing the market communication model.
This could imply introducing new roles or requiring different communication flows.
With regard to local flexibility products, defining new responsibilities for demand-side
aggregation might be considered, such that the provision of flexibility may be handled
separately.
The introduction of a new aggregator role is frequently brought up in discussions
about demand response, but it may be interpreted very differently (e.g., Ding et al.,
2013; Energinet.dk & Dansk Energi, 2012; Ikäheimo et al., 2010). In principle, the role
contains elements of both suppliers and BRPs in that it involves gathering a portfolio
of customers like a supplier, while at the same time, at least to some extent, it includes
responsibility for marketing flexibility (similar to a BRP).
How to treat this role within the market-role model is unresolved as it is somewhat
unclear where it would fit into the picture. Some argue that although it would be
necessary to establish such actors, they would still have to refer to a BRP that takes
final responsibility for marketing and balancing of flexible capacities (as in Figure A.3).
The Danish system operator favours such a set-up (cp. Energinet.dk & Dansk Energi,
2012). It does not necessarily add anything new, as it would essentially still be a BRP
aggregation model.
It would mean a substantial change, however, if the new role represented self-
contained flexibility aggregators. Such actors would have to be able to market flexibility
independent of the supply of electricity. One aggregator presumably would have to
refer to several BRPs, which would be somewhat contradictory to their aggregation role.
It might be more obvious to let such aggregators refer to the system or grid operators
directly to market their flexibility in a truly aggregated manner (see Figure A.4).
Some see such an aggregator role as new pivotal point for the marketing of flexibility
services separate from existing roles (cp. Ding et al., 2013). However, as this model for
some parts separates flexibility from the energy delivery, a flexible customer would
have to be affiliated with both a supplier and an aggregator. While the supplier would
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Figure A.3: Market-role model including aggregator
have to procure energy for the customer, the aggregator would need to manage the
flexibility.
The advantage of a set-up with separate flexibility aggregation would be that it
creates an open market with competition among aggregators over flexibility capabilities
of the demand side. It would however, require substantial adjustments to settlement
rules in order to not affect the balancing responsible of the energy deliveries. It may
also open up the possibility of managing different appliances behind the same meter
by different aggregators. For household customers, in particular, this may create more
transaction costs than actual benefit.
While separating flexibility marketing may be a workable idea, the most practical
model to implement it is probably to integrate the flexibility aggregation role with the
supply task. In this model, retailers would also be able to aggregate and market the
flexibility of their customers (Ikäheimo et al., 2010). This would ensure that although
flexibility could be marketed directly (with for instance the grid company) all adjust-
ments would happen within the same balancing account and settled volumes at the
BRP level could be more easily corrected for flexibility actions.
Under a supplier aggregation model the coordination requirements for the system
operator and potentially also the BRP will inevitably increase. The model may be
attractive to the suppliers and in particular to the customers maintaining a single point-
of-contact to the electricity market (cp. Scheer & Strömbäck, 2010). As acceptance and
adoption is one of the major issues for demand-side flexibility, this may prove to be
valuable.
Table A.3 provides an overview of consequences to the different market roles of
the discussed approaches for allocating the demand-side flexibility aggregation task.
Aggregation by BRP, supplier, or a new aggregator role is compared to the current
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Figure A.4: Market-role model including aggregator with direct market access
status. Coordination requirements increase as soon as flexibility aggregation happens
around the BRP. At the same time the opportunities for the provision of demand-side
participation and new services will improve.
In any case it would first be necessary to establish adequate settlement rules. Real-
time metering and frequent settlement is costly and not yet feasible for small consumer.
The usual tariff for hourly metering with daily settlement lies at almost 700 EUR per
year and will only be borne by larger customers.
For now, only proposals for intermediate solutions exist that aim at a compromise
between efficient informational flows and cost by introducing hourly metering with
monthly settlement (Danish Energy Regulatory Authority, 2012). This way the flexibility
potential can only be utilised to a limited extent, as response actions would not have
direct influence on the market portfolios. To communicate price signals towards the
demand side, however, this is a good starting point that should be further developed.
A.6 Conclusion
As Section A.2 suggests, flexible capacities on the demand side may become valuable
to the electricity system if enabled to take over reliability tasks. The level of adoption
of this new function is critical for a policy strategy aiming at utilising demand-side
flexibility potential.
Establishing informational links is a fundamental precondition for having the de-
mand side actively participate in the market. While the smart meter roll-out is firmly
seated on the political agenda, it is questionable whether the relevant actors can be
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Table A.3: Implications of different aggregation models on market roles
Market roles Continued BRP
aggregation
Supplier aggregation Separate aggregation
role
System operator – Additional coordina-
tion with distribution
level
←−−−−−−−Potentially increasing coordina-
tion
with new counterparties
−−−−−−−→
Grid company ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Potential access to new
services
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
BRP – Dependence on cooper-
ation with suppliers
– Potentially increasing
competition from new
BRPs
←−−−−−−−Potential for cooperation
Potentially increased coordina-
tion
−−−−−−−→
Supplier – Dependence on cooper-
ation with BRP
– New business oppor-
tunities
– New competencies re-
quired
– Potentially increased
coordination
– Increasing competition
Demand side – New options offered by
(potentially unknown)
specialists
– Comfortable access
through single-point-of-
contact
– New options offered by
(unknown) specialists
– Potentially several new
contractual counter-
parties
Aggregator – Dependence on cooper-
ation with BRP
– Dependence on cooper-
ation with suppliers
– New business oppor-
tunities
forced to implement dynamic pricing or other incentive-based schemes and whether
consumers can be motivated to adopt such schemes.
From a policy perspective, it will be important to establish economically efficient
solutions that also work in an international context, especially within the common
European electricity market. Emphasis has to be placed on the right issues. As Section
A.2.4 points out, some barriers have their background in the fundamental character-
istics of the electricity market structure such that intervention may create inadvertent
inefficiencies.
The policy priority should thus be on addressing barriers in market rules, products,
and existing regulation. This analysis identifies the design of incentives, their expected
value and related risks as well as the distribution of roles and responsibilities, as key
elements for successful activation of demand-side flexibility.
Important design-related barriers due to the implicit risks of applying existing
market products to flexible demand were examined in Section A.3. They include
short trading lead times, penalties and inappropriate hedging instruments. Regulat-
ory options to consider include short gate-closure times and more frequent auctions.
Moreover, pricing schemes with a high degree of certainty about price levels could
improve investment incentives.
Imperfect information about the timing and location of physical demand for flexibil-
ity were described in Section A.4. A first step towards improving imperfect information
about locational flexibility needs would be to implement coordinating mechanisms
between the system operator and local grid operators regarding the demand and availab-
ility of flexibility. This would also be a precondition for efficiently utilising demand-side
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resources for system services. Such mechanisms may eventually develop into market
platforms at the distribution-grid level. Information about timing may be improved
by refining the rules of regulating power markets and possibly by shorter settlement
periods.
Section A.5 looked into the delegation of responsibility from many decentralised
actors to a few wholesale market participants as well as the route of information between
markets and the demand side. An important precondition is to establish a settlement
system that reflects response actions back onto market portfolios.
Regarding aggregation, the model of continued BRP aggregation has some clear
advantages. It would keep flows simple and utilise established processes. However, it
is dependent on cooperation between BRPs and suppliers and may favour incumbent
market participants.
Separating responsibility for demand-side flexibility from the usual BRP tasks would
indeed be another option, but it would require extending the current model with a new
aggregator role. To avoid the risk of designing new barriers and additional transaction
costs, it seems recommendable, to initially let existing roles (that is, suppliers) handle
the aggregation task for demand flexibility, with only minor adjustments to the current
market-role set-up.
A big challenge following the roll-out of smart metering lies in activating the poten-
tial for demand response by inducing the adoption of smart technologies and matching
electricity market products. Future research should consider incentives and barriers
faced by different kinds of demand-side actors, including the potential transaction
costs. The expected increase in the demand for flexibility will be the major driver for
new capacities. Market-design barriers should stay in the focus of researchers and
policy-makers to not impede the development of beneficial flexibility.
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Abstract
Applying a partial equilibrium model of the electricity market we analyse
effects of exposing household electricity customers to retail products with variable
pricing. Both short-term and long-term effects of exposing customers to hourly spot
market prices and a simpler rebate scheme are analysed under scenarios with large
shares of wind power in a Danish case study. Our results indicate strategies that
could be favourable in ensuring high adoption of products and efficient response by
households. We find that simple pricing schemes, though economically less efficient,
could become important in an early phase to initialise the development of household
demand response. At a later point, when long-term dynamics take effect, a larger
effort should be made to shift consumers onto real-time rates, and an increased
focus on overall adoption of variable pricing will be required. Another finding is
that demand response under variable pricing makes wind power more valuable.
These gains in value reduce the need for support, and could be redistributed in
further support of demand response.
aTechnical University of Denmark
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B.1 Introduction
Incentives for household electricity consumers to provide flexibility are increasingly
being discussed to support the integration of intermittent renewable energies (Torriti
et al., 2010). To do so, incentives need to be highly dynamic, and real-time pricing
is frequently mentioned as providing highest economic benefits. Households may
perceive dynamic pricing as complex and as potentially colliding with their preference
for stability, predictability and low risk (Curtius et al., 2012; S. J. Darby, 2013). Because
individual behaviour shapes household consumption (Rathi & Chunekar, 2015), it
will barely be planned ahead of time and will most often not be automated or remote
controlled. Demand response in this segment may therefore face a dilemma in that
the economically most efficient pricing schemes will be too complex for the majority
of customers to become interested in or react upon. If schemes are simplified, on the
other hand, they will generate far less economic benefits, especially in systems with
large shares of renewable generation. In this paper we contribute to evaluating this
trade-off between economic efficiency and product simplicity by determining the effect
of a simple rebate scheme as compared to dynamic hourly pricing.
While our analysis builds on general economic principles, we derive results in a
stylised Danish setting, to illustrate the interplay of demand response with large-scale
development of intermittent production. With Danish energy policy aiming at a fossil-
free electricity supply in 2035 (Danish Government, 2011), wind energy is going to play
a major role in the future (Kwon & Østergaard, 2012). In 2020 electricity generation from
wind energy should make up close to 50% of annual consumption (Danish Government,
2012). The increasing volumes of wind power require sufficient flexible capacity to
maintain a stable system, and with conventional power plants replaced by renewable
generators, the Danish electricity system operator, amongst several other initiatives,
aims at a better utilisation of demand-side flexibility (Energinet.dk, 2013); though this
still is subject to removing various barriers within the regulatory framework (Katz,
2014).
We focus on household consumption, because in this segment we expect the trade-
off between efficiency and effectiveness of incentives to be most significant. It has been
established that household consumers hold a technical potential to provide flexibility
(Gils, 2014). Several studies show that, when provided with economic incentives, they
will utilise their potential and thus reveal some extent of elasticity towards short-term
electricity prices (see Faruqui & Sergici, 2010, for an overview). For competitive retail
markets it should be acknowledged, though, that consumers cannot be forced into
specific schemes. They rather choose their pricing plans themselves and determine
which products for demand response are going to be adopted.
Possible products have been discussed thoroughly (Albadi & El-Saadany, 2008)
and may be categorised into price-based and volume-based schemes, depending on
whether customers receive varying prices or are subject to direct constraints on their
level of consumption (X. He et al., 2013). Demand response of households without the
use of automation will typically have to occur under price-based schemes. Here we
can distinguish three major types of rate designs (Cappers et al., 2012): 1) time-of-use
pricing, 2) critical event pricing, 3) real-time pricing. The first type consists of a mostly
static pattern of prices that make it less efficient in a system based on wind power like
the Danish one. The latter two are more dynamic schemes. In critical event pricing
98
Complexity 
Ec
on
om
ic
 p
ot
en
tia
l 
Fixed rate 
In
te
rr
up
tib
le
 
co
nt
ra
ct
s 
Real-time 
pricing Direct load control 
Fixed  
remuneration 
Variable 
remuneration 
Critical  
event pricing 
Critical-peak 
pricing 
Peak-time 
rebate 
Fi
xe
d 
 
ca
p 
D
yn
am
ic
  
ca
p 
Figure B.1: Complexity and economic potential of different pricing schemes
customers are subject to a significant price increase or rebate at specific times considered
critical. With real-time pricing customers receive frequently updated price signals
reflecting system cost. While all of these schemes provide an incentive for demand
response, they differ in their theoretical economic potential and in how effective they
will be in practice.
Real-time pricing is the ideal scheme from an economic point of view (Vickrey,
1992) and should be well suited in a dynamic environment with large fluctuations from
wind power. Recent experience shows, however, that real-time prices work best with
automated control and may be less applicable to manual response (Lund et al., 2015;
Vanthournout et al., 2015). Comparisons of dynamic pricing studies also reveal that
higher elasticities are achieved under critical event pricing or time-of-use schemes than
under real-time pricing (Conchado & Linares, 2012). Schemes with higher economic
potential tend to be more complex from a customer point of view (Sarah J. Darby &
McKenna, 2012) resulting in higher transaction costs (Faruqui et al., 2010), which in
turn may reduce effectiveness by lowering adoption and response potential. Figure B.1
is an attempt to illustrate this trade-off by putting different types of pricing schemes
into the two mentioned dimensions. So although real-time pricing in theory should
be the best solution, it might not be in practice, when taking into account behavioural
aspects of households like: response fatigue (Kim & Shcherbakova, 2011), risk aversion
(Costello, 2004) and resistance to increasing transaction cost (Broberg & Persson, 2016).
In this paper we evaluate the economic benefits of an electricity retail product for
demand response that is less complex than real-time pricing. We therefore compare
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economic gains of switching customers from a flat rate to hourly pricing to those of
switching customers to a rebate product that customers should be better able to foresee
the implications of. For that purpose we set up a partial equilibrium model of the
electricity market based on hourly values (Section 2) and derive results for two different
scenarios of wind production in a Danish setting (Section 3 presents the underlying case
study assumptions). We then compare outcomes for the different retail price regimes
(Sections 4 and 5).
As we will show in the following brief review of related work, elements of our
study have been addressed in the literature previously. Economic analyses of demand
response have been conducted in various studies and within different market and
regulatory contexts (for an overview see Conchado & Linares, 2012). Where we identify
a gap and contribute with this paper is in economic benefit analyses of different retail
pricing schemes including long-term dynamics in a setting with intermittent renewables.
Based on such analyses we will be better able to evaluate the gap in economic benefit
that we might have to accept in order to achieve effective incentives in terms of adoption
and response levels.
A number of studies conduct their analysis in a static setting assuming the response
has no impact on prices. Many of these works consider real-time or hourly pricing:
e.g. analysing heating and cooling in Texas (Yoon et al., 2014), household appliances
in Ireland (Finn et al., 2011) and Germany (Gottwalt et al., 2011; Stötzer et al., 2015) or
storage-like loads under German (Schreiber et al., 2015) and Danish (Biegel et al., 2014)
conditions. Static prices simplify the analysis of different retail pricing structures, which
might be the reason that besides real-time pricing also many analyses of simpler rate
structures have been performed. Some of them study critical event pricing (Park et al.,
2015; Schare, 2008), but most works look into the effects of time-of-use rates from the
perspective of utilities (Y. He et al., 2012; Vera et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2015) or customers
(Gudi et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2013).
We choose an approach based on economic equilibrium modelling in order to
account for the dynamic market impacts of demand response. After all the impact
on prices and generation capacities has been one of the main arguments in favour of
demand response. Even though many studies use a similar equilibrium approach, they
do not necessarily take long-term dynamics into account. Such works acknowledge
the price impact of the response, but keep supply capacities static. Analyses with a
short-term focus have been carried out examining real-time or day-ahead pricing (e.g.
in the US (Hirst, 2002; Sioshansi & Short, 2009; Spees & Lave, 2008), the UK (Green
& Vasilakos, 2010; Roscoe & Ault, 2010), Slovenia (Kladnik et al., 2013) or Denmark
(Andersen et al., 2006)), time-of-use and critical peak pricing (Faruqui et al., 2009;
Moghaddam et al., 2011) as well as incentive-based response schemes (Aalami et al.,
2010; Walawalkar et al., 2008). A short-term equilibrium approach provides a bit more
insight into the market dynamics of demand response. To fully evaluate the impact of
policies, however, the short-term approach should be accompanied by an analysis of
the long-term equilibrium (Cepeda & Saguan, 2016). One particular formal equilibrium
framework developed for demand response by Borenstein and Holland (2005) has
been applied several times in different variations, showing how real-time pricing and
resulting response of elastic demand generates significant benefits even with limited
elasticities, for example, for US electricity markets (Allcott, 2012; Borenstein, 2005)
and Norway (Kopsakangas-Savolainen & Svento, 2012). A related approach has been
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developed and applied to four weeks of Danish wind and demand data (De Jonghe
et al., 2012).
Long-term models result in the construction of an electricity system with optimal
generation capacities. Usually this neglects existing capacity in a market, assuming
divestment from overcapacity. As long as the state of the system is not taken into
account, the long-term equilibrium found remains somewhat theoretical. Energy system
models take a step further. They require a high level of detail in representing the energy
system often resulting in extensive computation requirements. Analyses have been
carried out, for example, with a focus on demand response from residential appliances
(Göransson et al., 2014; Pina et al., 2012; Rodrigues & Linares, 2015), heat pumps
(Fehrenbach et al., 2014; Hedegaard & Balyk, 2013; Hedegaard & Münster, 2013) or
electric vehicles (Hedegaard, Ravn et al., 2012; Juul & Meibom, 2011; Kiviluoma &
Meibom, 2010).
Besides one analysis quantifying the impact of time-of-use pricing (Borenstein, 2005),
the above long-term equilibrium studies do not take into account retail products that
are less complex than hourly pricing. While hourly pricing may be the efficient and a
realistic option, one has to take into account the restrictions of individual consumers
in reacting to hourly prices and their potential reluctance in adopting such schemes
(Dütschke & Paetz, 2013). The impact of rebate pricing or other critical event pricing
has only been analysed in short-term modelling frameworks (Faruqui et al., 2009;
Moghaddam et al., 2011) or estimated on the basis of empirical data (Fenrick et al., 2014;
Herter, 2007).
Increasingly renewable energies have become an argument in favour of demand
response and benefits are expected to become even more distinct. The economic impacts
of large shares of renewables have been studied in equilibrium settings, without includ-
ing demand response (e.g. for Southern (Mendes & Soares, 2014; Sáenz de Miera et al.,
2008) and Central European markets (Obersteiner & Saguan, 2011; Rosen et al., 2007)).
Some studies take into account demand response and renewables but limit analysis to
a local grid (Zareen et al., 2015), apply a static market setting (Batas Bjelic´ et al., 2013;
Hedegaard, Mathiesen et al., 2012; Kwon & Østergaard, 2014), or derive short-term
equilibria (Green & Vasilakos, 2010; Roscoe & Ault, 2010; Sioshansi & Short, 2009). The
long-term interaction of renewable energies with demand flexibility is most thoroughly
analysed in the energy system studies mentioned above. These studies however assume
optimal response to real-time system prices and do not consider specific retail product
structures. This is where we set in with this paper.
B.2 Method
B.2.1 Market model
The model developed is a closed-market model without interconnections to other
systems. To find a short-term equilibrium requires a specification of demand and
supply curves based on the characteristics of generators and consumers and their
respective marginal cost and benefit functions.
The demand side is characterised by a price elasticity of demand that may be defined
in several ways depending on the underlying model of individual utility (Ramskov &
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Munksgaard, 2001). Moreover one has to distinguish between elasticity of demand due
to price changes of the good itself (own-price elasticity) and of other goods (cross-price
elasticity). Here we focus on own-price elasticity. We use constant elasticities defined as
the percentage change of quantityQ given a percentage change of the price P (Wetzstein,
2013):
ε =
dQ
dP
P
Q
(B.1)
Our focus lies on the short-term elasticity of electricity demand, which is expressed
in adjustments along a demand curve that is static within the analysed time horizon.
Sometimes this is referred to as the real-time price elasticity (Lijesen, 2007). We do not
consider structural changes in electricity demand due to investments in appliances on
the basis of the long-term price level (Genc, 2016). Moreover, potential effects from
changes in income are not included (Jamil & Ahmad, 2011). This is a simplification we
consider acceptable, as individual changes in income based on savings from variable
pricing will be relatively small.
Our constant-elasticity demand curves have the form:
Dt = D0,t
(
Pt
P0
)ε
(B.2)
With:
Dt: Demand in hour t
D0,t: Baseline demand in hour t
Pt: Price in hour t
P0: Anchor price
ε: Price elasticity
The model requires a baseline demand D0,t and an anchor price P0 as a starting point
for any response. While P0 is a fixed anchor price, D0,t changes on an hourly basis. P0 is
set such that it reflects the efficient level of the flat-rate tariff in the reference case.
The marginal benefit function is derived from the demand function incorporating
both the demand from consumers on a flat-rate tariff and consumers on a variable tariff
such that:
Dt = D0,t
(
α
(
Pt
P0
)ε
+ (1− α)
(
Pf
P0
)ε)
(B.3)
With additional parameters:
α: Share of consumers on variable prices
Pf : Flat-rate price
Rearranging for the price Pt to find the inverse demand function (Kirschen & Strbac,
2004), provides us with the aggregate marginal benefit function:
MB t = P0
(
1
α
(
Dt
D0,t
− (1− α)
(
Pf
P0
)ε)) 1ε
(B.4)
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Figure B.2: Aggregate demand curve for different shares of variable price customers
Here we have to ensure that Dt > D0,t(1− α)(Pf/P0)ε, i.e. total demand will never
be less than the demand of flat-rate customers.
With a flat rate Pf equal to P0 and a 100% share of flat-rate customers the model
simply yields the load curve D0,t. If a share of customers is exposed to spot prices,
total demand follows the curve described by equations (B.3) and (B.4). For increased
elasticity ε and increased share of customers on variable prices α market demand
becomes more elastic. For a given price elasticity ε, Figure B.2 illustrates the shape of
the demand curves at different adoption levels of the variable pricing scheme.
To model generation we use a step-wise supply curve. Supply is based on wind
power and three generic thermal technologies: base load, mid-merit and peak load ca-
pacity. The short-term marginal cost function is a piecewise linear function as illustrated
in Figure B.3 and described by:
MC t =

cvar,wind for Dt ≤ Qwind,t
cvar,base for Qwind,t < Dt ≤ Qwind,t +Kbase
cvar,mid for Qwind,t +Kbase < Dt ≤ Qwind,t +Kbase +Kmid
cvar,peak for Qwind,t +Kbase +Kmid < Dt ≤
Qwind,t +Kbase +Kmid +Kpeak
(B.5)
With:
Qwind,t: Quantity supplied by wind in hour t
Kbase/mid/peak: Installed capacities of respective technology
cvar,wind/base/mid/peak: Variable costs of respective technology
A computational difficulty occurs at the shift of one technology to the next, as
well as when demand exceeds supply capacity. We therefore insert steep slopes at
these positions of the supply curve to avoid vertical curve sections. These enable us
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Figure B.3: Stylised supply curves with and without wind production
to determine equilibrium prices at any point and ensure market clearing in every case.
Most importantly, we may approximate finite price spikes without having to set a price
cap. The sloping sections are defined such that:
MC t = cmargin,t + k (Dt −Qsum,infra,t) for Ksum,infra < Dt < cvar,extra − cmargin,t
k
(B.6)
With:
cmargin,t: Variable costs of the marginal technology in hour t
Qsum,infra,t: Sum of inframarginal production incl. wind in hour t
cvar,extra: Variable costs of next extramarginal technology
k: Emergency slope
In theory the factor k, representing the slope between steps, has an infinite value.
Using a sufficiently large number will result in practically vertical slopes. We can
interpret the minor additional capacity as emergency generation only utilised during
short periods of time (Stoft, 2002). We use a constant value for k of 106.
B.2.2 Determining equilibrium
The above supply and demand curves enable us to calculate a short-term equilibrium
by setting marginal cost equal to marginal benefits in every time step. We derive a set
of hourly prices that, in combination with the respective technologies’ cost structures,
determines generator revenues. Profits are then determined as:
Πgen =
T∑
t=1
(Qgen,t (Pt − cvar,gen))−Kgen cfix,gen (B.7)
With:
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Qgen,t: Quantity supplied by generation technology in hour t
Kgen: Installed capacity of generation technology
cvar,gen: Variable cost of generation technology
cfix,gen: Fixed cost of generation technology
In the long run generators have the possibility to adjust their capacities. New
entrants may join the market, or plants may be shut down. This process continues until
capacity reaches a new long-term equilibrium, where adding additional capacity would
result in overall losses, while reducing capacity would result in profits attracting new
entrants and a capacity increase.
Retailers will have to buy volumes supplied to their customers at the equilibrium
wholesale prices. The retail market will reach equilibrium, when retailer profits become
zero. Eventually, consumers will therefore pay a price exactly covering whole-sale
procurement costs of their suppliers, and retailer profits would be determined as:
Πretail =
T∑
t=1
(
(Pf − Pt)D0,t (1− α)
(
Pf
P0
)ε)
(B.8)
Equation (B.8) is valid as long as variable pricing customers exactly pay the whole-
sale market price, thus, not affecting retailer profits. Below we define a slightly different
version of the retailer profit function if the variable retail price and the wholesale price
are not necessarily equal (as in the analysed rebate pricing schemes).
Figure B.4 illustrates the steps to take in determining short-term and long-term
equilibria. As a reference we first establish an equilibrium without any variable retail
rates largely resembling the situation of today (α = 0). We determine a set of generation
capacities that results in a profit of zero for all generators. This is done by: 1) setting
peak generator capacity to supply all of demand at zero profits, 2) substituting peak
generator capacity with mid-merit capacity until both produce at zero profits, and 3)
substituting mid-merit capacity with base-load generation until all generators, except
for wind, produce at zero profits. We then find the flat retail rate that exactly covers
wholesale market procurement cost of the retailer if consumption equals D0 (which will
be the case at P0 = Pf ).
When customers switch to variable prices (α > 0), consumption and price in all
of the hours changes according to the price elasticity of demand. To compensate for
the retailer profits generated by a change in wholesale prices a new flat rate has to be
determined. A change in consumption also affects producer revenues. In order to fulfil
the equilibrium condition of zero profits will therefore require adjusting capacities until
we reach a new long-term equilibrium state with both generator and retailer profits at
zero.
B.2.3 Determining the economic benefits
Overall economic benefits are determined as the net-change in consumer and producer
surplus. Due to retail market competition retailer profits will be at zero. Producer
surplus, defined by the difference between costs and revenues, will also be at zero in
long-term equilibrium as revenues exactly cover fixed costs. This does not, however,
apply to wind power producers; here we allow for the exception of non-zero profits.
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Figure B.4: Algorithm to determine short and long-term equilibria
The relatively high investment cost of wind power would usually result in losses that
we assume support payments to compensate for. We can then account for a change
in support payments caused by the introduction of variable pricing in the overall net
benefits.
The change in consumer surplus, from a situation with all costumers on fixed prices
to a new option with variable pricing, can be measured using the demand curve and
the new set of prices. Figure B.5 illustrates the change during one time step t as an area
to the left of the marginal benefit curve in equation (B.4). As the marginal benefit curve
is the inverse of the demand curve the area in Figure B.5a corresponds to the area under
the demand function shown in Figure B.5b. We can thus take the integral of equation
(B.3) over the price difference to determine the following expression for a change in
consumer surplus per time step t:
∆CS t = αD0,t
P0 − Pt
(
Pt
P0
)ε
ε+ 1
+ (α− 1)D0,t
P0 − Pf
(
Pf
P0
)ε
ε+ 1
(B.9)
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Figure B.5: Change in consumer surplus to the left of the marginal benefit curve (a) and
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B.2.4 Modelling of rebate pricing schemes
In modelling the load-shift rebate we want to reward only volumes shifted – payments
for all other volumes stay the same as for flat rate customers. Although the rebate is not
applied to the full volume, customers will have a marginal benefit on their consumption
of the full rebate. Demand of rebate customers can thus be determined in line with
equation (B.3) as:
Dreb,t = αD0,t
(
(1 + r)Pf
P0
)ε
(B.10)
To settle such a product we need to establish a baseline in order to measure the load
shift. The base-line consumption DBL,t is determined as the expected consumption of
rebate customers at a rebate of zero:
DBL,t = αD0,t
(
Pf
P0
)ε
(B.11)
The aim of the product is to react upon system conditions. Therefore the rebate will
depend on the difference between the average flat rate price and the price during a
predefined critical period. If during a particular rebate period Treb spot prices on average
show a price difference to the flat rate, then the rebate gets triggered. A threshold value
rthr may be added to avoid the provision of large rebates for relatively small deviations.
During every single rebate period the rebate r is thus based on a predefined percentage
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rebate level rlevel and determined as:
r =

rlevel for P t∈Treb > (1 + rthr)Pf
−rlevel for P t∈Treb < (1− rthr)Pf
0 otherwise
(B.12)
Depending on whether customers are expected to increase or reduce consumption
in a given period the rebate r will now be either negative or positive. With the rebate
determined by equation (B.12) during critical periods the electricity cost of a customer
is calculated as:
Crebate,t = Pf (DBL,t + (1 + r) (Dreb,t −DBL,t)) (B.13)
Equation (B.13) should result in savings only if Dreb,t deviates from DBL,t in the
requested direction. Otherwise r should equal zero and costs will simply be based on
the consumed volume times the flat rate Pf . This is important in contractual terms,
but we do not add this condition here, because with demand determined by equations
(B.10) and (B.11) this will always be the case due to the sign of the rebate.
Dividing equation (B.13) with the consumption of rebate customers Dreb,t yields the
average price a rebate customer pays for the full consumed volume during a rebate
period – again provided the customer reacts as requested. The result may be simplified
to:
Prebate,t = Pf
(
1 + r − rDBL,t
Dreb,t
)
(B.14)
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the changed marginal price level, which is the flat rate
adjusted for the rebate, and the resulting relative average price (Prebate,t/Pf ) during
critical periods for a rebate of 50%. While customers never pay more than the original
flat rate, the marginal values under this scheme always create an incentive to shift
demand in the required direction.
A long-term equilibrium is not easily established for the rebate pricing scheme.
As for other averaging variable pricing schemes, like for example time-of-use pricing,
convergence is not guaranteed (Borenstein, 2005). In our case, rebates should ideally
be based on the actual price outcome, which in turn is affected by the behaviour of
rebate customers. We avoid such feedback loops by setting rebates once for all based on
prices in the reference case. Price changes in the variable pricing case are not allowed to
further affect rebate levels.
As for the hourly pricing cases we establish a retail market equilibrium by requiring
zero retailer profits. The rebate customers do not pay the wholesale price, though, and
thus affect retailer profits. We therefore need to adjust equation (B.8) accordingly:
Πretail =
T∑
t=1
(
(Pf − Pt)D0,t (1− α)
(
Pf
P0
)ε
+ (Prebate,t − Pt)Dreb,t
)
(B.15)
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Figure B.6: Rebate for reduced consumption
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Figure B.7: Rebate for increased consumption
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B.3 Case study assumptions
B.3.1 Demand side
Consumption profiles
A fundamental input to the model is the baseline demand D0. We use the aggregate
Danish consumption profile of 2012, however, only of consumers not settled on an
hourly basis (Energinet.dk, 2015a); that is, consumers with an annual consumption of
less than 100 MWh. We focus on this particular group of customers, because we want to
isolate the impact of a shift to variable pricing for customers without access to variable
pricing schemes in the current regime.
The price elasticity of demand is another crucial input. Although the exact elasti-
city will affect the overall absolute results, for our purpose it is most important that
customers are price elastic at all. We therefore assume a fixed elasticity value and
use -0.1 in line with various previous publications (Conchado & Linares, 2012; Lijesen,
2007; U.S. Department of Energy, 2006). Table B.1 summarises the main features of the
demand assumptions.
Table B.1: Main features of demand input data
Demand input
Total consumption GWh 15,729.40
Max. consumption MW 3700.8
Min. consumption MW 824.6
Elasticity - -0.1
Retail pricing schemes
We analyse four different retail pricing schemes. The first one is an hourly real-time
pricing scheme reflecting wholesale market prices. The three remaining cases are
variations of the rebate pricing scheme as described in section B.2.4.
The parameters of the rebate scheme should be kept simple from a customer point
of view. Therefore customers will only be asked to shift volumes relative to a time
window of three hours. The difference between the analysed cases lies in the time of
day defined as rebate periods. In two of the cases periods are fixed, while the third
case operates with a dynamic time window. As the response potential of household
customers, in particular, is expected to be highest in the evening hours we analyse cases
covering the early evening hours (16.00-19.00) as well as later hours (20.00-23.00). In
the following we refer to these products as “Rebate Evening” and “Rebate Night”. In
the dynamic case (“Rebate Dynamic”) we determine the daily rebate period such that it
covers the three-hour period with the largest price deviation, in any direction.
The input parameters for the rebate cases are summarised in Table B.2. In all cases
shifted volumes generate a rebate of 50% of the retail price. A signal to customers is
triggered, whenever the average hourly price level within the defined time window
differs from the flat rate price with more than 10%. This built-in threshold is to ensure
that the response generates sufficient value at wholesale level.
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To not further complicate social benefit calculations all levies and taxes are left out
of the picture. This is important to keep in mind, when interpreting the results. The
consumers thus respond to prices as if taxed on an ad valorem basis instead of the usual
unit tax.
Table B.2: Input data for rebate pricing cases
Rebate
Evening Night Dynamic
Rebate % of flat rate 50% 50% 50%
Rebate period Hours of day 17-19 21-23 3 hours with
largest ∆
Rebate threshold % of flat rate 10% 10% 10%
Adoption scenarios
We calculate results for different adoption rates of variable pricing, and a reference
case with all customers on a flat retail rate. For all of the different retail pricing cases,
we calculate the effects of 20% of customers under the scheme and of all customers
adopting the scheme. The 20% scenario should reflect a realistically achievable potential,
while the 100% is calculated as a reference showing the maximum potential under the
different schemes.
B.3.2 Supply side
Generation
We use fixed and variable costs for three stylised thermal generation technologies and
wind power as shown in Table 3. Cost and technology data are based on the Technology
Catalogue of the Danish Energy Agency (Danish Energy Agency & Energinet.dk, 2015).
All costs are adjusted for inflation to the price level of 2016. Prices of fuels and CO2 are
based on a simple average of forecasts over the lifetime of the respective technologies
(Danish Energy Agency, 2016).
Wind power scenarios
Two wind power scenarios are defined to determine the impact of an increase of variable
production. The first scenario (“Base wind”) applies an hourly profile of the wind share
in consumption in 2012. Using shares instead of the actual production values allows
us to scale the wind profile to the share of consumption that we analyse. The annual
share of wind power in consumption for this case is around 31%. In the second scenario
(“High wind”) we increase the share to 50% of consumption.
To estimate the costs of wind power we weight the assumptions in Table B.3 to reflect
the relative shares of onshore and offshore wind installations. In the base wind scenario
we use a share of 25% offshore wind installations approximately reflecting current
levels, while in the high wind scenario we assume an increase of offshore installations
to 35% of installed wind power in line with scenarios by the Danish TSO (Energinet.dk,
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2015b). The installed wind power capacity is determined based on the maximum annual
wind production assuming that the production peak will lie at 92% of installed capacity.
Table B.3: Input costs of stylised generation technologies
Base Mid Peak Wind Wind
(onshore) (offshore)
Fixed costs
Specific investment M EUR/MW 2.19 0.93 0.7 1.29 3.61
Lifetime years 40 25 25 20 25
Discount rate % 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Equivalent annual cost EUR/MW 110,764 59,849 44,715 94,891 231,140
Fixed O&M cost EUR/MW 61,471 32,240 0 0 0
Total fixed costs EUR/MW 172,235 92,089 44,715 94,891 231,140
Variable costs
Plant efficiency % 46.00% 56.50% 39.50% - -
Fuel - Coal Gas Gas - -
Emission ton/GJ-fuel 0.094 0.056 0.056 - -
Fuel price EUR/GJ-fuel 3.05 7.14 7.14 - -
CO2 price EUR/t-CO2 14.47 12.97 12.97 - -
Fuel cost EUR/MWh 23.9 45.48 65.06 0 0
CO2 cost EUR/MWh 2.96 1.29 1.84 0 0
Variable O&M cost EUR/MWh 2.15 2.69 3.44 10.75 20.42
Total variable cost EUR/MWh 29.00 49.46 70.34 10.75 20.42
B.4 Results
B.4.1 Base wind scenario
Hourly pricing
Table B.4 provides a summary of the results for the hourly retail pricing scheme under
the base wind scenario showing the different cases horizontally and the results within
several categories vertically. We will present results in similarly structured tables for all
cases throughout this section.
The first vertical section of the Table B.4 provides an overview of consumption and
generation. For the consumption total annual volumes and the annual peak level is
shown. On the supply side the installed capacities are shown together with the full
load hours for each of the three dispatchable generation types: base load, mid-merit
and peak load. Wind volumes are not shown as they are constant throughout all the
cases within the same wind scenario.
In all simulated cases total consumption increases as compared to the reference
case. A part of the increase will again rebound towards the reference level in the long-
term, however. The usual expectation is that the peak consumption decreases due
to the customers’ response to high peak prices. This is the case for all but one of the
simulations. Quite contrary to intuition, we do notice an increase in peak consumption
in the short-term simulation results for 20% of customers on hourly pricing. This is due
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to a reduction of the flat rate in combination with the variable production profile of
wind power (see also the discussion in Section 5).
The generation capacities in the short-term simulations are kept at the reference case
levels. In the long term they are adjusted by the model as expected, such that peak and
mid-merit capacities are reduced, and base load capacity increased. These adjustments
are due to the respective generator profits provided in the third vertical section of Table
B.4. In the short-term they become negative, because of the changes in wholesale prices
caused by demand response. In particular, the peak prices are clearly reduced, but also
the average is lower than in the reference case. The wholesale price is shown in the
second vertical section of the results table. The capacity adjustments increase peak as
well as average prices from their short-term levels, and generator profits return to zero.
The long-term price peaks are lower than in the reference scenario, while the outcome
for the average price level in both adoption scenarios is a slight increase.
Besides wholesale prices the second vertical section of Table B.4 also shows the cost
of serving total load, reflecting the wholesale procurement cost of retailers, and the
average prices paid by retail customer on either flat rate or variable rate. In all cases the
cost of serving load is reduced compared to the reference. The described changes in
wholesale market prices are reflected onto the flat retail rate that is reduced by more
than 9 AC/MWh as compared to the reference case in the short term. In the long run,
however, the rate may as well increase. So while consumers immediately gain from
responding to variable prices, not all customers will necessarily profit after generation
capacity has been adjusted.
The overall costs and benefits are presented in the lower sections of Table B.4, where
we show the change in consumer surplus for different customer groups in absolute
terms and relative to total reference cost of serving load. Here we can observe that it is
not even required for all of the consumers to switch to variable rates in order to find
short-term gains of around 16%. The short-term result in the 100% adoption case is
not much higher. The effect of capacity adjustments in the long run is evident in the
results and reduces the change in consumer surplus to about 4.2% for 100% adoption
and down to 1.18% for 20% adoption.
We already mentioned thermal generator profits; besides those the total profit of
wind generators is shown. The figures are negative due to high investment costs and
reflect their need for support payments. The line showing total change in generator
profits is the difference in profit compared to the reference case, which we consider as
the relevant benefits on the supply side. It is worth noting that for wind generators
the change in profits is positive and their losses are reduced in all of the cases. The
heightened value of wind power will result in reductions in the need for support
payments and thus may also have a positive impact on consumers.
Netting the effects in the lowest two lines of Table B.4 provides us with the ideal
economic gains of hourly pricing under given assumptions. These are 3.95% relative to
total costs for serving load including the support to finance wind power in the reference
case. With a more realistic adoption level of 20% the long-term results point at a relative
annual improvement of 1.12%.
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Table B.4: Simulation results for hourly pricing in base wind scenario
Case Reference Hourly pricing
Adoption rate % 0% 20% 100%
Equilibrium long-term short-term long-term short-term long-term
Consumption
Total GWh/y 15,729 16,033 15,815 16,134 16,106
Max MW 3701 3737 3658 3622 3613
Generation capacities
Base MW 1302 1302 1316 1302 1372
Mid MW 284 284 268 284 205
Peak MW 1864 1864 1572 1864 856
Full load hours
Base h/y 7045 7200 7091 7406 7256
Mid h/y 3116 3294 3114 3262 3093
Peak h/y 488 516 565 430 882
Wholesale price
Avg. AC/MWh 48.54 44.39 48.61 44.36 48.61
Max. AC/MWh 44,785.07 117.64 12,328.52 70.34 1749.17
Cost of serving load
Total TAC/y 891,570 761,060 882,073 756,461 857,867
Specific AC/MWh 56.68 47.47 55.77 46.89 53.26
Average retail rate
Flat rate AC/MWh 56.68 47.61 56.73 - -
Variable AC/MWh - 46.89 52.06 46.89 53.26
Consumer surplus change
Flat rate TAC/y 0 115,096 -571 0 0
Variable rate TAC/y 0 29,915 11,123 150,121 37,447
Total TAC/y 0 145,011 10,552 150,121 37,447
Relativea % 0% 16.26% 1.18% 16.84% 4.20%
Generator profits
Thermal TAC/y 0 -143,304 0 -144,988 0
Wind TAC/y -236,276 -235,494 -234,239 -234,556 -229,135
Total change TAC/y 0 -142,522 2037 -143,268 7141
Net effect
Total TAC/y 0 2489 12,589 6853 44,588
Relativeb % 0% 0.22% 1.12% 0.61% 3.95%
a Relative to total reference cost of serving load
b Relative to total reference cost of serving load and wind support
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Rebate pricing schemes
Results for the rebate pricing schemes are presented in Table B.5 showing the different
rebate schemes horizontally. We only present the final long-term equilibrium results
here. The relation between short-term and long-term results is similar to the previous
calculations of the hourly scheme. Note also, that we have not repeated the reference
case results, so the presented numbers should be held up against the first column in
Table B.4.
The rebate pricing scheme as defined for this analysis only covers a daily three-hour
period. Therefore effects are limited as compared to the hourly pricing scheme. The
most significant impact comes from a rebate during the early evening hours (Rebate
“Evening”), because this is the time of the wholesale price peak in the reference case,
given the used hourly data. Having a rebate during later hours (Rebate “Night”) is not
very effective if using the same elasticity. The net effect of the “Night” rebate is only
around 25% of the “Evening” rebate.
A dynamic rebate turns out slightly better. But although this scheme catches the
highest daily differences between flat rate and hourly prices, it could not improve on the
result of the evening rebate. The major reason for the weak performance of the dynamic
rebate is that the level of the flat rate lies above the simple average of wholesale prices,
and thus the difference to peak prices is usually less than the difference to base prices,
resulting in rebates to increase consumption during off-peak hours on many days. Only
during very high price spikes will the dynamic rebate be triggered at peak times. At
off-peak times, however, the rebate is often not sufficient to affect prices, and this is also
a reason for the negative impact on wind power profits under the dynamic scheme.
Similar to the hourly scheme two of the rebates may result in an increase in total
consumption. But while the hourly scheme reduces total cost of serving load in spite
of increased consumption, this is not the case for all of the rebate simulations. On the
other hand the rebate products are able to consistently increase the consumer surplus
and the net effects including the change in generator profits are positive as well. Just as
in the hourly case, we also note that passive flat rate customers in the 20% scenario may
be affected negatively. However, this only happens in the “Night” rebate case which
has a very limited impact anyway.
B.4.2 High wind scenario
Hourly pricing
Results for hourly pricing under the high wind scenario are summarised in Table B.6.
At first it is important to note the difference in the results of the reference case with 100%
flat rate pricing as compared to the base wind scenario. In the reference case of the high
wind scenario total costs of supply are reduced by around 40 million EUR. At the same
time the net support to wind power is increased by 160 million EUR, mostly because
we require higher capacities to be installed and a larger share of them will be offshore
and thus more expensive. Moreover, base load capacity is lower compared to the
base wind scenario, while required peak capacity rises. Full load hours are decreased
for all dispatchable generation technologies, most significantly, though, for the base
load capacity. We can also observe higher price peaks than in the base wind scenario.
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Table B.5: Simulation results for rebate pricing schemes in base wind scenario
Case Rebate "Evening" Rebate "Night" Rebate "Dynamic"
Adoption rate % 20% 100% 20% 100% 20% 100%
Equilibrium long-term long-term long-term long-term long-term long-term
Consumption
Total GWh/y 15,728 15,726 15,745 15,804 15,749 15,819
Max MW 3671 3709 3701 3700 3701 3701
Generation capacities
Base MW 1305 1317 1306 1321 1305 1309
Mid MW 282 273 283 275 282 276
Peak MW 1836 1721 1862 1853 1858 1858
Full load hours
Base h/y 7045 7035 7047 7045 7054 7096
Mid h/y 3121 3128 3118 3118 3111 3109
Peak h/y 488 492 484 473 489 488
Wholesale price
Avg. AC/MWh 48.60 48.61 48.54 48.54 48.61 48.61
Max. AC/MWh 44,784.86 44,784.80 44,784.92 44,784.86 44,784.84 44,784.67
Cost of serving load
Total TAC/y 890,706 885,791 892,022 894,177 890,658 892,423
Specific AC/MWh 56.63 56.33 56.66 56.58 56.55 56.41
Average retail rate
Flat rate AC/MWh 56.68 56.56 56.70 56.80 56.59 56.58
Variable AC/MWh 56.45 56.33 56.48 56.58 56.42 56.41
Consumer surplus change
Flat rate TAC/y 0 0 -244 0 1211 0
Variable rate TAC/y 712 5537 618 1496 802 4051
Total TAC/y 712 5537 374 1496 2013 4051
Relativea % 0.08% 0.62% 0.04% 0.17% 0.23% 0.45%
Generator profits
Thermal TAC/y 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wind TAC/y -235,401 -233,818 -236,242 -235,936 -237,513 -237,708
Total change TAC/y 875 2458 34 340 -1237 -1432
Net effect
Total TAC/y 1587 7995 408 1836 775 2619
Relativeb % 0.14% 0.71% 0.04% 0.16% 0.07% 0.23%
a Relative to total reference cost of serving load
b Relative to total reference cost of serving load and wind support
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Consumption on the other hand is at a similar level for all cases in both wind scenarios,
with a less pronounced increase under hourly pricing in the high wind scenario.
Again we see the expected relation between short-term and long-term effects. A
more surprising result is the extent of the negative impact on passive flat rate customers
in the 20% adoption case in the long run. While in the short term all customers gain as
expected, the flat rate is required to rise significantly above the reference level in the
long-term in order for the retailers to break even. The result in this case is that the 80%
flat rate customers loose three times as much as the 20% variable pricing customers
gain.
The net effect is still positive for all of the cases. In absolute terms the net effect is
higher than in the lower wind scenario, while relative to the reference cost the gains are
slightly lower. This is because, even in the case affecting flat rate customers the worst,
the effect on revenues of wind power producers is positive. Their increased income on
the wholesale market more than compensates for the losses of flat rate consumers. If
these gains are evenly distributed amongst customers then the 80% flat rate consumers
will be compensated, because 80% of the gains for wind producers exceed the reductions
in the 20% adoption case.
Overall we observe the net effect to be similar to the base wind scenario. But while
in the base wind scenario gains primarily come from an increase in consumer surplus,
they will to a larger extent result from the increase in the value of wind power in the
high wind case.
Rebate pricing schemes
Table B.7 provides an overview of the simulation results for the rebate pricing schemes.
A striking result is that for all of the partial adoption cases the consumer surplus gains
of rebate customers are insufficient to compensate for losses of remaining customers
due to a rise in the flat rate. In order to maintain the same flat rate across all customers,
pure flat rate customers will contribute to compensate a reduction in revenues to the
retailer caused by rebates. This will not necessarily be the case in practice, where rebate
customers may have to compensate for inefficient response on their own.
The short-term results, not shown in the table, are very positive in all the rebate
cases. In the long-term, though, one might see an increase in prices and thus cost as
compared to the reference level. Although we are observing these effects in the high
wind scenario, the rebate schemes still provide a positive contribution to wind power
producers. Therefore the overall net results in all of the cases stay positive.
The 100% cases for the “Night” and the “Dynamic” rebate schemes show that a
poorly designed scheme would result in long-term losses for the participants. As
compared to the base wind scenario, however, the dynamic rebate has a much more
positive effect on the value of wind power. In the reference case for the high wind
scenario, wind is the marginal technology in more than 1000 hours of the year as
compared to 40 hours in the base wind case. The dynamic rebate reduces the number
of hours by 365 in the high wind scenario, which is much more than what could be
achieved in the base wind case. This stresses the importance of dynamic instruments in
a setting with high wind production.
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Table B.6: Simulation results for hourly pricing in high wind scenario
Case Reference Hourly pricing
Adoption rate % 0% 20% 100%
Equilibrium long-term short-term long-term short-term long-term
Consumption
Total GWh/y 15,729 16,001 15,770 16,110 16,069
Max MW 3701 3727 3646 3682 3682
Generation capacities
Base MW 1029 1029 1036 1029 1086
Mid MW 385 385 369 385 309
Peak MW 2007 2007 1690 2007 909
Full load hours
Base h/y 6050 6238 6113 6514 6394
Mid h/y 3097 3204 3094 3165 3082
Peak h/y 460 478 534 398 857
Wholesale price
Avg. AC/MWh 46.88 44.06 48.61 43.90 48.61
Max. AC/MWh 44,785.07 102.65 23,692.33 70.34 2589.32
Cost of serving load
Total TAC/y 850,818 739,813 863,535 733,354 838,582
Specific AC/MWh 54.09 46.24 54.76 45.52 52.19
Average retail rate
Flat rate AC/MWh 54.09 46.38 55.78 54.09 54.09
Variable AC/MWh NA 45.66 50.81 45.52 52.19
Consumer surplus change
Flat rate TAC/y 0 97,761 -21158 0 0
Variable rate TAC/y 0 25,577 7028 130,515 13,596
Total TAC/y 0 123,339 -14130 130,515 13,596
Relativea % 0% 14.50% -1.66% 15.34% 1.60%
Generator profits
Thermal TAC/y 0 -147,308 0 -150,238 0
Wind TAC/y -398,437 -372,343 -370,650 -372,172 -363,524
Total change TAC/y 0 -121,214 27,787 -123,974 34,913
Net effect
Total TAC/y 0 2124 13,656 6542 48,509
Relativeb % 0% 0.17% 1.09% 0.52% 3.88%
a Relative to total reference cost of serving load
b Relative to total reference cost of serving load and wind support
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Table B.7: Simulation results for rebate pricing schemes in high wind scenario
Case Rebate "Evening" Rebate "Night" Rebate "Dynamic"
Adoption rate % 20% 100% 20% 100% 20% 100%
Equilibrium long-term long-term long-term long-term long-term long-term
Consumption
Total GWh/y 15,729 15,741 15,734 15,777 15,728 15,799
Max MW 3671 3782 3699 3699 3696 3696
Generation capacities
Base MW 1030 1039 1031 1039 1028 1036
Mid MW 382 371 382 371 383 373
Peak MW 1981 1872 2006 2008 1984 1986
Full load hours
Base h/y 6057 6081 6056 6088 6062 6115
Mid h/y 3100 3104 3095 3104 3097 3090
Peak h/y 462 471 457 451 465 464
Wholesale price
Avg. AC/MWh 47.00 47.00 47.09 47.09 47.50 47.50
Max. AC/MWh 44,784.89 44,785.04 44,784.83 44,784.89 44,784.85 44,784.80
Cost of serving load
Total TAC/y 851,736 846,711 854,366 855,504 860,503 862,217
Specific AC/MWh 54.15 53.79 54.30 54.23 54.71 54.58
Average retail rate
Flat rate AC/MWh 54.19 54.09 54.34 54.42 54.75 54.75
Variable AC/MWh 53.98 53.88 54.15 54.23 54.57 54.58
Consumer surplus change
Flat rate TAC/y -1292 0 -3137 0 -8237 0
Variable rate TAC/y 329 3254 -210 -2227 -1542 -7761
Total TAC/y -963 3254 -3347 -2227 -9780 -7761
Relativea % -0.11% 0.38% -0.39% -0.26% -1.15% -0.91%
Generator profits
Thermal TAC/y 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wind TAC/y -395,782 -394,794 -394,676 -394,246 -387,201 -387,397
Total change TAC/y 2655 3644 3761 4191 11,237 11,040
Net effect
Total TAC/y 1692 6898 414 1965 1457 3279
Relativeb % 0.14% 0.55% 0.03% 0.16% 0.12% 0.26%
a Relative to total reference cost of serving load
b Relative to total reference cost of serving load and wind support
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B.5 Discussion
The results of our case study illustrate some general effects of variable pricing in line
with findings in other studies on real-time pricing. As we used the case of Denmark
applying two scenarios of wind power production, we are able to observe some ad-
ditional effects specific to systems with high shares of fluctuating, non-dispatchable
generation. We also used alternative rebate pricing schemes to investigate whether the
economic effects under such schemes may justify their implementation, assuming they
could reach higher levels of adoption and response than hourly pricing.
Some generally expected effects of variable pricing can be observed in our simulation
results. Maximum price peaks are significantly reduced under hourly pricing. In the
short term reduction will be quite strong, while in the long-term prices return to a
higher level due to adjustments in generation capacity. Another observation confirming
previous findings (Caves et al., 2000) is that low adoption rates, with hourly pricing in
particular, are sufficient to generate very attractive results from a consumer point of view
in the short term, while increasing adoption does not change results significantly. In the
long term, however, we find adoption to be more important in generating economic
benefits, underlining the importance of analysing these effects.
The impact of wind power is reflected in some effects we found to be different from
results in other studies. Usually peak consumption would be decreased with variable
pricing, however, the irregular pattern of wind production allows for increasing peak
consumption without increasing costs in some of the analysed cases as well. The
reason for that is a significant decrease in the flat retail rate with flat rate customers
increasing their consumption in response. This is only possible, because due to the wind
production during the consumption peak, this is not the hour determining demand for
dispatchable capacity.
Variable pricing will on average lead to price reductions in the short term that affect
other customers on fixed rates positively as well. In the long run this is not necessarily
the case and the immediate cost of flat rate customers may even rise in specific cases.
It has been stated in previous analyses that a switch of customers to real-time pricing
makes all customers better off (Borenstein & Holland, 2005). The intuitive explanation
of such a result is that the efficient retail rate is equal to the volume-weighted average
wholesale prices. Customers on variable pricing schemes reduce peak prices, at times
when demand is usually high. In contrast, our results show that in a system with high
shares of variable production it is possible to observe an increase in the flat rate. While
demand response customers still reduce price peaks, these peaks, because they also
depend on the wind power production, must not in any case coincide with the highest
consumption of flat-rate customers. Therefore, depending on the profiles of wind and
consumption, retailer costs to supply flat-rate customers are not necessarily reduced
as it should be expected without the effect of wind. This effect seems to become more
pronounced with larger shares of wind power in the system.
Besides the impacts on consumers we note direct implications for wind producers.
The value of wind production increases in all but one of the rebate cases under the base
wind scenario. For the high wind scenario we find a consistent positive effect in all of
the pricing schemes. This effect reduces the requirement for support payments to wind
producers. On the other hand the positive effect of variable pricing on consumer surplus
is reduced in the high wind scenario due to increasing prices for flat rate customers.
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The gains from savings in the support should therefore be returned to the consumers
via lower electricity bills or taxes.
The analyses of the rebate schemes have shown that simple rebate structures are
necessarily less effective from an economic point of view than customers responding
directly to wholesale price signals. Under rebate pricing the long-term peak prices are
almost at the same level as in the reference case. Only in the short term significant peak
price reductions can be attained under such schemes. If we compare the effect of the
rebates to the ideal schemes we see that we can still achieve up to about 18% of the
hourly pricing long-term effect with a much simpler rebate scheme as well. It should be
kept in mind that this level is achieved by only sending a simple signal regarding three
consecutive hours to the customers per day. The signal will only contain the information
of whether increased or reduced consumption will generate savings, and the benefit
to the consumers will always be the same. This is much to the contrary of conditions
under a real-time pricing scheme. Moreover, in the short-term the relative effect of a
rebate can be shown to be up to around 50% of gains under real-time pricing.
In the rebate pricing schemes the timing of rebate periods is critical. A problem of
fixed rebate periods, as applied in two of the cases, will be that in the long-term price
peaks are likely to occur at times outside of the rebate time window. The integration
of higher shares of wind will require more dynamic schemes (Mills & Wiser, 2013).
Accordingly we find the dynamic rebate to have the most positive impact on wind
power revenues in the high wind scenario. The design of the applied rebate structure,
however, could certainly be improved. Due to simplification in the modelling of the
dynamic rebate scheme in particular, it does not improve results as much as it should
be expected.
The model presented and applied above provides indications of how demand
response affects consumer and producer surplus in a system with high shares of wind
power. To keep the model versatile and enable testing of different pricing structures we
limited its complexity and left out a couple of conditions. In the following we briefly
discuss how these may affect results.
The most substantial concern may be that we look at a closed economy and do not
allow for other sources of flexibility to react upon prices. This would clearly reduce the
economic benefit of these kinds of pricing schemes, because the flat-rate benchmark
will not have such extreme price spikes as we see them in the model. It could still be
argued that for political reasons, from a national perspective, production capacities
should be held available for security reasons, even though peak demand is covered
by interconnection capacities with neighbouring countries. This approach has been
used previously (Batas Bjelic´ et al., 2013; Hedegaard, Mathiesen et al., 2012; Pillai et al.,
2011) and ensures that isolated system operation will be possible. The capacity will
then be idle at peak times and would not gain scarcity rents as in the model. They
would still have to be financed, though, so consumers would have to cover this cost.
In that case however, demand response could not directly contribute to avoiding the
costs, as payments for such capacity most likely will be independent of the timing of
consumption.
The model uses a simplified representation of production capacities, only incor-
porating the major categories of plants. Using a more detailed model of plants may
provide more accurate numerical results. The general conclusions, however, would
stay the same. In practice generators would have more technical restrictions limiting
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their flexibility. In Denmark, for example, combined heat and power production is an
important factor. Such restrictions of plant flexibility could be expected to add to the
value of demand response.
B.6 Conclusion
Using a partial equilibrium model of the electricity market we were able to derive
a couple of new insights regarding the economic benefits of different retail pricing
schemes for household customers. Applying case study data for Denmark we were
able to analyse the interplay of demand response with different levels of wind power.
Our results indicate favourable strategies in such a setting to ensure high adoption and
efficient response to load shifting incentives for households.
Simple pricing schemes could become important in an early phase to initialise
the development of household demand response. Our results confirm that variable
pricing, whether in the form of real-time pricing or less complex structures, will have
an overall positive economic impact. As expected, real-time pricing is clearly superior
to the analysed rebate pricing schemes in a long-term equilibrium producing significant
benefits of around 4% of total costs. Although the effects of the rebate structures may
be limited in the long term, it can also be observed that the simple schemes could
provide quite sizable gains in a short-term equilibrium. This result suggests that it could
be recommendable to implement simplified pricing schemes in building up a base of
demand response to begin with.
At a later point in time when the long-term dynamics begin to take effect, a larger
effort should be made to shift consumers onto real-time rates. As households would
have gathered experience with variable pricing schemes, the barriers to adoption should
be expected to be lower. Moreover, automation equipment should be more widely
available enabling a more active response. Such an approach would also accommodate
the point that with higher shares of variable production, more dynamic schemes are
preferable.
Benefits are not evenly distributed among customers on different rates. With in-
creasing shares of variable production passive customers may even become negatively
affected. While initially this should be evaluated as a welfare reduction, it could also
increase the incentive for such customers to switch to variable rates and become more
responsive.
Demand response under variable pricing can also be found to make wind power
more valuable. The resulting reduction in the need for support should be returned
to consumers in a way that preserves incentives for demand response, and could
maybe even reward flexible customers specifically. Such compensations could become
recommendable due to the diminishing long-term benefits for responsive customers;
but also because customer gains may be far lower in the high wind settings, even though
in absolute terms total economic benefits from demand response increase with more
wind.
Our findings also suggest that an increased focus on adoption rates will be required
in the long term. While harvesting the short-term gains could become an incentive for
first-movers, the decrease in benefits over time could have an adverse effect and result
in customers moving back to flat rates. As flexibility will be required even more in the
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long run this situation should be avoided. The more exact timing of long-term over
short-term effects is an important aspect that requires further research.
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Abstract
Dynamic pricing of retail electricity, as opposed to the widely applied average
pricing, has often been proposed to enhance economic efficiency through demand
response. The development of variable production from renewable energies and
expectations about the installation of heat pumps and electric vehicles have now
reinforced interest in flexible demand and dynamic pricing in Denmark. With a
roll-out of smart metering one important technical hurdle is going to be cleared, and
dynamic retail pricing may soon become an eligible option for Danish households.
Limited activity of household consumers on the retail market indicates, however,
that switching supplier or contract is perceived costly. We apply the concept of
switching costs to explain this hesitant behaviour, and use it to estimate a threshold
level based on recent observations in the Danish market. We calculate potential
savings from dynamic pricing and show how the choice of electricity taxation
technique may hamper or enhance potential benefits. In the light of switching
costs, our results suggest that a combination of smart meter roll-out and offering of
dynamic pricing schemes might be insufficient to convince the average household
consumers to switch contracts and become active in response to prices, unless
they hold a substantial flexibility potential. Dynamic taxation, even if applied to
smaller parts of the levies, is shown to exceed switching costs at moderate levels of
flexibility.
aTechnical University of Denmark
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C.1 Introduction
Dynamic pricing of retail electricity has become a recurring item on the energy policy
agenda. If introduced instead of the ubiquitous average pricing, it generates economic
efficiency gains – assuming retail demand is price responsive. So far, however, technical
and administrative requirements as well as uncertainty about potential gains have
prevented implementation in many markets. Large-scale development of variable
production from renewable energies in Denmark has now reestablished an interest
in flexible demand and dynamic pricing (Danish Ministry of Climate, Energy and
Building, 2013; Energinet.dk & Dansk Energi, 2012). As the effectiveness of new pricing
schemes depends largely on individual decisions of households, this paper explores
implications of dynamic electricity pricing in Denmark from a household consumer
perspective. While theoretical gains are mostly undisputed (Borenstein & Holland,
2005; Kopsakangas-Savolainen & Svento, 2012), it remains an open question whether
electricity retail customers find it attractive to adopt dynamic pricing schemes and
responsive behaviour (He et al., 2013).
A certain flexibility potential is assumed to be present also in Danish households
(Ea Energianalyse, 2011; Kwon & Østergaard, 2014), and consumers are continuously
equipped with smart meters (Jørgensen, 2014). Some regulatory issues regarding data ac-
cess and settlement have thus far hindered the development of dynamic price products
(Danish Energy Regulatory Authority, 2012). With the implementation of a data hub
and new retail market rules, though, all consumers in a foreseeable future should have
the possibility to switch to an hourly-varying price contract, both technically and in
terms of access to competitive products. This leaves us with the question of consumers’
potential financial benefits, providing an incentive to switch to dynamic rates and
become responsive to varying prices.
To date the Danish retail price is dominated by fixed per-unit elements (Kitzing et al.,
2016): payments for grid use, fiscal levies and the para-fiscal public-service-obligation
(PSO) levy that mainly finances renewable energy support (see Figure C.1). Even with
dynamic pricing of the purely market related part, relative variability becomes almost
invisible to the consumer. Analyses of retail electricity prices in Denmark thus must
consider taxes. In order to sustain the relative variations in the underlying market price
and increase the incentive for demand response under dynamic pricing, a changed
dynamic approach to levies and taxes could become relevant (Røpke & Nyborg, 2011;
Singh & Østergaard, 2010). A few studies already assess the possibility of dynamically
linking the para-fiscal levy that finances renewable support in Germany to spot market
prices (Ecofys, 2014; Jansen et al., 2015). In Denmark dynamic taxes and levies have
gained some attention in the debate as well (Togeby, Werling & Hethey, 2009; Togeby,
Werling, Hethey et al., 2009). But while some new dynamic electricity tax structures
based on market indicators, such as the amount of wind power in the system, have
been assessed (Danish Ministry of Taxation, 2010), we did not find any work exploring
the details of ad-valorem taxation based on the underlying electricity price.
The overall aim of our paper is to provide an indication of whether dynamic pricing
could be competitive as a product on the Danish retail electricity market taking into
account the possibility of consumers to respond to hourly prices in order to generate
benefits. Therefore we estimate potential benefits of consumers switching to a dynamic
pricing scheme under different assumptions of their ability to respond to prices. To gain
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Figure C.1: Danish household electricity price (4000 kWh/year) in 2013 (Danish Energy
Regulatory Authority, 2014)
insight into the distribution of benefits among households we use disaggregated load
profiles for different types of homes. In our evaluation we take into account all elements
of the retail price including taxation. We also determine the gains of converting fixed
per-unit adders to the electricity price into dynamic elements and evaluate the impact
on the attractiveness of dynamic rates. This is done for both the fiscal levies (dynamic
tax) and for the public-service-obligation levy (dynamic PSO).
While any demand response optimisation would result in financial benefits, it is
unclear what level of benefits would actually be required to trigger adoption of dynamic
pricing and responsive behaviour. We do have information, though, about the behaviour
of household consumers on the Danish retail market. Based on this information we
propose threshold levels and evaluate the attractiveness of dynamic pricing schemes as
a viable option to customers under retail competition.
C.2 Determining the attractiveness of dynamic pricing
C.2.1 Disaggregated hourly consumption data set
To account for heterogeneity of consumers we evaluate benefits on a disaggregated basis.
Actual hourly metering data has been acquired for Danish consumers in the period
of 2007–2012. Information on electric heating is available as well. Measurements are
obtained by various network companies that report to the Danish Energy Association
(Dansk Energi) and the Danish transmission system operator (Energinet.dk) on a regular
basis. Information on the used data set is shown in Table C.1. It covers a total of 652
meters, many on a sub-station level. On average a metering point covers around 14
individual households. In total the data set covers 9215 household customers with an
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average consumption of 3941 kWh per year. Where necessary the metering data for
a connection point is scaled down according to the number of households connected.
Therefore the load-shift potential of individual households in some cases is estimated
by using the respective sub-station profile.
Table C.1: Used hourly consumption data set
Meters Consumers Consumption
per average share in share in
total total meter [kWh/y] used data 2013
Apartments 86 5,691 66.2 3,464 11.6% 24.4%
Semi-/detached houses 566 3,524 6.2 4,013 88.4% 75.6%
without electric heating 557 3,057 5.5 3,999 86.7% 62.5%
with electric heating 9 467 51.9 4,858 1.7% 13.1%
Total 652 9,215 14.1 3,941 100.0% 100.0%
In Denmark residential consumption of electricity accounts for about 30% of total
electricity consumption, the major share consumed in detached or semi-detached homes
(Dansk Energi, 2015). Most commonly no electric heating is installed. The share of
consumption per category in the used data are shown in Table C.1 together with the
actual share in Denmark of 2013. Every metered profile is just used once and scaled
down to the size of one household. Consequently the apartment category, where limited
individual metering is available, weigh somewhat less in the analysis.
C.2.2 Benefits from dynamic pricing
The incentive to adopt a new contract is approximated by simulating potential response
activities and resulting savings on individual customers’ electricity bills. Based on the
actual metering data the total annual electricity bill of a household is determined, at
first, by applying a traditional flat price per kWh that is adjusted every quarter of a year.
This is then compared to hourly pricing. All end-user prices include relevant levies
and taxes within the analysed time period and have been deflated to the level of 2012,
the last year in the used data set. In addition to applying the current per-unit taxation
scheme we also derive results adding dynamic, ad-valorem levies for both the fiscal and
para-fiscal elements. In all cases these are defined as a percentage such that they result
in the same annual revenues if consumers would not respond to prices.
For simplicity we use a stylised demand response model rather than estimates of
price-elasticity or models of specific appliances. Load shift occurs to the lowest priced
hours within predefined time slices. We restrict the shifting by assuming that consumers
will not reduce their demand below the lowest hourly consumption measured during
one full year. Moreover, we assume that the measured peak during one year represents
the connected load of household appliances reduced by a coincidence factor (CF):
CF =
Peak load
Total connected load
(C.1)
Applying the factor to the peak load therefore gives us a theoretical maximum
load per household. A common approximation of the coincidence factor for different
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numbers n of connected loads is given by Bayliss and Hardy (2007):
CF = 0.5
(
1 +
5
2n+ 3
)
(C.2)
For large numbers of connected loads of around 250 this approximation approaches
0.5. We use this number for the apartment category. Although a single apartment might
not have 250 loads connected, we want to account for that the used profiles actually
cover larger blocks of apartments. In this way, when scaled down to a single apartment,
we avoid underestimating the individual peak loads. For detached homes we use a
slightly higher factor of 0.55 assuming that fewer electrical loads are covered by the
profiles (using equation (C.2) the value corresponds to around 23 loads). For customers
with electric heating we use a factor of 0.8 (Kasikci, 2004).
In mathematical terms our approach is equivalent to the following simple optimisa-
tion problem:
min
d≥0
T∑
t=1
dtPt
s.t. dt ≥ mintD0t ∀ t ∈ T
1
CF maxtD
0
t ≥ dt ∀ t ∈ T
t+L−1∑
s=t
ds =
t+L−1∑
s=t
D0s ∀ { t ∈ T | t = L(m− 1) + 1,m ∈ Z+ }
(C.3)
We minimise costs given by multiplying the chosen demand level dwith the end user
price P . The original metered consumption D0 determines upper and lower bounds of d
applying the principles described above. The last constraint ensures that load is shifted
and not just curtailed: within given time windows of length L the sum of load after
shifting (d) needs to be equal to the sum of loads in the original profile (D0). We use
windows of 3, 6, 12, 24 and 168 hours to represent the potential load shift horizons. These
time slices cover the most important short-term patterns in hourly electricity prices.
Moreover, it may be assumed that the load-shift potential of a household customer is
somewhat limited and would not exceed the maximum period of one whole week (i.e.
168 hours).
In order to estimate a savings potential we apply rather optimistic constraints.
Deriving results for this kind of best-case scenario helps us to determine, whether a suf-
ficient economic incentive to adopt dynamic pricing can be expected, and consequently,
whether such options can be attractive on a liberalised retail market.
C.2.3 Threshold benefit levels of consumers
Several studies have investigated benefits of demand response under dynamic pricing
(Albadi & El-Saadany, 2008; Conchado & Linares, 2012; Strbac, 2008). A number of
these also estimate financial impacts on household consumers (Faruqui & Sergici, 2010;
Zarnikau, 2008). We argue, though, that consumer benefits of demand response should
not be seen in isolation. Rather, they should be analysed with consumers’ adoption
decisions in mind. Making consumers actively participate will become one of the
critical issues in the further development of demand response under retail competition
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(Faruqui et al., 2010; Gyamfi et al., 2013). We therefore analyse our results in the context
of observed behaviour in the liberalised Danish retail market.
Switching rates of 3–7% indicate that consumers in Denmark are mostly comfortable
with their suppliers and the prices they offer (NordREG, 2012, 2014). For the largest
share of consumers this means they are buying electricity at traditional flat rate con-
ditions (Lyndrup, 2016). Potential savings of switching from the traditional rate to
competitive offers can be observed to be around 5–10% – on average not more than
AC50 per year; for many customers this does not provide a sufficient incentive. An offer
that in addition would ask for the consumer to change behaviour as a precondition to
obtain savings (as in the case of load-shifting) would likely require larger savings. For
example, research in Germany has shown that consumers on average expected savings
of AC54 per year (more than 5% of their total bill) from giving access to automatic control
of their fridges alone (Pfeifroth et al., 2012). A Swedish survey resulted in even higher
figures (Torstensson & Wallin, 2015).
With homogeneous goods like electricity one should expect that small price differ-
ences would be sufficient to induce switching. In practice, we can see that this is not the
case. For households in particular, factors beyond the financial incentive do play a role
as previous research has found (Darby & McKenna, 2012). A Dutch survey, for example,
has shown that autonomy, privacy and comfort are highly valued and that households
may be very reluctant towards participating if these factors are compromised (Peper-
mans, 2014). The findings seem to be supported by a Swiss experiment characterising
only 20% of a sample of household consumers as "price sensitive", whereas the remain-
ing share focussed more on rate stability, home automation and security (Kaufmann
et al., 2013). Furthermore, in a German study 69% of respondents preferred a fixed rate
to dynamic pricing as well (Dütschke & Paetz, 2013).
The observed switching behaviour as well as the above findings regarding household
consumer preferences suggest that potential benefits would need to outweigh a range of
intangible costs associated with switching to another supplier or pricing scheme (Jones
et al., 2002). If we could determine the cost of switching and compare it with the benefits
of a dynamic rate, then we would have an estimate of the required level of benefits from
a consumer point of view in order to switch to such new schemes. This is not easily
measured, but fortunately a simplified method to determine the cost of switching has
already been developed (Shy, 2002). It simply uses market shares and price differences
observed for a homogeneous product in the market, and has been applied previously,
for example, in the context of electricity (Defeuilley & Mollard, 2008), internet providers
(Krafft & Salies, 2008) or the airline industry (Carlsson & Löfgren, 2006).
A dominant market position with deviating prices in this framework is explained
by switching costs. Switching cost SAB of supplier A’s customers switching to supplier
B with respective market shares M and prices p is defined as:
SAB = pA − MB pB
MA +MB
(C.4)
This expression results from the assumption that the observed prices of A and B are
chosen such that it is unattractive for any of the two suppliers – costs of switching taken
into account – to offer their product to the other supplier’s customers at sufficiently
low prices to switch. Supplier B would have to offer a price of pA minus SAB in order
to convince A’s customers to switch. Switching costs may then be determined by
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observing that the actual revenue of supplier B, pBMB , has to be more or at least equally
attractive to the revenue resulting from getting supplier A’s customers to switch, which
is: (pA − SAB)(MA +MB). Setting these two expressions equal and rearranging results
in equation (C.4).
The data on market shares of suppliers in Denmark that is required to determine the
above switching cost is not readily available. We therefore use the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) for market concentration regularly published by the Danish transmission
system operator (Energinet.dk, 2016). The index is defined as:
HHI =
N∑
i=1
Mi
2 (C.5)
As the number of market participants is made public, we can approximate the
market share of the largest supplier M1 assuming that the remaining share is divided
equally amongst all other suppliers:
HHI = M21 + (N − 1)
(
1−M1
N − 1
)2
(C.6)
While 70 suppliers are active in Denmark in total, only a part of them supply
customers in the whole country. For the calculation of market shares we therefore define
the market to consist of 44 suppliers, which is the maximum number active in any
distribution area. As traditionally consumers have been supplied by their local utility
company, we take into account the concentration index within local distribution areas,
where the weighted average HHI value lies at 0.7, resulting in an average 84% market
share of the largest supplier. Being with the largest supplier does not necessarily mean
that customers have not been active on the market by comparing prices or choosing
new contracts. This could be taken into account by using the share of consumers on a
traditional fixed price product as the incumbent market share instead of the one derived
from the HHI. This alternative value is around 55% (Lyndrup, 2016).
Switching costs are estimated by applying equation (C.4). We use the above in-
cumbent market shares as MA and the combined share of all competitors as MB. As
the incumbent price we use average supply costs based on a traditional flat rate price,
whereas for the competitors we use the most attractive offers in the retail market:
products with prices fixed at the most for 6 months ahead. Resulting switching cost
estimates are given in Table C.2. We use these benchmark levels below to evaluate
estimated savings generated by a switch to dynamic pricing under different tax regimes.
Table C.2: Switching cost estimates
Incumbent Switching
share [-] cost [AC]
Local HHI 84% 114
Fixed price share 55% 78
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C.3 Results
C.3.1 Consumer benefits of dynamic pricing under different
taxation schemes
Figure C.2 shows resulting costs subdivided by price element. The top panel shows
results in the reference case of flat pricing. The other two panels show results for
dynamic pricing with and without a dynamic tax under different assumptions about
the load-shifting time window. As expected, larger windows reduce the supply cost for
customers under dynamic pricing, and the effect becomes even more pronounced with
a dynamic tax replacing the unit tax. Individual costs span a wide range from as low as
AC100 and up to far above AC2000 per year. To provide an indication of the distribution of
costs among households and consumer categories we use boxplots. In these, 50% of the
results lie within the boxes, and the bars are set to cover 95% of the results. The means
are indicated by different shapes per category and deviate from the median line, due to
asymmetric distributions in some of the results.
The average benefits of switching to another pricing scheme are summarised in
Table C.3 for different customer categories and in total. Horizontally the table shows
potential benefits from shifting load within the analysed time windows. The first
section represents a switch from flat to dynamic pricing maintaining per-unit levies on
electricity. The remaining sections of Table C.3 show the effects of introducing dynamic
PSO payments and taxes. There is an advantage to be gained by switching from the
default product to an hourly-price product even without load shifting (column ’no
resp.’). This has to be kept in mind when looking into the potential of demand response
actions. Although significant benefits may be achieved in total, some of those will have
to be attributed to the mere effect of hourly pricing that for some part covers the implicit
insurance premium in a fixed price. As competition increases one may expect this gap
to become smaller, though. Therefore the last line in each section of Table C.3 shows
the net load-shift benefit that would be achievable even if the average level of flat and
dynamic pricing would be exactly the same.
It does not seem to play a large role in the average benefits whether the consumers
live in apartments or detached homes. Additional consumption from electric heating is
an advantage when it comes to load shifting. What cannot be seen from the presented
average figures is that the benefits are not equal in all years of the data set and electricity
bills may become more volatile with hourly pricing schemes. Electric heating customers
are particularly vulnerable to high prices during the heating season. Therefore dynamic
pricing holds a certain risk for these customers. If the dynamics are further increased
through taxation this may have adverse effects if customers with electric heating do not
react to prices properly.
Switching from static unit taxation to dynamic ad-valorem taxation would support
the incentive for demand response. Even when correcting for savings that result from
the mere switch between a flat and a dynamic electricity price, demand response
generates significant savings under dynamic taxation. In all of the simulated cases
the load-shift benefits under dynamic taxation are more than three times the amount
achieved under dynamic pricing with traditional taxation. Admittedly, a dynamic tax
would be a rather substantial intervention. Therefore we also analysed the option of
a dynamic PSO payment, both as a separate instrument and in combination with a
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Table C.3: Average benefits of switching to dynamic pricing under different taxation
schemes by load shift window
Load shift horizon
no resp. 3 hours 6 hours 12 hours 24 hours 168 hours
[AC/y] [AC/y] [AC/y] [AC/y] [AC/y] [AC/y]
Dynamic price
Apartments 36.8 53.3 69.0 89.8 118.9 168.5
Semi-/detached homes 32.4 51.0 68.2 90.3 118.3 169.9
without electric heating 32.1 50.5 67.6 89.5 117.4 169.0
with electric heating 41.9 68.7 89.4 117.3 145.8 198.1
All categories 34.1 51.9 68.5 90.1 118.5 169.4
net load-shift benefit - 17.8 34.5 56.1 84.5 135.3
Dynamic price and PSO
Apartments 36.9 58.8 79.5 106.6 144.4 210.0
Semi-/detached homes 32.4 57.1 79.9 109.0 145.6 215.0
without electric heating 32.4 56.7 79.4 108.3 144.8 214.1
with electric heating 32.7 68.6 96.1 133.0 170.8 242.4
All categories 34.1 57.8 79.7 108.1 145.2 213.1
net load-shift benefit - 23.7 45.7 74.0 111.1 179.0
Dynamic price and tax
Apartments 36.5 89.8 140.0 206.0 297.7 458.1
Semi-/detached homes 33.2 92.8 147.7 217.8 305.7 472.9
without electric heating 34.0 92.8 147.3 216.7 304.6 471.6
with electric heating 6.6 93.0 159.7 249.2 340.6 510.8
All categories 34.5 91.6 144.7 213.3 302.7 467.2
net load-shift benefit - 57.2 110.3 178.8 268.2 432.8
Dynamic price, PSO and tax
Apartments 36.6 95.3 150.4 222.8 323.2 499.7
Semi-/detached homes 33.1 98.8 159.3 236.4 333.0 517.9
without electric heating 34.3 99.0 159.1 235.5 332.0 516.8
with electric heating -2.6 92.9 166.5 264.9 365.6 554.0
All categories 34.5 97.5 155.9 231.3 329.3 511.0
net load-shift benefit - 63.0 121.5 196.8 294.8 476.6
dynamic tax (see Table C.3). Similar effects can be achieved by a dynamic PSO, though
to a lesser degree. Benefits would increase by more than 30% as compared to a fixed PSO
payment under dynamic pricing. Combining dynamic tax and PSO would yield the
maximum incentive for load-shifting with savings around 3.5 times those of dynamic
pricing with fixed levies.
C.3.2 Attractiveness of pricing schemes
Considering the total average electricity bill of more than AC1000 under flat pricing
(see Figure C.2), demand response alone (after switching from a flat to a dynamic
price) generates savings in a range of 2–10% of total costs. This is comparable to price
differences we have seen under retail competition in the past (Lyndrup, 2016), but
may still seem somewhat limited considering the rather optimistic assumptions of
our demand response simulation. Dynamic taxation could increase results by a factor
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three, and such savings should make it far more likely to motivate customers to switch
contracts if we use today’s switching behaviour as an indicator. We will have to return
to our switching cost benchmarks, however, to further conclude whether such savings
are sufficiently attractive or not.
Figure C.3 shows distributions of cost savings under dynamic pricing for unit and
dynamic tax regimes subject to optimal load shifting under the given constraints. The
mean levels for the three different residential consumer categories are indicated by
vertical lines of the same colour as the distribution. As benchmarks we show the two
levels of switching costs from Table C.2 as grey vertical bars. Moreover, we indicate
gains that may be obtained by a simple switch of supplier under current retail market
conditions by a third bar. A first thing to note is how differently an hourly pricing
regime may affect customers. Due to the different individual profiles some households
are only able to achieve savings in the low end. It may even be the case that certain
customers lose on dynamic pricing. Another small group of customers will profit
substantially from variable pricing regimes.
The light blue distributions show savings under the present unit taxation. Without
any response, the level will lie at or around the observed savings from switching
supplier in the market. Although dynamic pricing provides benefits even without be-
coming flexible, it is unlikely that residential consumers would choose it with similarly
attractive, but more stable, options at hand. Adding flexibility, switching may become
attractive; the lower switching cost benchmark is exceeded at windows of 12 hours for
all three consumer categories. The higher switching cost level is exceeded with full
flexibility within 24 hours. For most consumers such levels of flexibility can only be
achieved for parts of their consumption, so the simulated savings will be difficult to
achieve in practice. With dynamic taxation (dark blue lines and distributions) the lower
switching cost benchmark will be exceeded already by being flexible within 3-hour
windows, while the high benchmark is exceeded at the 6-hour window for all categories.
Taking into account the various behavioural constraints of households this seems more
realistic. At the same time, though, benefits are distributed throughout a wider range
with both winners and losers among the individual households.
Although the switching cost levels are somewhat hypothetical and very uncertain,
they indicate that pure dynamic pricing might be insufficient to convince customers
of, firstly, choosing a dynamically priced product and, subsequently, become active
in response to the variable prices. Introducing dynamic taxation on the other hand
could help to counteract the inertia of consumers and make them switch to dynamic
pricing. But also a less intrusive option like the dynamic PSO payment might be helpful.
In Figure C.4 we show the isolated effect of the dynamic PSO on the distribution of
savings (note the shortened horizontal scale). Although effects are smaller than for
dynamic taxes, this instrument would exceed the lower switching cost benchmark with
6-hour load shifting windows as well, and could thus be a real alternative to the wide
ranging dynamic tax. The option seems particularly relevant with rising levels of the
PSO payment to be expected as renewable capacity is further increased.
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Figure C.3: Simulated savings of different load shift simulations with unit and dynamic
taxation (total frequency distributions and consumer category means) comparing with
switching threshold values
C.4 Discussion
On liberalised electricity retail markets dynamic pricing offers have to compete against
other types of retail products. Despite of the high uncertainty in determining a level
of benefits that would be sufficient for consumers to switch to dynamic pricing, our
simulations show that substantial flexibility will be required from consumers to make
savings from dynamic pricing more attractive than other retail market options. Benefits
compensating for switching costs suggested by the applied model will be difficult to
achieve with simple dynamic pricing. Dynamic taxation, or even just a dynamic PSO
payment, has been shown to create an incentive exceeding switching costs at moderate
levels of flexibility.
The rationale behind the retail electricity tax system in Denmark to date is primarily
to generate an incentive to save energy and so reduce import dependency. This reaches
back to the energy crises of the 1970s (Moe, 2007). At that time the largest share of
electricity was produced from imported fossil fuels; so any unit of electricity saved
had an immediate impact on imports. A per-kWh tax thus was well suited to provide
the right incentives. Add to that the relatively limited elasticity of electricity demand
in the short term, and the tax makes for a reliable and efficient source of government
income. With the introduction of more and more low-carbon electricity production
largely independent from fuel imports, the energy savings argument might not be as
straightforward anymore. In addition timing of savings becomes more crucial in a
wind-based system. Thus a dynamic electricity tax seems like an elegant solution to
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Figure C.4: Simulated savings of different load shift simulations with unit and dynamic
PSO (total frequency distributions and consumer category means) comparing with
switching threshold values
increase the incentive for demand response. It does, however, introduce a couple of
questions as we will discuss in the following.
A fiscal issue of potentially more unstable state revenues with dynamic taxes arises
from the fact that the tax income in a particular year is subject to uncertainty about
both market price and resulting customer responses. It will become necessary to
implement frequent adjustments of the tax rate to stabilise revenues. While technically
the problem seems manageable, politically this may pose a substantial issue (Østrup,
2013). Regarding the PSO levy similar issues in determining future revenues are
prevalent in the current system as well: neither production volume, nor market price
can be predicted exactly. Currently the levy is adjusted on a quarterly basis; so a frequent
adjustment of rates is common practice. If a dynamic tax rate would be kept stable or is
adjusted less frequently, we estimate annual variations in the range of 20-30%. By rate
adjustments it will be possible to keep revenue variations to a minimum.
From a welfare point of view it is essential to determine whether ad-valorem taxes
introduce higher or lower distortions as compared to unit taxes. It is well-established
theoretically that, in the case of fully competitive markets, unit and ad-valorem taxation
that generate the same revenue are equivalent in terms of distortions (Kay & Keen, 1983).
In oligopolistic settings ad-valorem taxation may even have the advantage of lower
consumer prices than specific taxation raising the same amount of tax revenue (M. Keen,
1998). For electricity such conclusions would only hold on average while in the extreme
situations of peak and off-peak consumption revenues will differ between the two
techniques of taxation. Eventually, the distortive effect depends on the shape of demand
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and supply curves, and we cannot at this point conclude which one of the taxation
techniques would result in fewer dead-weight losses in the Danish retail market. As
long as market mechanisms are missing that adequately address the flexibility potential
of small-scale actors, a dynamic tax could as well be justified, if flexible household
consumers enable the integration of intermittent production from renewable energies
and thus provide environmental benefits.
A more political question is the distributional effect: if the total amount of tax income
is to remain stable, then benefits for active customers will become a burden for passive
customers. Moreover, distributions of results among individual consumers show that
some will have better opportunities than others for participating in demand response
activities. It would be worth investigating if certain characteristics beyond the categories
we apply determine achievable benefits. This could provide the possibility of more
targeted measures. Potentially, high income households that do have the resources
to invest in, e.g., automation equipment would be likely to benefit more than others
(Alexander, 2010). On the other hand even if low-income customers remain passive,
they could benefit from an overall price reduction as a result of demand response from
active customers (Borenstein, 2005).
The competitiveness of dynamic pricing will change over time, as price patterns
develop more in favour of flexible loads with increasing shares of intermittent gen-
eration. In the future with even higher shares of production from wind energy we
expect to see a significant increase in potential savings if price volatility increases ac-
cordingly. The impact of wind on prices in scenarios up to 2035 is noticeable (Capion
& Meibom, 2016), and should lead to an increased interest in demand response. In
order to prepare for a future situation with a high demand for flexibility, however, it
could still be useful to implement additional incentives early on. Our analysis shows
that dynamic taxation of electricity certainly is an instrument that adds to the incentive
of adopting demand response. Savings could increase by a factor three or more for
those customers that respond to prices. In combination with a smart meter roll-out
and hourly pricing schemes dynamic taxation should be a feasible option to initiate the
development of active demand response at household level; especially if substantial
adoption of dynamic pricing is to be established before we see noteworthy market price
impacts from large-scale renewable generation. If desired, an incentive structure like
this could even be gradually phased out again in later years, with variations in energy
prices increasing.
C.5 Conclusions
We have analysed the incentives for household demand response under hourly pricing
schemes by calculating potential savings of individual households on their overall
electricity bill. The reluctant switching behaviour of household consumers in the
Danish retail market indicates that switching supplier or contract is perceived costly.
We apply switching costs as a concept to explain the lack of switching, and calculate an
estimate using recent observations in Danish retail competition. Accounting for such
intangible costs, our results suggest that a combination of smart meter roll-out and
the offering of dynamic pricing schemes might be insufficient to convince the average
household consumers to switch contracts and become active in response to prices unless
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they hold a substantial flexibility potential. Distributions of benefits among individual
customers, however, show that even if on average the results are only moderately
attractive, a dynamic pricing scheme could still have success amongst a smaller group
of customers.
Furthermore, our results show that dynamic taxation can help to activate flexible
demand on a larger scale. Maintaining the relative effect of hourly price variations after
taxes, increases the incentive to respond by a factor three in a Danish setting. Such
a change in taxation technique, thus, makes it more likely that customers will switch
their supplier and enter into demand-response activities. The issue of varying state
revenues could be solved by annual or even quarterly rate adjustments. Distributional
and welfare effects remain to be analysed in detail.
It could be an option to introduce an ad-valorem rate only for parts of the electricity
levies and taxes. Keeping in mind the positive effect of the expected demand response
on the integration of renewable production, it may be appropriate to apply dynamic
rates only to those elements related to renewable sources (i.e. the so called PSO levy).
Although effects are smaller, our results suggest that a dynamic PSO payment might be
just sufficient to surmount an optimistic estimate of switching costs.
From a policy perspective a gradual approach to encourage dynamic retail pricing
seems recommendable. As soon as settlement based on dynamic pricing becomes
practically possible in the market, contract offers by suppliers and their respective
adoption by consumers should be examined. If adoption lags behind expectation, it
should be considered to introduce dynamics within a share of the electricity levies. As
of now, the PSO payment seems to be an obvious starting point, but that could change
at a later point. As all stakeholders gain experience, further adoption may be induced
by introducing the full dynamic tax. During the time such a dynamic system is in place,
the market development should be closely monitored. If at some point market prices
would provide sufficient signals in support of demand response, commencing a gradual
phase-out of the dynamic tax would be possible.
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Abstract
In order to achieve a better understanding of the system value of residential
demand response, we study the potential impact of flexible demand on the costs
of system reserves in a fossil-free electricity supply. Comparing these costs with
traditional means of regulation, our analysis aims to contribute to the identification
of the least-cost options for reserves in a fossil-free power system. To do so, we
extend an existing energy system model with demand response and reserve mod-
elling and analyse the impact for the case of Denmark in 2035 to reflect a system
based on renewable resources for electricity and heating. The reserve requirement
is determined subject to the installed wind power capacity. To reflect a realistic
demand response potential, we base it on hourly distributions of suitable household
appliances. Our results show that residential demand flexibility could provide
significant value if used for intra-hourly reserves. The reserve value of flexible
demand might even be higher than the value attainable in the hourly spot market.
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D.1 Introduction
The flexibility potential of the demand side has received increased attention in recent
years from policy makers in countries developing large shares of variable renewable
electricity generation (European Commission, 2015). System operators and regulators
frequently mention the potential contribution of demand response to reliability in a
system with large shares of renewable energies (Council of European Energy Regulators,
2016). Technically, load following production, could provide a partial solution to the
arising intermittency problem. Such potential contributions of demand response to the
efficient operation of power systems have been studied extensively in many different
settings (Conchado & Linares, 2012) confirming that properly timed load adjustments
generate benefits by avoiding or deferring investments in new generation or grid assets
(Strbac, 2008).
One limitation of many types of demand response is the restriction to a short
duration (Chassin & Rondeau, 2016). An evaluation of contributions to system operation
must therefore be sufficiently detailed on the time scale. Many analyses focus on the
hourly scale, and often the economic potential found is limited (e.g. Gottwalt et al.,
2011; Prüggler, 2013). Flexibility of the demand side may, however, be better suited
for short-term response. For instance, the Danish Energy Agency (2009) argues that
new flexibility products are required to utilise demand-side resources; pure hourly spot
price products would not suffice. In order to grasp the full potential one should include
contributions within the hour (see also Welsch et al., 2014). Such flexibility could then
be interpreted as a reserve to the power system.
In the future, reserve markets will become increasingly important. As wind power
production rises, its fluctuations add to the reserve requirement of the system, as has
been analysed in previous studies (see Brouwer et al., 2014, for a review). At the
same time, the increased reserve demand has to be met by fewer dispatchable plants,
because power from renewable sources displaces conventional generation. As a result,
new providers of ancillary services will be needed (Douglass et al., 2011). Technically,
demand response is capable of providing reserves if automation equipment is installed
(Kirby, 2006). Such regulation is not just restricted to large industrial loads, but could
also be provided by aggregation of many small residential loads (Molina-Garcia et al.,
2011; Short et al., 2007). The available capacity could be used for reserves of different
qualities (Kirby, 2003). It may even react faster than generation capacity, and some loads
might be able to comply with the conditions for fast frequency control (Lakshmanan
et al., 2016).
From a consumer’s perspective, revenues in the reserve and balancing markets could
significantly improve the business case of demand response (see Alcázar-Ortega et al.,
2012; Bessa & Matos, 2014; Biegel et al., 2014; Hao et al., 2015; Hovgaard et al., 2012;
Huang et al., 2015; Lakic´ et al., 2015; Valencia-Salazar et al., 2011). The precondition to
install automation equipment could pose a barrier; but at the same time, participation in
demand response by automation may be the more comfortable and effective option as
opposed to manual response. Pilots and field experiments have shown that the interest
in manual activities may be rather low (for experiences in Denmark see e.g. Lund et al.,
2015; Togeby & Hay, 2009), and that large groups of, in particular, residential consumers
stay unresponsive to price signals (Gyamfi et al., 2013). This is even more pronounced
for complex schemes based on real-time pricing (Vanthournout et al., 2015). Another
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positive side-effect of automation may be that it prevents response fatigue, that is, a
declining willingness to react over longer times or upon many events within a short
time frame (Goldman et al., 2007). Ultimately, to conclude on the attractiveness of
demand response as a reserve it is necessary to evaluate it from a system perspective.
This has been done to some extent within different settings and by applying different
modelling approaches in previous works. We briefly review these to point out the
contribution of this paper.
In partial models of reserve markets, Shayesteh et al. (2010) and Artacˇ et al. (2016)
conclude that demand response may reduce the cost of reserves and increase reliability.
Babonneau et al. (2016) present a linear model that explicitly includes the contribution
of decentralised generation and demand in distribution grids to secondary reserves
and reactive power. They demonstrate how the developed module can be directly
applied within large energy system models. Keane et al. (2011) use a stochastic unit-
commitment model of the electricity system to evaluate operational benefits of demand-
side resources, including the impact of providing system reserves. The study concludes
that demand flexibility may significantly improve adequacy. It does not consider,
though, how this would affect investments in new capacities. Brouwer et al. (2016) also
use a unit-commitment model and include requirements for spinning and standing
reserves to model the impact of different flexibility options (amongst them demand
response) on system costs including investments in new capacities. Demand response
is not allowed to provide reserves, though, as the capabilities of demand response
regarding reserve provision are considered uncertain. Zerrahn and Schill (2015a) present
a linear energy system model that explicitly models reserve provision of different
qualities. While the model is calibrated to German conditions, it does not include
existing generation, interconnections to neighbouring countries or other energy sectors.
We want to contribute with a study of residential demand response in Denmark
using Balmorel, a partial equilibrium model of the electricity and district heating systems
formulated as a linear program (see Hindsberger, 2003; Ravn et al., 2001, for a detailed
description). In this paper, we (1) implement a residential demand response model
in Balmorel; (2) implement a reserve requirement in the model based on statistical
characteristics of forecasting errors and contingencies; (3) estimate the cost of reserves
without demand response; (4) estimate the potential savings in costs of reserves with
contributions from demand response. In comparison to most of the studies mentioned
above, the model has a larger sectoral and geographical scope. Our focus, though,
lies on Denmark and the cost of reserve provision in the electricity system. We use
a strictly linear model resulting in formulations regarding the reserve provision that
differ from previously published models. The flexibility potential we use is defined
per hour and based on a bottom-up analysis of residential appliances. To determine
the reserve requirement, we use a static probabilistic approach to construct a reserve
demand curve dependent on the share of installed wind power.
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D.2 Method
D.2.1 Demand response modelling
As a first step, we extend the existing system model Balmorel by incorporating responsive
electricity demand from households. Implementations of demand-side flexibility in
Balmorel and similar models have been done in previous works. Some of these have
focussed on single applications like electric vehicles (Hedegaard et al., 2012; Juul,
2012; Kiviluoma & Meibom, 2010) or residential heat pumps (Hedegaard & Balyk,
2013; Hedegaard & Münster, 2013). Early versions of the model already included
the possibility of adding demand response in the form of elastic demand curves (see
Grohnheit & Klavs, 2000). Certainly good arguments exist to represent residential
electricity consumers’ ability to be flexible using price elasticities. On the other hand,
due to the limited manual response under real-time pricing, automation of response
could become a crucial factor. The automation algorithms may be better represented by
generic storage-like models instead of elasticities (as implemeted by e.g. Biegel et al.,
2014; Göransson et al., 2014; Tveten et al., 2016; Zerrahn & Schill, 2015b). Moreover,
the technical potential can be more directly assessed looking at the usage of different
appliances, as opposed to assessing the more abstract concept of price elasticity.
We implement a generic demand response model that is based on assumptions
about the flexibility of different categories of household appliances. We then use hourly
consumption profiles per appliance category to define the distribution of the flexibility
potential throughout the year. The consumption data set and its construction has been
described by Jacobsen and Juul (2015). It builds on data from several sources. First,
average daily load curves for individual appliances on working days and weekends
have been adopted from a large European study (Grinden & Feilberg, 2008). These
have been adjusted to Danish conditions using information about annual profiles of
Danish household consumption (Energinet.dk & Dansk Energi Net, 2016) as well as
ownership rates (Danish Energy Agency, 2016b). The daily profiles have been rolled
out accounting for seasonality in appliance use (as observed by Bennich et al., 2011).
Appliances covered make up around 25% of total Danish electricity demand.
The appliance profiles have been divided into four categories with different load-
shifting capabilities. Time windows for load shifting have been assigned to each of the
categories based on literature values as shown in Table D.1 (Bertsch et al., 2012; Franz
et al., 2006; Gils, 2014). We restrict shifting to major appliances for cleaning, cooling and
freezing. Appliances for cooking, lighting as well as smaller devices such as consumer
electronics are not considered available for automated control. Figure D.1 shows the
hourly appliance profiles for one week coloured according to the assigned categories.
The consumption of the relevant appliances is included in the model as a flexibility
potential. Our extensions to the model are described below with a list of symbols
at the end of the paper. For every hour h, geographic area a and appliance category
j, we define a flexibility potential Dflex-pota,h,j defined by the hourly end-use profiles per
appliance. The time windows defined in Table D.1 are termed Sj . Within these windows
the changes in demand due to load shifting Dflexa,h,j are determined such that:
h+Sj∑
h
Dflexa,h,j = 0 ∀ j, {h ∈ T | (h− 1) mod Sj = 0 } (D.1)
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Table D.1: Load-shift potential per category
Appliances Time window
Cleaning 24 hours
Washing machine
Dishwasher
Tumble dryer
Freezing 4 hours
Freezer
Cooling 2 hours
Refrigerator
Refrigerator with freezer
Inflexible 0 hours
Lighting
Cooker
Microwave oven
Electric kettle
Vacuum cleaner
Audio/Video
Mobile phone charger
Computer
The sum of Dflexa,h,j over all categories j thus represents the hourly load-shift delta in
MW relative to the baseline demand of the hour. It will also be used in the overall system
balance equation to adjust the load to be served by the system. As the system model
we use is defined with an hourly resolution, this representation reflects participation of
flexible demand in the hourly spot market. We could as well reserve the flexibility for
activation within the hour reflecting participation of demand flexibility in the system
reserve. We will therefore include unused flexibility in our reserve modelling in section
D.2.3, equations (D.10) and (D.11).
Equation (D.1) could have been applied to all hours h ∈ T , i.e. a rolling time window
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Figure D.1: Hourly appliance load profiles for one week
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Figure D.2: Division of installed capacity
across all hours. Because we only consider demand flexibility actions that do not add
or remove demand, but just shift it across time, such a rolling constraint would create
interdependencies, even for hours that lie far apart from one another. In order to
avoid this, we use fixed time windows defined by the capabilities of relevant flexible
appliances. Therefore every window starts only in an hour h that is a multiple of the
window length Sj determined by use of the mod-operator that provides us with the
remainder of the division (h− 1)/Sj .
To always cover inflexible conventional demand, flexibility is restricted in the fol-
lowing way:
Dflexa,h,j ≥ −Dflex-pota,h,j ∀ h, a (D.2)
We allow Dflexa,h,j to reduce demand (i.e. the variable may become negative), but it is
always limited by the potential. On the other hand we do not include an upward limit,
so that the model is free to choose the optimal time of consumption within the time
windows Sj .
D.2.2 Reserve dimensioning
A reliable system requires a certain reserve margin to ensure that sufficient capacity is
available at any point in time to serve load. Figure D.2 illustrates how installed capacity
may contribute to the margin. The most simple approach to define an adequate capacity
compares the system peak load with the available generation capacity. A distinction
has to be made between reliable and non-reliable capacity. Plants with limitations
in the fuel supply or primary energy source, such as wind and solar power, would
traditionally not be counted as a reliable source (ENTSO-E, 2012). In Europe at present,
the whole definition of adequate capacity is subject to revisions that aim to include
probabilistic analyses due to the development of renewable production (ENTSO-E,
2015). As a result, certain shares of the variable production could be considered reliable
in the future. Capacity from dispatchable plants counts as reliable, unless it is out for
maintenance, mothballed or reserved for system services. The remaining available
reliable capacity should add up to exceed peak demand by a minimum spare capacity
margin. Recommendations for such a margin range from defining it deterministically,
i.e. as a percentage of total generation capacity, to using a probabilistic approach that
ensures a shortage risk of, e.g., less than 1% accounting for the risk of outages.
In a linear programming model, like the one used for our analysis, a system balance
equation warrants that production and load match in all time steps. Based on this
constraint, costs would be minimised by investing in production capacity that is exactly
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able to cover demand up to the system peak load. As illustrated by Figure D.2, this
would exclude the capacity margin. Accounting for a reserve margin thus requires the
definition of additional constraints. To implement the deterministic version of the above
adequacy requirement, average availability factors may be used. Plant availabilities
between 90% and 95% depending on the technology have been suggested (Kiviluoma &
Meibom, 2010). With such an approach alone, installed capacity would always have
to be slightly higher than the load served. This would fulfil the adequacy requirement
if the modelling period includes the system peak. Capacity defined as unavailable for
adequacy, such as intermittent production, and non-domestic sources, i.e. imports, may
have been included to cover for the required capacity, though.
To ensure sufficient reliable capacity from domestic sources a capacity balance
equation may be included to define technologies allowed to contribute to the margin.
Random non-availabilities during system peak may be accounted for by limiting the
contribution of a technology through a capacity credit (Doherty et al., 2006). Applying
this approach, appropriately determines a capacity margin both excluding unavailable
reliable capacity as well as non-reliable capacity. Depending on the underlying assump-
tions on capacity credits one could even argue that the capacity margin implies the
system need of operating reserves as well. From the studies that apply the approach,
however, it cannot be told whether this had been the intention or not. In determining
an adequate capacity in accordance with ENTSO-E (2015), the capacity required for
operating reserves needs to be taken into account, and in our analysis we aim to in-
clude it explicitly. In contrast to the capacity margin, the operating reserve only covers
short-term imbalances with a duration of less than one hour.
The main purpose of including the reserve in our analysis is to determine the po-
tential contribution from demand flexibility. The approach using a capacity balance
equation with capacity credits allows for an extension to account for flexible demand,
as it has been demonstrated for electric vehicles (Hedegaard et al., 2012; Juul, 2011) and
heat pumps (Hedegaard & Balyk, 2013). These extensions allow for peak shaving to re-
duce the capacity margin. An advantage of including an operating reserve requirement
is that it provides us with the possibility of assigning an additional capacity value to
demand response that goes beyond the hourly peak-shaving contribution analysed in
the mentioned studies.
There is no absolute set of rules for the calculation of the requirement for reserves,
and different types of methodologies are available (Ibanez et al., 2014). For continental
Europe, rules are provided by ENTSO-E (2004). Furthermore, a new grid code on load-
frequency control and reserves is under development (ENTSO-E, 2013). Nordic rules
are defined by Nordel (2006). All of these arrangements, however, leave some degree of
freedom to the individual system operators. Traditionally, deterministic methods have
been used to determine reserves relying solely on variations in the system load. The
ENTSO-E Operation Handbook still proposes a deterministic formula to size control
reserves for predictable load and generation variations (ENTSO-E, 2009). Methods
relying on the probabilistic characteristics of variability and contingencies, however, are
becoming more common (Ela et al., 2010; Jost, Speckmann et al., 2015).
For Denmark, criteria for measuring security of supply have been set forth (Danish
Energy Agency, 2015b). The Danish Energy Agency uses a probabilistic model to
determine the level of security of supply in Denmark (Danish Energy Agency, 2015a).
A procedure to explicitly determine a reserve requirement, however, is not included.
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For the future Danish system the impact of fluctuations and forecast errors in relation to
renewable energies on the demand for reserves will be a central issue. The influence of
wind power on the reserve requirement is analysed in several studies (for reviews see
Ela et al., 2010, 2011; Hamon & Söder, 2011; Holttinen et al., 2012; Milligan et al., 2010).
A general finding is that wind power only influences the operating reserve requirement
and not the contingency reserves (Holttinen et al., 2012). This would mostly affect
slower types of reserves. With higher levels of penetration and the development of
large offshore wind farms, however, fast frequency response may also be affected (Das
et al., 2015).
Our approach to determine the reserve margin is based on static probabilistic criteria.
It combines the need for a capacity margin due to contingencies on plants and lines with
deviations due to forecast errors. The requirement will not be dynamically updated and
may therefore overestimate the actual costs of reserves slightly. Due to the focus of this
paper on the change of costs from demand response contributions, we find this to be
acceptable.
Following the findings by Holttinen et al. (2012) as well as Gül and Stenzel (2005),
forecasting errors reflect the most important balancing issue introduced by wind power,
which will make up a large share of the system we analyse. Holttinen et al. (2009) use
the standard deviation to characterise the increase in operational reserve requirements
from wind. Hodge et al. (2012), however, find that normal distributions are not good at
approximating the distribution of wind forecast errors due to their narrow tails and a
low peak. They propose to use the hyperbolic or the Cauchy distributions instead (see
also Hodge & Milligan, 2011). Similar findings are presented by Bludszuweit et al. (2008)
proposing the beta distribution for a better fit, their main argument being pronounced
kurtosis of the error distribution. Hodge et al. (2012) compare distributions of wind
forecast errors across different countries. For Denmark the distribution is found to be
fairly symmetric and its skewness not very distinct. We circumvent the question of the
exact distribution of errors by using a probability density estimate based on the relative
frequency count within 1 MW bins.
Danish day-ahead forecast errors on an hourly basis are available from for the
years 2013 to 2015 from Nord Pool (2016). We use these data in combination with
information on the installed wind capacities throughout the period (Danish Energy
Agency, 2016a) to determine a probability distribution of wind forecast errors relative
to capacity. The day-ahead errors will to some extent be corrected in the intraday
market by balance responsible traders. For the dimensioning of reserves capacities
a more critical dimension is the hour-ahead error (Das et al., 2015). Dragging on
Danish experience, the normalised wind forecast error can be reduced from 5.2% at
day-ahead to 3.0% at hour-ahead (ENTSO-E, 2010). Nitsch et al. (2012) provide even
more optimistic figures in a German study and expect further improvements in the
future. We therefore find it appropriate to use 50% of the observed day-ahead forecast
errors as an approximation for the hour-ahead forecast (see the second panel in Figure
D.3 for the resulting distribution).
Gül and Stenzel (2005) underline that the role of the demand side as a driver for
reserve capacity is limited due to low forecasting errors of 1–5%. In the future, there-
fore, operational reserve capacity may be dispatched mainly for reasons related to the
supply side. Load forecasting errors will, however, still have a role to play in reserve
dimensioning. We therefore apply a distribution of load forecast errors also using data
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from Nord Pool (2016). It is shown in the upper panel of Figure D.3.
Besides operating reserves to cover forecast errors in load and wind, we take into
account capacity to cover for contingencies, as critical outages may occur on power
stations or transmission capacity. For the Danish system we take into account capacities
in Table D.2 (data based on CESI et al., 2005; Energinet.dk, 2015). We only consider full
outages and disregard the possibility of partial outages in this analysis. To calculate
probability distributions for outages we use 4000 full load hours for power plant
blocks, which corresponds to the number used by Danish Energy Agency (2014a). For
transmission lines we use 2500 full load hours corresponding to an average of data on
imports over the different lines in 2015 (based on data retrieved from Energinet.dk,
2016b). We use a common outage risk on all lines and plants of 1% in any given hour.
This number is close to the outage risks considered in a comprehensive German study
(Jansen et al., 2005). Figure D.3 shows the resulting probability distribution for outages
Table D.2: Capacities included for contingency estimation (estimations based on CESI
et al., 2005; Energinet.dk, 2015)
Capacity [MW]
Power plants
Fynsværket Block 7 380
Fynsværket Block 8 35
Nordjyllandsværket Block 3 380
Skærbækværket Block 3 390
Amagerværket Block 1 70
Amagerværket Block 3 250
Asnæsværket Block 2 140
Avedøreværket Block 1 250
Avedøreværket Block 2 545
HC Ørstedværket Block 7 75
HC Ørstedværket Block 8 25
Transmission lines
Sweden - Eastern Denmark 800
500
Germany - Eastern Denmark 600
400
Norway - Western Denmark 250
250
500
700
Sweden - Western Denmark 350
330
Germany - Western Denmark 150
550
400
400
1000
1000
UK - Western Denmark 700
700
Netherlands - Western Denmark 700
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in the third panel, obtained by convolution of the individual outage risk probabilities.
The probability of no failures occurring at all is thus around 70%.
With these 3 major sources of imbalance risk: wind forecast errors, load forecast
errors and outages, we estimate a joint distribution of imbalances for the whole system
by convolution (as commonly applied in, e.g., Jansen et al., 2005; Jost, Braun et al., 2015;
Jost, Speckmann et al., 2015; Molly et al., 2010). In order to do so, we have to assume
that the events are independent. For plant and line failures versus forecasting errors
this should be the case. A correlation of wind and load forecasting errors should not
be ruled out in general. For the sake of this analysis, however, we ignore any potential
correlations. As we have normalised the wind forecast errors to the installed capacity,
we are able to scale them to the a relevant capacity in a future scenario. Figure D.3
shows the resulting distribution applying the currently installed capacity of around
5 GW.
In order to determine reserve capacity we need to define the level of deviations
required to be covered. The exact criteria used in practice is not publicly available. A
security margin of 99.9% corresponding to a loss of load probability (LOLP) of 0.1% or
8.76 hours per year is sometimes used (ENTSO-E, 2009). In the light of numbers for
actual outages this seems high in a Danish context. We calculate a reserve according
to a requirement of a LOLP of 1 hour per year. We use the cumulative probabilities
to find positive and negative reserve requirements. For the reserve modeling we only
use the positive reserve assuming that negative capacity would always be available
by means of reducing production. For different levels of installed wind capacity the
resulting reserve requirement is shown in Figure D.4. We divide the reserve requirement
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Figure D.4: Reserve requirement dependent on the installed wind capacity assuming a
LOLP of 1 h/a
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into two qualities, fast and slow, representing two categories of response time largely
corresponding to secondary and tertiary control. On the basis of the yearly maximum
of historically activated capacity of secondary and tertiary reserves (as of data retrieved
from Energinet.dk, 2016b) we use a division of 10% for fast and 90% for slow reserves.
D.2.3 Reserve modelling
In order to determine the cost of a reserve capacity margin in a fossil-free scenario for
Denmark in 2035, besides the reserve requirement of the system, we need to define
the capacity available to cover for the reserves. We require total capacity to be able to
fulfil demand in any given hour. The hourly flexible demand variable as introduced
in equations (D.1) and (D.2) enables peak shaving in order to save costs of installing
peak capacity. Moreover, we want to ensure that in any given hour we are able to cover
for an additional reserve requirement as determined in the previous section D.2.2. In
order to take into account the capability of different types of generation technologies
in regard to ramping, we define subsets of technologies that are able to provide the
system with fast (FR) and with slow reserves (SR). Fast reserves include capacities for
regulating and ramping reserves corresponding to secondary reserve in ENTSO-E terms
that are immediately activated (Milligan et al., 2010). Slow reserves include capacities
for load-following reserve and supplemental reserves corresponding to tertiary reserves.
Depending on the technology used, a share of capacity may be required to be spinning.
This way we make sure that a technology with long start-up times or slow ramping
capability is actually available in the required hour. Technology types used for reserves
are shown in Table D.3.
Table D.3: Generation technologies providing reserve
Slow Fast
spinning required Steam turbines Steam turbines
CCGT CCGT
Gas turbines
no spinning required Gas turbines
Combustion engines
Technologies capable of providing fast reserve capacity should reserve a share of
capacity in any given hour such that, after planned generation, the sum of available
capacity covers the reserve requirement. We define a variable for such reserved capacity
per technology g, area a and time step h for both slow and fast reserves respectively
(KFR/SRa,g,h ). To fulfil the reserve requirement in every country c we define:∑
a∈Ac
∑
g∈FR
KFRa,g,h ≥ RFRc ∀ h, c (D.3)
Similarly for the slow reserve capacity:∑
a∈Ac
∑
g∈SR
KSRa,g,h ≥ RSRc ∀ h, c (D.4)
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The installed capacity of any individual technology capable of providing reserves
constrains hourly reserve provision such that:
Ka,g −Ga,g,h ≥ KFRa,g,h +KSRa,g,h ∀ h, a, g (D.5)
For the technologies providing fast reserve capacity we also want to ensure that
sufficient capacity is spinning:
Ga,g,h ≥ kspin ·KFRa,g,h ∀ h, a, g (D.6)
where kspin defines the proportion of capacity available for reserves. A similar constraint
is added for the slow reserve technologies required to be spinning.
This ensures that no reserves may be provided if a technology is not running. At the
same time the constraint forces capacities to be running at higher levels to be able to
provide sufficient capacity. This formulation is only an approximation in order to avoid
unit commitment. We do ensure on a technology basis that capacity will be spinning.
We do not, however, exactly ensure in this way that a particular unit considered for
up-regulation will be spinning. What we do know is that some capacity of a technology
that would be capable of fast up-regulation is spinning. As usually several units of the
same technology type would be present in the system, we may risk that all spinning
units are fully utilised and we rely on a different non-spinning unit for the fast reserve.
We do consider this inaccuracy to be acceptable in the context of our analysis.
The constraint we use to force spinning capacities in equation (D.6) allows for
increasing levels of reserve provision as generation of a technology increases. To
reflect the ramping capability of generation technologies more realistically we introduce
an additional constraint to limit the reserve provision of a technology to a certain
percentage of installed capacity.
Ka,g · kramp ≥ KFRa,g,h ∀ h, a, g (D.7)
We use approximate ramp rates; moreover, we define the spinning factor kspin such
that it stays active only until a minimum load level of 20% is reached.1 Therefore, as far
as reserve provision is concerned, the full ramping capability is only utilised at levels
above the minimum load. Again we avoid unit commitment modelling and do not
model minimum load requirements explicitly. We do, however, substantially restrict
reserve provision at generation levels below the technical minimum using this kind of
non-integer linear approximation. Table D.4 shows the technology characteristics used
(based on Papaefthymiou et al., 2014). The potential for reserve provision subject to the
level of generation of the different technologies is indicated by the dark grey areas in
Figures D.5–D.7.
To determine the overall required capacity we apply an approach incorporating
demand flexibility in a way similar to that of Hedegaard and Balyk (2013). To determine
the capacity margin (as illustrated in Figure D.2) we use technology specific capacity
credits to account for availability constraints at system peak. In addition we have
defined an operating reserve requirement by equations (D.3) and (D.4). This far, demand
flexibility only explicitly affects the hourly energy balance of the system, and demand
flexibility is able to reduce required peak capacity to serve hourly load. We would like
1This will be the case for kspin = load
min
kramp
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Table D.4: Technology characteristics used in reserve constraints
Technology Min. load Ramp rate kspin
[%] [%/5 min.] [-]
Steam turbines 20% 20% 1
CCGT 20% 20% 1
Gas turbines 20% 40% 0.5
Combustion engines 0% 100% -
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Figure D.5: Potential reserve provision from steam turbines and CCGT
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Figure D.6: Potential reserve provision from gas turbines
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Figure D.7: Potential reserve provision from combustion engines
to extend this approach, though, to also allow for provision of reserves from demand
flexibility. To analyse this case we extend the reserve capacity equations (D.3) and (D.4)
with variables reflecting reserve contribution from demand response RDflex,SR/FRj :∑
a∈Ac
∑
g∈FR
KFRa,g,h ≥ RFRc −
∑
j
∑
a∈Ac
RDflex,FRa,h,j ∀ h, c (D.8)∑
a∈Ac
∑
g∈SR
KSRa,g,h ≥ RSRc −
∑
j
∑
a∈Ac
RDflex,SRa,h,j ∀ h, c (D.9)
The flexibility potential of the demand side may only contribute to reserves if it is
not utilised in the spot market. As we only consider positive reserves, we have to be
able to reduce consumption in order to contribute:
Dflex-pota,h,j +D
flex
a,h,j ≥ RDflex,FRa,h,j +RDflex,SRa,h,j ∀ h, a, j (D.10)
We want to avoid, however, that a planned increase in consumption due to post-
poned demand in earlier hours will be postponed even further as this would violate the
assumptions used in the demand response modelling of a limited time window for any
response. Therefore additional demand due to activated flexibility is not allowed to be
curtailed and used for reserves. Consequently, any contribution of demand flexibility to
reserves is restricted to the original flexibility potential:
Dflex-pota,h,j ≥ RDflex,FRa,h,j +RDflex,SRa,h,j ∀ h, a, j (D.11)
In principle, the model would be free to choose whether the demand side would
provide fast or slow reserves. We find it relevant to restrict this due to two reasons: 1)
we lack information on the reaction times of the controlled appliances, but assume that
some devices would be restricted to deliver slow reserves; 2) we consider it unlikely
that the system operator would solely rely on fast reserve provision by demand-side
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resource – a result that could easily occur without further restrictions. For those reasons,
we limit the provision of fast reserves from the demand side to 10%.
As opposed to reserves from generation capacity, the shifting of consumption in time
implies that it has to be recovered at some point. We do take this into account as long as
demand is shifted in the hourly simulation. As we do not explicitly model activation
of reserves within the hour, we lack the need for recovery. Thus reserve provision
from demand response would not take into account the potential costs of an activation.
Therefore we assume an average activation of demand response and distribute recovery
equally over the following hours corresponding to the time window of the response.
The overall system balance equation is extended by adding the following term:
· · ·+Dflexa,h,j + α
∑
j
 h∑
t=h−Sj
RDflex,FRa,j (t) +R
Dflex,SR
a,j (t)
Sj
−RDflex,FRa,j (h)−RDflex,SRa,j (h)

(D.12)
The factor α represents the fraction of reserve capacity expected to be activated.
Based on historical observations (Energinet.dk, 2016b) we use a factor of α = 0.15.
D.2.4 Scenario set-up
Denmark pursues a strategy of decarbonising its energy system. Although not undis-
puted, the long-term target of a fossil-free energy system in 2050 is widely supported.
An important contribution is supposed to come from the electricity and heating sectors,
both of which should become fully renewable by 2035 according to a strategy set forth
by the Danish Government (2011). We reflect this strategy in our model using frame-
work conditions in line with the Danish Energy Agency (2014b) "wind scenario" (see
Salvucci & Münster, 2015, for further details regarding the scenario implementation).
Although the model formulations in sections D.2.1 and D.2.3 are applicable to cover any
country that is part of the model, we focus on Denmark only for this case study. Both
the reserve requirements and the demand response model are therefore only applied in
the two Danish regions East and West in order to isolate the effects.
We set up the following model runs for the year 2035 in order to evaluate the system
contribution of demand response with high shares of renewable energies:
1. Reference case: including neither reserve requirement nor flexible demand;
2. Reference with flexibility: including flexible demand, but no reserve requirement;
3. Reserves with hourly flexibility: including reserve requirement, and flexible
demand in the hourly energy balance equation;
4. Reserves with demand flexibility reserve: including reserve requirement, with
flexible demand included in the energy and reserve balance equations.
The difference in costs between the reference and the base case reflects the costs
of the reserve requirement if no flexible demand is available. We want to determine
the potential contribution of flexible demand to a reduction of these costs. Therefore
we need to isolate the effect on reserves from general savings in the spot market. We
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Figure D.8: Reserve costs derived from case results 2–4 relative to the reference case 1
can calculate the benefit that demand flexibility generates in the hourly spot market
as the difference between the total system costs of cases 1 and 2, the reference cases
without and with demand flexibility. To determine the net effect of a direct contribution
of demand flexibility to reserves, we first find the reference costs of reserve without
demand flexibility (case 2 minus case 3) and compare it to the new reduced costs (case 2
minus case 4).
D.3 Results
The reference case results provide us with a benchmark to compare results of the
remaining cases. We derive total costs of maintaining a certain capacity in excess of
demand to provide balancing services covering the imbalances introduced by wind
power and load forecasting errors as well as potential plant and line outages as shown
in Figure D.8. We derive annual benchmark costs of AC185 million to provide sufficient
reserve capacity to the Danish system in the year 2035. We use the full flexibility of
the supply side of the power system, including flexibility in the district heating sector
for as far as it may affect the electricity balance. It should be mentioned that this cost
only covers the availability of capacity and not the potential activations due to actual
deviations.
Including demand response as a resource that may be used just as any supply-
side resource to provide flexibility in order to minimise total system costs, will in the
first instance be equivalent to optimising available capacity in the hourly spot market.
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Figure D.9: Utilisation of flexible demand during one week by case
As we run the model on an hourly basis, any contribution can only be on an hourly
level. Moreover, the deterministic nature of the model within a year means that we
do not deal with uncertainties in the first place. The participation in the spot market
yields a positive effect on the total system of AC27 million. As should be expected from
the formulation of the demand response model, within the given assumptions on the
flexibility of consumers, load may be served in a cheaper way. The resulting demand
profile for one of the modelled weeks is shown in comparison to the original profile in
the top panel of Figure D.9.
Another effect we observe is whether and to what extent the optimisation in the spot
market relieves capacity and makes it available for the use as system reserve capacity. In
particular, if investments in new capacity that should stay available as peak and reserve
capacity could be avoided or reduced, this could be expected to generate significant
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benefits attributable to the utilisation of demand response – although only participating
in the spot market. We do observe a change in the demand response pattern (see mid
panel of Figure D.9), however, the cost of reserves is hardly affected by the hourly
demand flexibility.
We assume idle demand response capacity to be available as reserve, as it implicitly
contains a potential for curtailment or load increase. The ability of the demand side
to leave idle capacity for system reserves results in a reduction of costs for providing
reserves. Comparing the reference cost with the demand response case (right bar in
Figure D.8) we find that contributions from the demand side could reduce the costs of
reserves provided by generating units by AC59 million. The resulting costs lie at AC126
million corresponding to a reduction of around 30%. One has to mention here that this
result does not take into account other costs than the opportunity costs of withholding
capacity from the hourly market and the cost of recovering activated reserve at later
points in time.
A notable result is that the types of demand flexibility that we included in our
calculations are more valuable as a system reserve than in the hourly spot market.
Based on our assumption the savings of AC59 million generated in reserves are more
than double the savings of AC27 million generated in the hourly market. Accordingly,
idle flexible demand is utilised as reserve to a large extent when allowed to, as it can
be seen in the lower panel of Figure D.9. At the same time, hourly benefits may be
maintained at the same level as in the case without demand-side reserve provision.
The composition of capacities available for reserves change slightly under the dif-
ferent scenarios. In Figure D.10 we show the composition in cases with and without
demand participation in reserves. We can see that demand is mostly substituting re-
serves provided by large-scale biomass plants based on wood chips. In the case of fast
reserves, the demand side also reduces the relative high share of biogas.
As we use a linear optimisation model we interpret the marginal values of the
electricity balance equation in the model as the electricity production cost that provide
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us with the marginal spot prices. As the costs of the system changes with the different
demand flexibility scenarios we apply, so do the electricity prices. Results are presented
in Table D.5. We allow the model to invest in new generation capacity, therefore, the
hours triggering investments due to capacity bottlenecks will have significantly higher
marginal values. Such spikes may be interpreted as scarcity prices required in order to
finance new investments. We find that the utilisation of demand response reduces these
scarcity prices due to a lower demand for new capacity. However, if demand flexibility
is utilised in the reserve instead of the spot markets the reduction in the price peak is
clearly lower.
Table D.5: Electricity prices in reserve scenarios
Eastern Denmark [AC/MWh] Western Denmark [AC/MWh]
Min. Max. Avg. Min. Max. Avg.
Without demand flexibility 40.28 3456.31 60.13 41.84 3456.31 60.35
With hourly load-shift 43.33 3419.14 60.10 43.37 3419.14 60.30
With demand-side reserves 40.33 3451.52 60.35 43.37 3451.52 60.58
D.4 Discussion
Our case study results show that intra-hourly flexibility holds a significant value poten-
tial for demand response. To the extent that the control of residential appliances, for e.g.
cooling, freezing or cleaning, may be automated, even household customers could be
able to capture some of this value. The benefits of providing reserves clearly exceed
those of hourly load shifting. In our calculations demand response reduces system costs
by around three times as much when providing reserves as compared to when it is
utilised only in the hourly market. Thus, the value of participating in reserve markets
could potentially contribute to two thirds of the total value. The provision of reserves
could also be attractive for another reason: in the spot market revenues may only be
generated when load is actively shifted, whereas in reserve markets only parts of the
offers will be activated and result in actual load shifts. Therefore it may be an option for
the demand side to participate primarily in the reserve markets, despite of the trade-off
present in the model results between utilising response potential in the spot market and
leaving it to stay available for intra-hour demand response.
It should be noted, though, that the absolute level of the reserve costs and the
corresponding savings are somewhat uncertain. A crucial model input is the reserve
requirement and its forward projection based on installed wind power. Although
the resulting curve of the reserve requirement resembles findings of similar analyses
(e.g. Hirth & Ziegenhagen, 2015), it cannot be fully verified. We are able, however,
to validate the order of magnitude of the resulting reserve costs on the basis of costs
published by the Danish system operator. In 2015 the costs for reserves have been
stated as close to AC79 million (Energinet.dk, 2016a), but costs have been as high as
AC142 million in 2008 (Energinet.dk, 2009). Our estimations are slightly higher, which
should be expected as we scale wind forecast errors with the expected capacity in 2035
and, accordingly, assume a higher reserve requirement. A couple of conditions make it
difficult to directly compare the model results with actual costs, though. The modelled
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costs reflect the need for building additional capacity, while it is unclear in how far plant
operators actually rely on reserve markets to drive investments. Moreover, we do not
reflect, in our reserve dimensioning and modelling, the Nordic cooperation that enables
cross-border provision of reserves subject to available transmission capacities. We also
exclude some potential providers of reserve, like heat pumps, from the market. A slight
overestimation of costs, thus, seems to be inherent in our assumptions. Considering the
substantial simplifications in the dimensioning and modelling of reserves, however, we
regard our cost estimates as rather close to actual costs.
In relation to the demand-side contributions to reserves, we need to add some quali-
fications. An important precondition for using demand response as reserve capacity, in
general, would be automatic control. Devices could be controlled in a centralised way or
even in a more autonomous decentralised manner. It is unlikely, however, that a system
operator would rely on price-based manual control to ensure system reliability. Our
analysis relies on studies that identified certain potentials, some of which may not be
fully automated. Moreover, automation will come at a cost that has not been considered
in our model runs. An additional uncertainty is added by the adoption behaviour of
households and a limited willingness to accept automation equipment (Fell et al., 2015;
Murtagh et al., 2014). The total cost savings should therefore be considered as an upper
bound. Household consumers with a high flexibility potential and the willingness to
accept automated control would still be able to benefit considerably. It should also
be noted that other appliances, like heat pumps and electric vehicles with a possibly
even higher potential in the future, would be able to contribute in a similar way and
compensate for a lack of potential in the appliances used for this analysis.
A general challenge for load-shifting demand is that a response will have to be
made up at a different point in time such that the overall consumption does not change.
In an hourly market this could be planned ahead of time, although one may have to
rely on price-independent bidding. In a regulation market, if capacity is provided
as reserve within an hour and it is activated, then activation will only occur in one
direction. The recovery will require changing consumption in the opposite direction. At
present this could not occur within the regulating market, as it would not be possible to
place a bid for the recovery beforehand. A compensation has to occur at a later point
in time, potentially through intra-day activities or through placement of adjusted bids
in the following periods for regulation. Alternatively it might be helpful to integrate
load recovery directly into the bidding mechanism (as proposed by O’Connell et al.,
2016). The challenge could also be decreased if settlement periods were shortened
and the regulating market would be re-organised around such periods. With any bid
placed in this market, one would only commit capacities during a comparatively shorter
time frame, and recovery could happen through short-term market transactions in
subsequent periods. If none such options are established, recovery would have to be
settled through the imbalance mechanism, potentially recreating the problem it was
meant to solve in the first place. Demand participation as reserves in the form of load
shifting may therefore be limited until products are re-designed.
Another issue that may have an influence on the value of demand flexibility is the
timing of its introduction. Early availability of demand flexibility will reduce or delay
the investment needs in new flexible capacities. We have in our analysis restricted
demand response to the Danish market. The potential value that could be achieved in
the ordinary spot market, thus, reflects either early adoption in Denmark, or delayed
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adoption in surrounding countries. With neighbouring regions pursuing similar plans
for demand-side flexibility, the value in the internationally coupled hourly markets
would become lower than estimated. The value of reserve provision should not be
affected in the same way, as the reserve requirement will be provided by domestic
resources to a larger extent. Efforts towards an improved international integration of
reserve and balancing markets, however, could have an impact on the intra-hourly
value in the future as well.
D.5 Conclusion
Keeping in mind the limitations discussed above, we were able to determine a first
estimate of the system value that demand flexibility could contribute with by participat-
ing in hourly spot and reserve markets. While attractiveness of the price differences in
hourly spot markets may be limited also in future systems with large shares of variable
renewable production, participation in reserve markets could provide an interesting
additional source of income to providers of flexibility on the demand side. We focussed
on the Danish case, but analysed the feasibility taking an energy system approach. In
this way, we were able to reflect the dynamic interactions with neighbouring systems
and the heating sector as well as, to a certain extent, competition with other sources of
flexibility.
An important conclusion is that the value of shifting load intra-hourly may exceed
the value of doing so on an hourly basis. Thus, it might be an attractive market segment
for the demand side to participate in, and our results suggest that the short-term value
of demand response should be analysed in greater detail. The addressed short-term
flexibility, however, is complex to handle and its utilisation is subject to several precon-
ditions. It seems recommendable to further explore the value potential through system
studies based on refined modelling of reserves and demand flexibility. A more detailed
assessment of the input parameters regarding the reserve requirement and specific load
characteristics may be required in order to draw more robust conclusions. Also, the
potential of increased competition from other flexibility measures both domestic and in
neighbouring regions should be considered.
From a more practical point of view, technical and regulatory limitations need to
be addressed. First of all, the processes of bidding and activation need to be largely
automated. But besides such technical constraints, large-scale participation of demand-
side units requires some of the market mechanisms to be adjusted accounting for the
specific characteristics of load shifting. If no measures are taken, demand-side reserve
provision would stay restricted to mere load curtailment or load shifts with a longer
time horizon; these conditions would probably exclude many residential loads. To
utilise the full value potential that lies within the intra-hourly time frame, therefore, the
reserve market design should provide for a better integration of residential demand
flexibility.
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Nomenclature
h: index for hours
c: index for countries
g: index for generation technology
j: index for consumer appliance
a: index for areas
Ac: set of areas belonging to country c
FR: set of generation technologies capable of providing fast reserves
SR: set of generation technologies capable of providing slow reserves
Dflex-pota,h,j : hourly demand flexibility potential of appliances j in area a [MWh]
Dflexa,h,j : shift from flexible demand in area a [MWh]
Sj : load shift horizon of appliances j [h]
KFRa,g,h: hourly capacity of technology g in area a reserved for fast reserves [MW]
KSRa,g,h: hourly capacity of technology g in area a reserved for slow reserves [MW]
Ga,g,h: hourly generation by technology g in area a [MWh]
RFRc : fast reserve requirement in country c [MW]
RSRc : slow reserve requirement in country c [MW]
RDflex,FRa,h,j : hourly demand flexibility from appliances j reserved for fast reserves in
area a [MW]
RDflex,SRa,h,j : hourly demand flexibility from appliances j reserved for slow reserves in
area a [MW]
Ka,g: installed capacities of generation technology g in area a [MW]
kspin: factor for spinning requirement [-]
kramp: factor for ramping limitation [-]
α: average share of activated reserve capacity [-]
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Abstract
Aggregators are expected to play an important role in making households
provide flexibility to the electricity system. We investigate the business case of
aggregators offering a demand response product in a competitive retail market,
then directly accessing their customers’ flexibility through remotely controlled
demand response devices and marketing it on the electricity markets. As the
value of flexibility largely relies on price variations, we use a stochastic electricity
price model, which we combine with a linear optimisation program and a cash-
flow model to determine expected operating gross margins and their probability
distributions. We find that, for a case of Danish residential customers with optimistic
assumptions on the available flexibility in terms of flexible volumes and load-shift
time horizons, the benefits may be in the range of current investment cost for
automation equipment. Furthermore, a Value-at-Risk analysis shows that income
expectations are rather stable with more upside than downside potential. With
foreseeable cost reductions for smart devices the aggregator business case might
soon become attractive, particularly in markets with high shares of renewable
production.
aTechnical University of Denmark
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E.1 Introduction
In electricity systems with large shares of intermittent renewable production, a growing
challenge arises to provide sufficient flexibility. This has reinforced interest in utilising
the flexibility potential of the demand side. From a technical perspective, this is certainly
a feasible option. Some practical issues, however, prevail in actually exploiting demand-
side flexibility. These issues include how to organise market access for the demand side
and how to activate consumers who are used to receiving electricity as an unconditional
service and often do not attach much significance to contract structure and pricing
of electricity. To cope with such organisational and motivational issues it has often
been proposed that end user flexibility should be marketed by an entity aggregating
many consumers’ flexible units (see Katz, 2014). Moreover, it has been found that
automatic control will be far more effective than relying on an active manual response
by customers (e.g. P. Lund et al., 2015).
We investigate in this paper the business model of such aggregators with remotely
controlled demand response devices added to appliances of end customers. The ag-
gregators’ operative conditions will be highly dependent on variable market prices and
their capability to profit from these variations. It is therefore crucial to understand the
inherent risks of their business model. In our analysis we also explore risk implications
of aggregated demand-side response regarding the exposure to uncertain future market
prices and how it influences the decision of aggregators to invest in demand response
equipment.
In the business model that we propose, aggregators market end user flexibility in the
electricity wholesale market, while remunerating their customers in the form of a reduc-
tion in their contracted electricity price. In order to be able to access certain customer
devices for flexibility purposes, the aggregators equip their customers with remotely
controllable switches that should be installed with the relevant flexible appliances. Such
switches require additional upfront investment by the aggregators.
In this paper we investigate whether such a business model is feasible for an ag-
gregator, i.e. whether the additional revenue from marketing demand-side flexibility
is sufficient to justify the required investment. For this, we develop an investment ap-
praisal model consisting of a price module, a demand response module and a cash-flow
module. For the stochastic electricity price model we choose to apply a framework pro-
posed by Lucia and Schwartz (2002). We see this model fit as it provides the possibility
to incorporate seasonality into the price process and therefore is helpful in the context
of electricity. We calibrate the stochastic process to the Danish electricity market. The
realistic results from the specific case application shall help to strengthen our point. The
demand response model is an optimisation model based on load shifting, calibrated to
historical profiles of Danish residential customers. We explore three different scenarios
of the share of consumption available for flexibility and four different scenarios for the
load-shift horizon. The cash-flow model is based on a single-period operational gross
margin indicator.
Using Monte Carlo simulations we calculate the aggregator’s income as well as the
threshold levels that indicate the maximum allowable investments to ensure a certain
expected gross margin for the aggregator. Doing this, we can identify not only the
expected average benefits for the aggregator (and the customers), but can also explore
the related risks by analysing the probability distribution of the outcomes. Applying
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a Value-at-Risk approach we quantify the risk of adverse outcome, i.e. when prices
develop in a direction where demand-side flexibility is not valuable enough so that
the installation of equipment leads to a loss for the aggregator. Having determined
the maximum allowable investment levels under different flexibility assumptions, we
compare this to currently available technology and assess whether the business model
of an aggregator is viable in the current market environment.
E.2 Methods
E.2.1 Model concept
We build a model that determines the operational gross margin for the aggregator based
on several different input factors. First of all, it depends on the contractual relation that
the aggregator has with the electricity customers: The aggregator may be their supplier,
i.e. delivering the full volumes consumed, or may only be a third party optimising the
load profile of a customer portfolio on behalf of the actual supplier. In the latter case, the
added value must be shared amongst all parties subject to the contractual arrangements.
For simplicity, we assume that the aggregator is also the supplier. We further assume
that the aggregator offers an annual fixed price contract to their customers, with the
price being determined by the expectation on the annual cost of procuring electricity
for the customer portfolio from the spot market plus a margin. We assume that the
aggregator then undertakes the required investment in demand response equipment
and generates additional revenue by being able to optimise procurement of electricity
on the spot market using the obtained flexibility from load-shifting. The aggregator
may pass through some of this additional revenue to the customers in form of a reduced
price.
As we focus on the aggregator role and the marketing of demand flexibility we do
not directly analyse the risks involved in the supply business case. That is, depending
on the price development, the supply business may be subject to higher than expected
cost of procuring electricity on the spot market and thus the risk to achieve lower
margins than expected. This part of the business risk is not in scope of the analysis here,
so in the risk analysis we focus on the margin added by utilising the flexibility potential
only.
The margin contribution from demand flexibility depends on the demand profile,
the flexibility potential and characteristics of the underlying appliances as well as the
market price for electricity. We take into account all of these elements in different
modules. Figure E.1 provides an overview of the model set-up.
The demand profile depends on the customer portfolio. In planning the business
case an aggregator will face uncertainty about the characteristics of potential customers.
Using average and standard profiles may be a good first approximation. It might be the
case, though, that aggregators will attract and maybe even target a type of customer dif-
ferent from the average. Our focus will be on a small portfolio of residential customers.
As limited data is available on the portfolio level it might for some application cases
be necessary to scale down consumption data of a larger data set, e.g. of a country or
region. We are able to avoid that by having access to a consistent set of historical indi-
vidual profiles of Danish residential customers aggregated to a joint portfolio (Dansk
179
CAPEX 
• Annualised 
• Lifetime: 20 years 
• Cost of capital: 5% 
• Gross margin 
• Investment threshold 
• Price reduction potential 
• Value-at-Risk 
Optimised 
load profiles 
Demand 
response 
model 
Price model Cash-flow model 
Customer portfolio 
• 3,071 customers 
• 11,766 MWh/y 
Flexibility characteristics 
• Share of flexible consumption 
• 10/20/30% 
• Load-shift horizon 
• ±1/3/6/9 hours 
Price 
simulations 
Figure E.1: Overall model concept
Energi, 2013). The portfolio consists of 3,071 residential customers with a total annual
consumption of 10,766 MWh.
We generate electricity price developments using a stochastic price model. The price
paths are then fed into a demand response model together with the aforementioned load
profile. The model optimises available flexibility using a linear programming approach
utilising the solver LPSolve. Finally, the results of the optimal demand response in
form of savings achieved in the procurement price of electricity are used together with
the assumed investment costs for the demand response equipment to determine the
profitability of the aggregator business in an annualised cash-flow model. Each part of
the model is described in more detail in the following sections.
E.2.2 Stochastic price model
To simulate electricity prices for our analysis we define a stochastic price model includ-
ing a deterministic seasonal component. We use a one-factor model based on the log
spot price as defined by Lucia and Schwartz (2002):
ln(Pt) = f(t) +Xt (E.1)
where Pt denotes the spot price, f(t) is a function defining the seasonality and Xt is
a variable that follows a mean-reverting stochastic process reverting to a mean of zero
such that the increments are determined as:
dXt = −κXtdt+ σdZ (E.2)
Here κ defines the speed of mean reversion and σ represents the volatility. The term
dZ stands for the random increments of a Brownian motion.
Adding the stochastic and deterministic components of the model, we get a mean-
reverting price process around a fixed seasonal pattern.
The seasonal pattern should capture observable patterns within a year. In order to
do so we use a harmonic model (as described in Hannan et al., 1970; Sørensen, 2002).
As electricity prices are very different on working days as compared to holidays and
weekends, we include a factor for the type of day as well. Moreover, we include a linear
trend. The resulting seasonal model is defined as:
f(t) = α + βt+ γDt +
K∑
k=1
(a cos(2pikt) + b cos(2pikt)) (E.3)
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with Dt representing a dummy variable for whether a day is a working day or
non-working day (i.e. holidays and weekends), and the integer value K defining the
number of annual cycles. α, β and γ as well as a and b are parameters that need to be
estimated.
E.2.3 Price model calibration
To calibrate the model we follow a stepwise approach similar to the one applied by
Lucia and Schwartz (2002). We use hourly Nordpool spot price data for the Western
Danish price zone for ten historic years (2006–2015). As a first step we calibrate the
deterministic seasonal component using ordinary least squares. This provides us with a
fitted model and we can derive the observed residuals. The stochastic component is
then fitted to the series of residuals according to, Iacus (2008, p. 113ff.).
The first two steps are based on daily average spot prices. For the demand response
optimisation, however, we require more detailed price simulations. We therefore extend
the approach by applying normalised hourly profiles to the daily averages in order to
achieve hourly prices.
The simplest approach to normalising an hourly price series would be to divide by
the daily average. This approach, however, cannot be applied with a series including
negative prices. There is the option of neglecting negative values and set those prices
to zero. As far as possible we would like to reflect the full price variation in our
model, because it determines the value of demand response, in particular for small
residential customers with limited load-shift horizons. Moreover, we want to keep
extreme cases like spikes or negative prices, because they hold a significant share of the
value potential. We therefore choose to calculate the hourly deviations from the daily
average and normalise by the annual average like this:
Pt,nrm =
Pt − P t,d
P t,y
(E.4)
with P t,d and P t,y representing the average price over a time period of the day and
year that the hour t is a part of. This approach would thus result in the same absolute
hourly deviations from the daily average as long as the yearly average is the same.
With increasing annual average, we would assume the hourly profile to become more
pronounced as well. A negative hourly price would be represented by a large negative
absolute deviation from the daily average, which would likely produce a new negative
price based on a different daily average in the stochastic model as well.
We apply the normalised hourly profiles to the simulation results by random
sampling of daily 24-hour-sets depending on the type of day. We thus randomly
apply observed hourly profiles of working days and non-working days to the daily
averages in our simulation:
Pt,sim = P t,yPt,nrm + P t,d (E.5)
This way we are able to preserve the extreme prices that can be observed in electricity
price series with a probability reflecting the frequency of occurrence in the sample series.
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E.2.4 Demand response model
We use a generic demand response model that implements only load shifting. Demand
is based on historical profiles of residential consumers, and a certain percentage of the
profile is assumed to be flexible, while the remaining load cannot be shifted.
Assuming the aggregator uses demand response to minimise spot market procure-
ment costs, we need to solve a minimisation problem for all sets of modelled prices,
such that:
min
d≥0
∑
t∈T
dtPt (E.6)
where dt denotes consumption in hour t at a price of Pt.
We ensure that the resulting consumption dt in any given hour will at least cover the
inflexible base demand determined as a share of 1− kflex of the the total demand D0t
before demand response with kflex as consumption share assumed to be flexible:
dt ≥ D0t ·
(
1− kflex) ∀ t ∈ T (E.7)
Moreover, we need to take into account restrictions keeping flexibility within a
technical bound of the underlying appliances. We use a rolling time horizon of S to
contain volumes shifted in the short-term within a predefined time span. In every hour
volumes may be shifted back or forward in time resulting in an interdependence of load
shifts also beyond the defined horizon. We contain such interdependencies within a
second larger time horizon L.
t+S∑
t−S
dt ≥
t+S∑
t−S
D0t ∀ { t ∈ T | S < (t mod L) < L− S } (E.8)
The long-term horizon is furthermore governed by the following contraint:
t+L∑
t
dt =
t+L∑
t
D0t ∀ { t ∈ T | (t− 1) mod L = 0 } (E.9)
In both equations (E.8) and (E.9) the modulo operator produces the remainder
of dividing the two values providing a way to refer to individual hours within the
longer time horizon. The two constraints may be interpreted as the possibility to shift
volumes, but at the same time shifted consumption in total over a certain time needs
to equal consumption before load shifting. An example of a resulting profile is shown
in Figure E.2. It is based on parameters S = 3 and L = 24 with a flexible share of
kflex = 10%. The lower panel shows a corresponding price scenario generated by the
stochastic model that is used as the basis for cost minimisation.
E.2.5 Cash-flow model
We determine the profitability of the aggregator business using a single-period opera-
tional gross margin as indicator. The demand response module aggregates the demand
response effect into annual values, so that we can keep the cash-flow model on the same
basis.
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Figure E.2: One week example of simulated load and price profiles (10%-flex scenario,
±3 hours load shift)
We determine the operational gross margin in a simplified way by approximating
net profits based on Earnings before Interests, Depreciation and Amortisation (EBITDA)
(thus neglecting taxes and several other elements) and then dividing this by the total
revenues. We thus calculate the operational gross margin (OGM) as:
OGM =
Rsales +RDR −Opower −Oother − IDR
Rsales +RDR
(E.10)
where Rsales is the annual revenue of power sales to customers, RDR is the annual
revenue from demand response activity, Opower is the annual cost of procuring power
from the spot market, Oother is additional operating cost of the aggregator, and IDR is
the annuity of the investment cost for demand response equipment. In the base case
without demand response, RDR and IDR are zero.
We exogenously set the operational gross margin. The gross margin of Danish
suppliers varies between years and products offered. It has been found to lie between
50–100 DKK/MWh in the past years under retail competition (Okholm et al., 2015).
Assuming competition to rather increase than decrease in the coming years we use the
lower value of 50 DKK/MWh, which transforms to a margin of 18.025% to be used as
our baseline. The corresponding electricity sales price to customers in the base case is
37.23 EUR/MWh excl. any levies, taxes and network charges. By then ensuring that
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the aggregator achieves the same expected profitability in either case, we re-estimate
the possible sales price to customers after demand response. If the demand response
activity as a whole is good business, the aggregator will be able to offer a discount to
their customers.
By choosing the approach of keeping the expected profitability of the aggregator
constant, we calculate the maximum potential reduction in sales price to customers
that can be achieved by the aggregator through demand response activities. In reality,
one could expect that the aggregator will not pass all of the effect through to the
customers but that the savings are shared between the two. For our purpose of analysing
the business case of an aggregator as such and to enhance transparency between the
scenarios we find it appropriate not to split the effect further.
In the same way, we can also find the threshold of maximum allowable investment
cost at which the aggregator would start to be interested in entering into the business.
Here again, we assume that the aggregator should at least be able to achieve the same
expected profitability and to offer at least the same sales price to customers.
E.2.6 Value-at-risk estimation
Exploiting the information on probability distributions of the demand response effect
that the stochastic price modelling generates, we can further analyse the risk that the
aggregator assumes when investing into demand response equipment. For this, we use
the Value-at-risk measure.
In the Value-at-risk measure, a quantile α ∈ (0, 1) is specified that represents the
risk tolerance of an investor. From the specified α and the mean profit, a value η is
calculated, so that the probability of obtaining a profit less than η is lower than (1− α):
VaR(α, x) = max
{
η : P (ω | f(x, ω) < η) ≤ 1− α}, ∀ α ∈ (0, 1). (E.11)
Commonly used values for α are derived from the standard deviation σ. When using
one standard deviation, the profit will lie above the calculated value η with a probability
of 68.27%. Using 2σ corresponds to 95.45% probability. In financial analysis, a rounded
value of α = 5% is commonly used, and we apply this here as well. Thus, using the VaR
to our operational gross margin as the measure for profitability, we determine the level
of the margin that the aggregator can expect to at least obtain with a probability of 95%.
E.2.7 Scenarios
We calculate results for a set of scenarios to account for the uncertainty about the
volume of flexible consumption as well as the technical load-shift capabilities of specific
appliances. These scenario parameters only affect the demand response optimisation.
The literature on flexibility potentials of Danish households is rather sparse. Ea
Energianalyse (2011) provides one of the few estimates: A share of 35% of residential
consumption is considered to become flexible if fully equipped with automation units.
A similar figure has been used by Kwon and Østergaard (2014) in their analysis of
flexible demand in Denmark. Such estimations are in line with international findings
as well (e.g. Faruqui et al., 2007; Klobasa & Obersteiner, 2009). Most of the flexibility
comes from shifting loads. Only a few categories of lighting as well as some electrical
heating could be considered for curtailment or additional load during extreme periods.
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The estimated potential of 35% flexible load share on the national level defines an
upper bound that is subject to how many customers actually adopt demand response
technology and behave flexibly. In our analysis, however, the aggregator creates a
dedicated portfolio with flexible customers, so the adoption uncertainty is not relevant
here (other than for a potential limit of the possible number of customers in the portfolio
itself). At the same time we may assume that those customers that are part of the port-
folio utilise a large share of their individual flexibility potential. Still, a full utilisation
of the estimated 35% load share potential might be too optimistic, as it e.g. might not
be feasible to attach devices to all potentially flexible appliances so that not all of the
flexible load can be included in the business case of an aggregator. Furthermore, one
should account for some variation in the customer base. We therefore use the following
scenarios for the flexibility share kflex: 10%, 20%, 30%.
Regarding the load-shift horizon, Gils (2014) points out that most demand response
options are limited to a relatively short time horizon. Other assessments of the flexible
potential in residential appliances with regard to timing are available from, e.g., Klobasa
(2007) or Paatero and Lund (2006). They find that some load-shifting options provided
by fridges and freezers are restricted to one hour, while appliances like washing ma-
chines and dishwashers are assumed to be flexible within a whole day. As we use
aggregated profiles we do not explicitly account for individual appliances. Instead we
use a set of values for the load-shift horizon S that should cover the possible range
of shifting potentials from the overall load of residential customers. We choose to set
these at: ±1 hour, ±3 hours, ±6 hours, ±9 hours. At the same time we fix the longer
load-shift horizon L to 24 hours.
E.3 Results
E.3.1 Results for the expected value of load-shifting
In this section we present results based on the expectation of savings generated by
load-shifts across all simulated scenarios. All numbers in this section are thus based on
the mean value over 1,000 simulations.
As described in Section E.2.1, we have calculated for each set of scenarios the
operational gross margin and then analysed it from different perspectives. Here the
investment cost threshold is one of the crucial elements in the analysis. Note that the
investment thresholds of the different scenarios are calculated so that both the margin
for the aggregator and the sales price for the customers are kept constant in comparison
to the base case without demand response. The investment thresholds presented here
are thus the maximum allowable cost which have in reality to be undercut for the
aggregator business model to become attractive.
Table E.1 provides an overview of the investment thresholds subject to the load
shift and flexibility scenarios. With longer time horizons and larger flexible volumes
we observe a substantial increase in the investment cost that may be covered by load-
shifting returns.
In addition to determining the feasibility of investment it is relevant to establish by
how much customer prices could potentially be reduced. As customers in competitive
retail markets like the Danish one will have to be convinced of participating in demand
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Table E.1: Investment threshold [EUR/customer]
Load-shift horizon
Flexible share ±1 hour ±3 hours ±6 hours ±9 hours
10% 2.65 8.88 15.97 32.88
20% 5.31 17.76 31.94 65.76
30% 7.96 26.64 47.91 98.64
response activities, a benefit to the customer will be essential. Table E.2 provides an
overview on the leeway that would exist regarding the sales prices based on the full
load-shift effect. The values are therefore equivalent to zero investment costs and, in
practice, any benefit would have to be shared between the customer and the aggregator:
The aggregator needs to cover the investment cost and may want to achieve some
additional margin, while the customer must be provided with an incentive to switch to
the demand-response product.
Table E.2: Maximum price reduction potential [EUR/MWh]
Load shift horizon
Flexible share ±1 hour ±3 hours ±6 hours ±9 hours
10% 0.07 0.25 0.45 0.92
20% 0.15 0.50 0.89 1.84
30% 0.22 0.74 1.34 2.75
Although the absolute price reduction may seem low in comparison to the average
sales price of around 37 EUR/MWh, one can conclude that some of the scenarios hold
a rather attractive relative reduction potential. It has to be noted, though, that we
disregard taxes and network tariffs in our price. Considering these elements, which
make up around 80% of the total residential electricity bill in Denmark (cp. Kitzing
et al., 2016), one could suspect that the potential reductions resulting from our scenarios
may not be sufficient to attract much participation of residential customers.
E.3.2 Results for a distribution of load-shift effects
In addition to analysing the investment thresholds and potential sales price reductions
based on scenario mean values, we assess the probability of achieving a certain benefit.
For this, we determine the probability distributions of the demand response effects
in each scenario. In Figure E.3 we show the distributions for all simulated load-shift
horizons under the scenario with a 20% share of flexible consumption. As the load-
shift horizon is extended, the results become more favourable and move along the
x-axis. At the same time it becomes clear how the distributions get wider and thus the
return becomes more uncertain. Another observation is that all the distributions have a
pronounced upside represented by a thicker tail.
The shapes for other simulated shares of flexibility (10% and 30%) are similar to
those presented in the graph. The 10%-scenario results are slightly narrower and shifted
further towards the left of the x-axis, while the 30%-scenarios are wider and further
towards the right end.
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Figure E.3: Distribution and Value-at-Risk (5%) for different load-shift horizons in the
20%-flex scenario
Assuming that the aggregator decides to invest as soon as the investment cost
undercuts the threshold in the mean outcome, we estimate the Value-at-Risk (VaR)
in case of lower than expected demand response potential. The VaR for the different
scenarios are summarised in Table E.3. For the scenario with a load-shift horizon of 6
hours and a flexibility potential of 20%, for instance, the profitability for the aggregator
would decrease from 18.025% to 17.861% for a 5% VaR, corresponding to a 0.9% decrease
in gross margin. Overall, the margin reductions lie in a range of 0.1–3%. These relatively
small deviations are due to the small share of the load shift benefits in the gross margin
as defined in equation (E.10).
Table E.3: Gross margin at the 5% VaR level [%]
Load-shift horizon
Flexible share ±1 hour ±3 hours ±6 hours ±9 hours
10% 18.004% 17.969% 17.942% 17.838%
20% 17.983% 17.913% 17.861% 17.659%
30% 17.962% 17.858% 17.782% 17.487%
E.4 Discussion
The maximum allowable investment costs lie between 2.65 and 98.64 EUR per customer
in our scenarios, depending on the flexible share and the load-shift horizon. Comparing
these results to the current market conditions is rather difficult as no established market
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exists for neither aggregator businesses nor demand response equipment. Remote
controllable smart plugs are offered in the Danish market for around 50 EUR (cp.
Develco Products, 2016). Such devices have been applied to control single appliances
(see Lakshmanan et al., 2016), but require additional equipment to be installed for
automatic remote control not included in the price. Reverting to other studies, Jötten
et al. (2011) present the cost of automation equipment for three demand response
business cases. One of the cases is similar to the aggregator case in our analysis. In this
case, the required device was provided at a cost of 100 EUR/customer. None of our
scenarios reach above that level. If actual investment cost for automation equipment
will be in this range, we must conclude that in our investigated scenarios for the Danish
market and under current market conditions, the business case for an aggregator will be
rather difficult. Investment cost in the range of 50 EUR/customer can, however, already
provide an interesting business case for aggregators today, depending on the customer
portfolio that they are able to attract.
It may be discussed if our assumptions on the flexibility share and the load-shift
horizon are realistic. We can see that especially the load-shift horizon becomes inter-
esting as soon as it involves the opportunity to benefit from day-to-night differences,
i.e. at ±9 hours and above. But ±6–9 hours load-shifting are already rather optimistic
assumptions for many home appliances, and could certainly not be expected from all
of them. As mentioned freezers will probably have a much shorter time frame for
load shifting. Even heat pump systems might run into problems with such horizons
if storages are not large enough. One could thus expect that the longer the load-shift
horizon the lower the flexible share of the load and vice versa. On the other hand, for
the very short horizon, one could potentially achieve higher flexible shares.
We have made many simplifications in the analysis. One of these is that we operate
with constant investment cost in all scenarios. In reality, one should expect higher
investment cost for getting access to higher flexible shares, because then probably more
appliances have to be equipped with remote control devices at a customer.
Due to the scope of the analysis, it was not possible to consider all kinds of risks
in the aggregator business model. One major risk for an aggregator is not being able
to access flexibility despite of having invested into the demand response equipment.
This risk arises from unforseeable actions by the customers, e.g. if they remove the
remote control device from the appliance, or they remove respective appliances on the
whole. Customers might also unexpectedly shut down appliances, e.g. when going
on holidays and forgetting to inform the aggregator. All such issues pose potential
threats to the business case of an aggregator and will in practice have to be factored into
the calculation of potential sales prices, thus further diminishing potential benefits for
customers.
E.5 Conclusion
Aggregators are expected to become important providers of flexibility in a system that
relies on decentralised demand response. The analysis of a robust business case for
such aggregators should not only take into account average values, but also consider
risks and their implications for income variability and attractiveness of investments.
We have developed a model that is capable of analysing the operational gross margin of
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an aggregator, related investment thresholds and potential sales price reductions. At
the same time, it provides the opportunity to determine probability distributions and
thus enables us to do a Value-at-Risk assessment.
Applying the model to the Danish market, we find that aggregators have a difficult
business case under current market conditions unless they can find a portfolio of
customers with a very high flexibility share of their load and very long load-shifting
horizons. In the residential segment such opportunities are limited at present. On the
other hand, we do see smart devices emerging in the market with investment cost in
a range that could make the business model of an aggregator attractive already today.
Furthermore, we find that the income expectations are rather stable and there is more
upside than downside related to uncertain electricity market price developments and
their exploitation for demand response.
Overall we can conclude that there is still some way to go for aggregators to assume
a significant role as providers of flexibility in the future. In terms of analysis, more must
be done on the evaluation of the business case; all risks must be assessed. An updated
model could, e.g., include implications of volume risk stemming from uncertainty
about the exact response from a portfolio of end user devices. In practical terms, the
business model of aggregators must still be further elaborated, and investment cost
for remote control devices must decrease. Additional sources of income for tapping
into the demand-side flexibility potential could be developed by providing reserves or
ancillary services to the transmission or distribution grid operators. In combination
with foreseeable cost reductions for smart devices the aggregator business case might
soon become attractive for highly flexible customer segments.
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